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Abstract 
This thesis analyses the relationship between health, solidarity, and justice from a 
discourse theoretical perspective. Jürgen Habermas links justice to free, uncoerced, and 
inclusive processes of discursive consensus building. The realisation of these rational 
discourses, however, depends on a sense of solidarity between participants: solidarity is 
the counterpart of justice. Yet, in modern capitalism solidarity is the scarcest social 
resource. This leaves societies with the task of reconstructing the conditions that would 
make solidarity, and therefore justice, sustainable. This thesis argues that health offers 
an important contribution to this project.  
Habermas‟s universal pragmatics is used to analyse different concepts of health, and in 
adopting the perspective of the participant an intersubjective understanding of health is 
proposed. Placed within Habermas‟s theory of society, health is conceptualised as a sub-
system of the lifeworld that contributes to social reproduction at the cultural, normative, 
and personality levels by: reproducing lay and medical knowledge; nurturing social 
solidarity through nets of formal and informal healthcare; and contributing to the 
development of personalities capable of and motivated to joining relationships of mutual 
recognition. These last two contributions reveal the relevance of health in fostering 
conditions for justice.  
The growing literature on the social determinants of health is explored to the conclusion 
that the relationship between health and justice is reciprocal and closer than commonly 
assumed. This insight is then applied to the context of the right to health. The thesis 
refutes different liberal challenges to the right to health and explores the right from the 
perspective of Habermas‟s reconstruction of the system of rights and procedural 
paradigm of law. The thesis concludes that discourse theory provides a better 
understanding of the relationship between health and justice, and therefore, better 
grounds for interpreting health as a legitimate human right. 
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Introduction 
The world today is pervaded by large scale human tragedies. Not far in history from the 
moral shames of the holocaust and Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the commitment of a 
large number of the world‟s nations to the „never again‟ embodied in the United Nations 
Declaration of Human Rights, humanity still watches mass loss of human lives due to 
hunger, genocide, and curable diseases. Commitments that at best have been only partly 
met are not the only reasons, however, that make preventable and human-made human 
suffering in such a scale even more morally disturbing today. Today, preventable human 
suffering and extreme deprivation exist side by side with unprecedented human plenty 
and human thriving. Moreover, technological advances bring human tragedies closer to 
home – in richer and medium income countries most people can watch everyday real 
images of human suffering that before could only be heard of or read about and 
therefore assimilated in our moral imagination in impersonal and attenuated ways. Yet, 
this increased awareness of preventable human suffering and deprivation worldwide, 
does not fully account for the moral uneasiness of our times. 
The multitudes of interconnections that constitute the phenomena of 
globalisation expose more than the appalling realities in which millions of people 
around the world find themselves. They also help expose the ways in which people, 
locally and abroad, directly or indirectly, and intentionally or not, contribute to these 
realities. It is more difficult now than it has been in the past to hide our moral selves 
behind claims of ignorance and innocence. Local decisions are now known to affect 
people‟s lives beyond our localities. Environmental degradation is an oft-cited example, 
as indeed air and water pollution and their impacts on the health of others do not respect 
moral or political boundaries. There are a multitude of ways, some at first sight subtle, 
in which local policies and individual decisions can adversely affect the lives of people 
who are not usually included within the reach of our conventional moral considerations. 
In examining our individual and collective attitudes towards health we can identify 
many examples of these. Consumption of goods the production of which harms people‟s 
health in poorer corners of the world is one example. The casualness with which so 
many people deal with the moral questions related to the potential human impacts, 
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locally and abroad, now and on future generations‟ time, of new medical technologies is 
another.  
Health is in fact paradigmatic of the contradictions and moral turmoil of our 
times. In a time where the „human mastery of nature‟ has allowed the development of 
the technology that is releasing the human cloning project from the category of utopia, 
thousands of people die each day of cheaply preventable and curable diseases. The 
benefits of the extraordinary developments of human knowledge, of an unprecedented 
accumulated wealth, and of the emancipatory ideals of human rights – all highest ideals 
of modernity – are not being enjoyed by all. Indeed, for a significant part of the world‟s 
population, crucially in developing countries, the levels of basic sanitary conditions and 
life expectancy resemble the levels of two hundred years ago. Moreover, social 
institutions in charge of improving populations‟ health conditions both at the national 
and international levels have achieved only limited success.  
Crises in health are most commonly thought to be financial, caused by the 
accelerating costs of medical care and unequal coverage. The reasons for much of the 
failure in improving health conditions across the globe, however, reach far beyond 
matters of cost and distribution. In the academic debate, apart from problems of lack of 
funding and economic viability, other issues such as lack of definition of obligations and 
accountability, the conceptual inappropriateness of the right to health, and even the lack 
of agreement on the definition of health itself are also commonly associated with this 
failure. Yet, more convincingly, there are also studies that associate crises in health with 
social inequality – independent of a given population‟s baseline wealth – and with the 
corrosion of solidarity as an important value for social cohesion and community‟s 
support for health policies and services. These studies suggest that crises in health also 
have a lot to do with the way people relate with each other rather than being solely 
caused by financial, bureaucratic, and conceptual problems.  
A growing body of research have demonstrated, for example, that apart from the 
well-established correlations between social injustice, extreme deprivation, and poor 
health outcomes, health has a more complex set of social determinants.
1
 Among the 
findings that point to this conclusion are data demonstrating that richer countries with 
                                                 
1
 See for example Wilkinson and Pickett, 2009. 
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wide income gaps have worse health outcomes than more egalitarian medium income 
countries. Furthermore, once a certain threshold is reached, increasing absolute wealth 
and increasing expenditure in health care do not always translate in better health 
outcomes. In other words, once a country reaches this threshold, wealth is not the main 
determinant of health, a finding that poses a challenge to the assumption that improving 
health conditions and access to health always involve excessively high costs. Data from 
these studies further demonstrate that different societies have different patterns of social 
cohesion, which constitute one of the explanations for the findings above: more 
cohesive societies have better health outcomes. 
Rob Houtepen and Ruud ter Meullen also associate deficits in social cohesion 
and solidarity with crises in health systems. They point out that in Europe there is a 
widespread belief that healthcare systems are based on the value of solidarity. In the 
Netherlands, for example, solidarity as the basis of health systems, which initially was 
based on commonality such as membership in religious groups and workers unions, was 
progressively expanded to all as society and the health system increased in complexity 
and responsibilities were transferred to the state.
2
 Yet, this extended social solidarity as 
the basis of the system of health care is progressively losing its attractiveness. It is being 
threatened by factors such as budgetary pressures, rising consumerism, and a growing 
individualistic culture.
3
 Together, Houtepen and Meulen warn, not only do these factors 
threaten the maintenance of welfare structures, but they also threaten the very role and 
force of solidarity as a fundamental social value.
4
 What they suggest is that the impacts 
of the corrosion in solidarity reach well beyond structures of health care, affecting 
society as a whole.  
Linking their work on solidarity with the data about the poorer health outcomes 
of societies with low indexes of social cohesion and solidarity, it is possible to 
conjecture that vulnerable individuals living in less cohesive societies are exposed to a 
double risk: they are more likely to get ill and less likely to receive health care. Taken 
together, these studies also point to the conclusion that apart from increasing social 
                                                 
2
 See Houtepen and Meulen, 2000a, pp. 329-330. 
3
 Houtepen and Meulen, 2000a. 
4
 Houtepen and Meulen, 2000a. 
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justice more generally, the way to improving health outcomes also passes by nurturing 
social solidarity. Both projects, i.e. the achievement of social justice and the 
strengthening of solidarity, inevitably involve a profound transformation in the way 
people relate with each other. Moreover, in a complex, globalised world, both projects 
depend on people being able to expand their moral horizons to also include those 
beyond geographical and cultural boundaries.  
Exploring these relationships between health, solidarity, and justice in a complex 
world is therefore the focus of this thesis, and the critical theory of Jürgen Habermas 
provides the theoretical framework guiding this project. Habermas‟s discourse theory is 
ideally suited for this project. Two reasons for that are: (a) its intersubjective outlook, 
and (b) its construction of the relationship between justice and solidarity. 
(a) Habermas rejects the individualism that grounds liberal theories and that 
influences current practices and proposes intersubjectivism as an alternative paradigm. 
This paradigm shift is accomplished through the development of his theory of 
communicative action, which emphasises the fundamental role that language plays in 
creating society and coordinating action. This communicative paradigm represents the 
overcoming of the individualist focus because of the emphasis it places on the 
interactive capacities of human beings as the generator of society and its 
transformations. It is through communicative interactions that individuals make sense of 
and shape the external world, society and their own unique identities. As a result of this 
emphasis placed on interactions, the relationship between the individual and society 
takes a different shape, as the individual is neither seen in antagonism with society nor 
completed dissolved in it. The implication of that to the study of health in its 
relationship with solidarity and justice is that these three concepts have to be construed 
taking this dynamic between individual and society into consideration, i.e. they must 
receive an intersubjective interpretation.  
Health, for example, from an intersubjective perspective, can be construed as a 
sphere of interaction that exposes the vulnerability of the human condition and the 
inevitable interdependence of human beings. An intersubjective understanding of health 
thus, brings debates involving health also within the ethical-moral domain. Therefore, 
health is not only a technical, a medical matter. It is also ethical, moral and political. 
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(b) The intersubjective paradigm also reframes the relationship between justice 
and solidarity. Justice in Habermas‟s theory is linked with the perspective from which to 
judge whether patterns of interaction are equally good for all. In addition, this moral 
point of view is located in actual dialogical deliberation between autonomous 
individuals, who relinquishing violence and coercion must together take the 
responsibility of deciding the norms guiding their interactions. Yet, if these processes of 
deliberation are to work, they require that participants not only be free to expose their 
case and take a yes or no position. They must also be open to the perspective of others 
and feel motivated to leave their immediate interests aside to reach agreements that are 
equally good for all, i.e. individuals must be imbued with a spirit of solidarity and 
concern for the welfare of their fellow members of a communicative community 
committed to mutual understanding and cooperative action. Justice and solidarity, 
therefore, are inseparable partners in this project. One cannot be without the other. The 
implication for the study of health, solidarity and justice is that opens the analysis to 
seeing health not only as a demand of justice and as a product of social solidarity. If a 
health system conceived communicatively can be shown to be a privileged space for the 
nurturing of solidarity, then health contributes to justice too. If successful, this argument 
can provide a more solid support for universal inclusion and participation in the system 
by revealing that a solidaristic health system is equally in the interest of all, including 
those who benefit less from it.  
Methodologically, this thesis adopts both the observer and participant 
perspectives, which complement and inform each other. Chapter 4 is the clearest 
example of the use of this dual perspective. It starts by exploring an intersubjective 
account of health by looking at data and insights produced by empirical works in 
medical sociology and medical anthropology. Later in the chapter this participant 
perspective is complemented by the observer perspective. Together, the insights gained 
with the help of both perspectives lead to the development of a model of health system 
inspired by Habermas‟s concept of communicative action and by his dual approach to 
society. 
The use of this dual perspective also contributes to another methodological 
element of this thesis: its interdisciplinary orientation. To address the task of developing 
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a discourse theoretical account of the relationship between health, solidarity, and justice 
this thesis interacts with perspectives coming from different fields of knowledge, 
including moral theory, sociology, medical sociology, and medical anthropology. The 
intersection between normative theory and empirical health sciences is a rich and fruitful 
space, and its interdisciplinary character can provoke critically different reflections on 
health, justice, and society.  
Habermas‟s critical theory, in fact, stimulates this interdisciplinary orientation. 
This is part of the reason why using discourse theory to explore the relationship between 
health, solidarity, and justice, broadens the scope of analysis on the subject. By 
incorporating a multitude of perspectives Habermas‟s theory conduces to a critical 
analysis that looks not only at how its conception of justice supports inclusive health 
care structures, but also how the patterns of social interactions in the health sphere can 
affect solidarity, and therefore justice. This leads to the conclusion that health and 
justice, construed intersubjectively and through their mutual links with solidarity, have a 
reciprocal relationship. In other words, not only justice affects health, but health can also 
affect justice, and solidarity is the common link that channels their interactions.  
From the perspective of participants in the real world, the advantage of this 
broader understanding of the relationship between health, solidarity, and justice is that it 
brings the possibility of contributing to justice closer to home. In the different and 
shifting roles that individuals assume in their interactions in the health system, they can 
resist the commodification and instrumentalisation of healthcare practices as well as of 
health and its symbolic meanings, contributing therefore to maintain the health system 
as a social space in which social criticism, mutual recognition, and above all solidarity 
can flourish. A thriving solidarity, by its turn, is essential to achieving justice, not only 
in health outcomes but also more broadly.  
1 Outline of chapters 
The argument that health and justice enjoy a reciprocal relationship relies 
heavily on a number of arguments that are part of Habermas‟s discourse theory, 
including the intersubjective constitution of the self, the pragmatics of communication, 
the dual concept of society, the different forms of social reproduction and social 
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integration, the complementarity of law and morality. These arguments by their turn rely 
on a number of other arguments that are fundamental for the understanding of 
Habermas‟s theory. Fully grasping and unravelling the complexity of Habermas‟s work 
is no easy task, and I do not attempt to do it here. Yet, in Chapter 2 I do take the task of 
developing a review of the elements of Habermas‟s work that either directly or 
indirectly relevant to the purposes of this thesis. This review is not comprehensive and it 
leaves out a number of other interesting arguments. Yet, it is also not superficial in the 
arguments it addresses, and as a result, it takes a good part of this thesis. This is for a 
good reason: the arguments developed in the subsequent chapters depend on the 
understanding of Habermas‟s theory and how I use it to develop an understanding of 
health, solidarity and justice. Chapter 2, thus briefly reviews the theoretical foundations 
of the critical theory of Habermas from Kant to the Frankfurt School of Social Sciences, 
passing by Hegel and Marx. It then reviews how Habermas reframes classical themes in 
critical theory and how his communicative theory shapes his account of society, 
morality and justice, and law. 
As Chapter 1 defines the account of justice and solidarity that is used in the 
thesis, Chapter 3 takes the task of exploring the meaning of health. As it finds out, there 
are a multitude of different definitions and perspectives on the subject, which make for a 
lively debate. This debate is explored to reveal the different agendas and worldviews 
behind different accounts of health. A dichotomy is identified between more scientific 
and technical accounts on the one hand and more holistic and social accounts on the 
other. The implications of this dichotomy are analysed in the context of the debate 
surrounding the WHO constitutional definition of health, which is presented as an 
illustration of the social model of health. Using Habermas‟s universal pragmatics the 
chapter concludes that there is no ultimate account of health. Different accounts may be 
valid according not only to their rational justification, but also to their appropriateness to 
the context and the language games that are relevant to this context. In the context of the 
WHO constitution, it is argued that the definition of health should be seen as a claim to 
rightness as opposed to a claim to truth, independently of the validity of the substance of 
the claim. The substance of the claim is criticised not because of its broad scope but 
because of the potential ethical particularism that it represents and the lack of focus on 
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the justice of the interactions that lead to the ill health of populations. The chapter 
concludes that an interpretation of health that is appropriate for the study of the 
relationship between health, solidarity, and justice must account for its intersubjective 
dimension.  
Chapter 4 then takes the task of exploring an intersubjective account of health. 
The starting point of this task is the analysis of the contribution of the anthropological 
perspective on health of Arthur Kleinman and Robert Hahn. Their works demonstrate 
not only the importance of an intersubjective account of health, but also the importance 
of understanding health from the perspective of the participants, i.e. patients, families, 
carers, the public. They also reveal that health and the experiences of illness and 
healthcare are socially and culturally constructed; yet, regardless of how culture 
mediates these experiences in a varied different ways, these experiences retain a 
universal core, namely their intersubjective character. Finally they also expose how 
these experiences of illness and healthcare are imbued with moral and political 
meanings. The intersubjectivity of experiences of illness and healthcare is further 
explored through the analyses of the literature in medical sociology and medical 
anthropology on the subject of experiences of chronic and terminal illnesses and their 
impacts on the self and how social arrangements affect these experiences. This analysis 
concludes that health in its intersubjectivity can be a privileged space for social criticism 
and for the reconstruction of less egocentric and more solidaristic selves.  
This hypothesis is then given more solid analytical form by placing health in 
Habermas‟s dual concept of society. Here, health is construed as a specialised sub-
system of the lifeworld. This construction allows a broader understanding of health, its 
social roles, its crises, and its emancipatory potentials. Health broadly conceived is seen 
as contributing to the lifeworld‟s reproduction and at three different levels: cultural 
reproduction, social integration, and socialisation. At each of these levels, health makes 
use of different forms of knowledge, different moments of reason, and has different 
communicative functions and social contributions. The contribution of health towards 
social integration by nurturing solidarity and relationships of mutual recognition 
grounds the analysis of the relationship between health and justice in Chapter 5.  
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Chapter 5 analyses the relationship between health and justice by critically 
analysing Norman Daniels‟s recent works on the subject and the impacts of recent 
researches on the social determinants of health. Daniels‟s account of the moral 
importance of health as secondary to its role in protecting opportunities is criticised due 
to its focus on distributive justice and neglect of the broader moral relevance of health. 
The contribution of health to fostering solidarity is then juxtaposed to Daniels‟s account 
in order to identify that health enjoys a more significant relationship with justice. 
Because of the solidaristic character of health, the relationship between health and 
justice is then construed as reciprocal, insofar as justice is important to health and health 
is shown as to be also important to justice.  
2 Further comments 
The scope of Habermas‟s work is extraordinary. It encompasses a wide range of 
contributions to different fields of inquiry. By the same token, it invites comments and 
criticisms of an equally extraordinary magnitude. This thesis, therefore, does not assume 
the task of presenting a defence of Habermas‟s oeuvre nor of comparing it with 
competing theories. It already starts with the goal of seeing health and its social and 
moral implications through the lens of discourse theory. Yet, it does not assume that 
Habermas‟s work meets no difficulties. On the contrary, I agree with Joel Anderson, that 
„every system of philosophical ethics has issues it handles well and issues that it handles 
awkwardly.‟5 Habermas‟s theory is no exception. His work, however, offers the most 
promising approach to analyse a world marked by differences, conflicts, injustices and 
lack of mutual understanding, but that is also home to so many examples of human 
decency, cooperation, solidarity, and tolerance. Habermas acknowledges the long and 
ongoing history of moral disasters that are a mark of human societies at the same time 
that he sees in the very core of human sociation the potential for mutual understanding 
and emancipation. In sum, this research aims at locating health – presently (still) in 
crisis – within Habermas‟s theory and evaluating how the relationship between justice, 
solidarity, and health can be approached under the premises of his theory. This should 
                                                 
5
 Anderson 2005, p 821. 
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be seen as a work of cooperation; a work that seeks to contribute to take Habermas‟s 
theory to further directions.  
This research seeks to take Habermas‟s to further directions by filling a gap in 
the literature on Habermas. Developed at a more abstract and conceptual level, his work 
does not deal with the issue of health and its interconnections with justice and society as 
such. Some researchers, mainly in the field of medical sociology, are already 
compensating for this deficit by applying Habermas‟s theory more systematically to 
empirical researches on health.
6
 This thesis, however, is located somewhere in between 
Habermas‟s more general and abstract theory and these more empirical researches. It 
goes a step down Habermas‟s theoretical formulations in applying them to a more 
specific subject such as health; yet, it still develops a perspective on the subject that is 
more general and abstract than more empirical studies in the field. In addition, inspired 
by the tradition of critical theory, the thesis interacts with both philosophical and 
empirical studies. More importantly, in including contributions from medical sociology 
and also from medical anthropology, this thesis is greatly enriched by the 
interdisciplinary flavour that these contributions bring. 
Finally, the motivation behind this work is to contribute to the overall debate on 
health and justice. At a more personal level, as a developing country healthcare 
professional working in a social space in which the boundaries between ill-health and 
social injustice is difficult to define, this contribution symbolises a commitment to a 
much needed change in the patterns of interaction between human beings. Behind this 
motivation lies the conviction, against sceptics and nihilists, that an alternative society is 
still a possibility. This is a conviction, many times weakened and put to test, that I share 
with Habermas and with many other theorists whose inspiring works are informed by an 
inquietude against social injustices and the belief that egocentric individualism is a 
historical and social construction which does not fully account for the much broader and 
richer potentials of social and moral beings. In this sense, this work pays homage to a 
long history of utopian resilience.  
                                                 
6
 See, for example, the essays in Scambler 2001a. As in Scambler‟s words, this collection „sets out to 
begin to make good the neglect of Habermas‟s work within the specialist domain of medical sociology (p 
1)‟.  
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Chapter 2 
THE CRITICAL THEORY OF JÜRGEN HABERMAS – 
FOUNDATIONS AND CENTRAL CONCEPTS  
1 Habermas and the critical theory of the Frankfurt School 
Although critical theory today represents a broad range of theoretical perspectives, it is 
typically associated with the research programme of the Frankfurt Institute of Social 
Research, also known as the Frankfurt School. The institute, founded in 1924, was 
dedicated to the development of a non-orthodox Marxist social theory based on a 
collaborative approach between philosophy and the empirical social sciences. The 
research programme of the Institute takes a critical stance towards orthodox and 
totalitarian strands of Marxism and it incorporates the humanistic legacy of Immanuel 
Kant and G. W. Friedrich Hegel, Max Weber‟s account of modernity, and Freudian 
psychoanalytical theory. In locating critical theory, Max Horkheimer asserts: „critical 
theory is neither “deeply rooted” like the totalitarian propaganda nor “detached” like the 
liberalist intelligentsia‟.7 While maintaining the Marxist critique of capitalism and of the 
bourgeois society, the Institute expands the interpretation of capitalism beyond the 
economic realm. Capitalism is also seen as a pervasive cultural phenomenon, the social 
consequences of which extend beyond economic inequalities, also affecting society‟s 
scientific enterprise, social life and ultimately individuals‟ ego constitution. 
The particular period of history in which Europe was embedded since the 
foundation of the Institute, marked by the rise of fascism and National Socialism, by 
wars, and by Stalin‟s totalitarianism exerted a major influence in the works of its first 
generation of theorists. The core members of the Institute fled Nazi German to work in 
exile in the USA, returning to Frankfurt in 1949. The experiences of the holocaust, but 
also of the rise of consumerism in America, marked the pessimistic tone of the works of 
the Institute that followed this period. 8 
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Habermas joined the institute in 1956, and he is considered the main voice of its 
second generation of theorists. The experience of the holocaust has also deeply 
influenced his work.9 The realisation of the horrifying extent of the war crimes 
influenced his work as much as what he perceived as the uncritical return to normality 
of German society in the years that followed the war. Yet, in contrast with the first 
generation of the Frankfurt School, Habermas‟s work is characterised by a more positive 
approach to the potentials of modernity. He rejects his predecessors‟ nihilism and 
scepticism towards modern rationality and argues that the crises that affect society are 
not the result of an all-encompassing instrumental rationality and inexorable reification 
of social life in modernity. On the contrary, he argues that crises arise because of a one-
sided approach to modern rationalisation. The possibility of human emancipation passes 
by the completion, and not the rejection, of the project of modernity.10 
In order to overcome the negative view of modernity that characterised the later 
works of the first generation of the Frankfurt School, apart from the classical works that 
influenced critical theory, Habermas also incorporated insights from a wide range of 
theoretical developments of the 20th century – from psychoanalysis to systems theory, 
passing by American pragmatism, hermeneutics, and philosophy of language to name a 
few. The result is the development of a broad and influential theory of modern society. 
To understand Habermas‟s work, and how his different strands of arguments are brought 
together, it is necessary to discuss some of critical theory‟s classical frameworks which 
Habermas has appropriated and reinterpreted in the light of his communicative 
paradigm.  
2 The Foundations of critical theory – central frameworks 
2.1 Kant and the Enlightenment’s reason  
Kant‟s work has a strong influence in Habermas‟s work; most notably in Habermas‟s 
theory of morality. Kant is perhaps the most prominent and influential thinkers of the 
Enlightenment, famously heralding the role of reason in overcoming the obstacles to 
human freedom. According to Kant, the Enlightenment, 
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is man‟s emergence from his self-imposed immaturity. Immaturity is the inability to use one‟s 
understanding without guidance from another. This immaturity is self-imposed when its cause 
lies not in lack of understanding, but in lack of resolve and courage to use it without guidance 
from another. Sapere Aude! [dare to know] „Have courage to use your own understanding‟ – that 
is the motto of enlightenment.
11
 
For Kant, then, immaturity means the attitude of delegating to external sources, such as 
religious and public authorities, the task of providing one‟s life perspectives. This 
delegating attitude, he argues, can only lead to loss of freedom, as freedom is only 
possible in using one‟s own understanding, one‟s own reason.12  
 The central role accorded to reason by the Enlightenment is at the heart of an 
ongoing intellectual dispute, which today divides critical theory as the dispute between 
„rationalists‟ – among whom Habermas is included – and post-modernists testify. Since 
Kant this dispute, among other issues, revolves around (a) the subject of reason and (b) 
the role of reason.  
(a) Kant states that reason is an innate characteristic of the human being. 
Borrowing from the Cartesian model of reflexive self-consciousness (ego cogito), and 
its subject-object model of speculation, Kant argues that through rational reflection the 
individual can „know‟ the world;13 the sphere of a knowledgeable world including the 
natural world, social processes, and the subject itself. As a result, reason plays an 
important role in moral theory too. Rejecting traditional and taken-for-granted sources 
of moral normativity, Kant argues that the individual in autonomous self-reflection is 
able to grasp the rational moral point of view by projecting a universal moral 
perspective applicable to all.14 This reflection allows the individual to „know‟ the moral 
law which prescribes the right course of action, i.e. the categorical imperative: „[t]here is 
only one single categorical imperative and this is: act only on that maxim through which 
you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law‟.15 To act rationally 
and autonomously for Kant, is to choose to act in accordance with the universal moral 
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law that the individual has grasped herself.16 This absolute self-consciousness of the 
subject and the moral prescriptivism of Kantian moral theory is the focus of Hegel‟s 
critique of Kant, which still significantly influences the critics of modern thought.  
b) In Kant‟s three critiques,17 he reinforces the role of reason against dogmatism, 
and for Habermas, this marks an important point of reference for critical theory, namely 
the possibility of rational scrutiny of society and its institutions instead of judging them 
according to their conformity to pre-given sets of rules.18 Kant also divides reason in 
three different moments: theoretical knowledge, practical reason and judgement. These 
three moments would correspond respectively to the capacity of the subject to develop 
objective knowledge about the natural world, moral insight, and aesthetic evaluation. As 
a result of these different moments of reason, spheres of knowledge are separated: 
morality, science, arts, and so forth. In addition, the separation of spheres also happens 
institutionally. In line with natural law tradition, Kant separates the domain of morality 
as the normative guide of private life, and the domains of law and politics as the 
normative guides of public life.19  
Kant‟s differentiation of reason and consequent separation of the spheres of 
science, morality and art is also criticised by Hegel as a fragmentation of the ethical life. 
The echoes of this critique are found in the works of the first generation of the Frankfurt 
School and in much of the works of the critics of modernity – communitarians, 
feminists, and post-modernists included. Habermas, however, appropriates central 
insights of Kant‟s account of reason and its different moments. Combining this account 
with insights from Weber‟s theory of differentiation of modern society, Habermas 
reinterprets the different roles of reason in modern society and accounts for social 
pathologies as misplacements of reason in its different roles as opposed to challenging 
reason altogether. 
This is not to say that Habermas is not critical of Kant. On the contrary, he also 
incorporates insights from Hegel‟s critique of Kant, such as the critique of Kant‟s 
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conception of the individual as a decontextualised being. Some of Hegel‟s critiques of 
Kant follow below. 
2.2 The ambivalence towards the Enlightenment– Hegel and Marx 
2.2.1 Hegel 
Habermas sees Hegel as the first thinker to develop an adequate account of modernity 
and its contradictions.20 In fact, Hegel‟s relationship with the reflexivity of modernity is 
ambivalent. He welcomes, on the one hand, modern developments such as civil society, 
the individual right to question norms and institutions, and the pluralism of life 
projects.21 On the other hand, he is critical of (a) Kant and natural law theories for the 
modern culture of bifurcation and split in ethical life, and of (b) modern alienation and 
reification. Hegel‟s work is generally divided in two phases: the young Hegel, critic of 
modernity and its bifurcations, and the later Hegel, guided by (c) the idea of the all-
encompassing Geist. 
(a) It is in the first phase of his works that Hegel develops a critique of Kant and 
of natural right theories. For Hegel, the separation of the spheres of morality and legality 
amounts to a dissolution of the ethical life.22 He describes modernity as a culture of 
bifurcation, manifested in the separation of inner nature and life in society, individual 
and the community, senses and understanding, inclination and will, necessity and 
freedom, fact and value, knowledge and faith, and so forth. According to Hegel, natural 
law theories are guilty of imposing arbitrary divisions in ethical life. Furthermore, 
Kant‟s moral formalism and abstraction make his theory ahistorical, blind to the 
historical contingency of the „autonomous individual‟. As a shortcoming of that, his 
theory fails to engage real people and fails to address the experiences of the community 
in the real world. 23 The premise of the ethical life constituting a totality underlies this 
Hegelian critique. Accordingly, Hegel sees in the overcoming of bifurcations the 
solution for modern crises. The premise of an ethical totality also supports his later 
                                                 
20
 Habermas, 1987b, pp. 23–44 and Edgar, 2005a, p. 195. 
21
 Habermas, 1997, pp. 16–7. 
22
 Benhabib, 1986, p. 27. 
23
 See Edgar, 2005a, pp. 194–5 and Benhabib, 1986, Chapter 3. 
23 
development of a theory of history as the necessary process of Geist reconciliating with 
itself and regaining its lost unity. 
(b) Labour for Hegel is the fundamental way through which the individual 
relates to her object, humanises it, and becomes conscious of herself: 
Man brings himself before himself by practical activity; ... This aim he achieves by altering 
external things whereon he impresses the seal of his inner being and in which he now finds again 
his own characteristics. Man does this in order, as a free subject, to strip the external world of its 
inflexible foreignness and to enjoy in the shape of things only an external realisation of 
himself.
24
 
Because of that, Hegel associates the excessive development of modern industry and its 
mechanistic way of production with the alienation of the modern individual.25 In contrast 
with individuals of less complex societies, who directly produce the goods to satisfy 
their own needs and in so doing make sense of the world and of themselves, modern 
individuals cannot fully relate the product of their work with their needs or themselves.26  
Apart from labour, Hegel conceives another medium by which the subject relates 
with the world: interaction. 27 Through this medium, the relationship between subject and 
object that characterises labour gives way to a relationship between subjects. This is the 
realm of morality; the realm in which, through interaction, subjects reconciliate with 
each other.28 Reconciliation for Hegel translates the recognition of the self in the other 
through relationships of love and mutual recognition. These relations are nonetheless 
fragile, and their disintegration leads to a failure in mutual recognition and a loss of 
sense of community. In other words, the subject is alienated from others.29 
In the Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel introduces the concept of reification, 
which translates the idea that in conditions of alienation the interaction between subjects 
takes the form of relations between subjects and objects. In failing to recognise 
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themselves in others subjects have the impression that the rules that govern their 
interaction are akin to the laws of nature. Under reification, subjects fail to realise that 
the rules governing their interaction are not natural, but a human-constituted social and 
historical reality.30 As it will be seen below, Hegel‟s concepts of modern alienation and 
reification in modernity are profoundly influential in the works of Marx, Western 
Marxists and the Frankfurt School theorists. 
(c) A more conciliatory relationship with modernity, moved by his concept of 
Geist as the subject of history, characterises Hegel‟s later work. For Hegel, despite all 
human suffering and lack of sense, history is a reasonable process, a dialectical 
progression whose ultimate goal is to achieve its final stage of freedom and 
reconciliation.31 The subject of this history is Geist, or Being in its process of Becoming, 
and human history is the history of this development.32. Becoming is the process of 
Being reaching its unity with not-Being. Yet, to reach this final stage of unity, Being has 
to pass through a process of self-estrangement, of alienation from itself. This alienation, 
according to Hegel, is only possible with the creation of the world – the expression of its 
otherness. In the unfolding of world‟s history, Being progressively becomes self-
conscious until the final stage of ultimate reconciliation with itself, the moment of 
ethical totality.33  
The process of modern alienation, therefore, becomes for Hegel a necessary 
process of the historical Geist. Like Geist, human beings have to overcome alienation 
through reconciliation with what is seen as external to them. The overcoming of this 
division is for Hegel, a fundamental human drive.34 In addition, Hegel believes that the 
reconciliation of Geist in modern societies can be achieved only by means of the State 
and its strong crisis management capacity. This privileging of administrative integration 
over political participation has attracted much criticism.35  
2.2.2 Marx 
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Karl Marx is, as Hegel, ambivalent towards the ideals of the Enlightenment. Although 
Hegel‟s critique of natural law theories and concept of alienation influence Marx 
greatly, he is also influenced by Kant‟s conception of human beings as autonomous and 
rational beings who require freedom to realise their full potentials.36 Marx‟s critique, 
rather than doing away with modern ideals, aims at revealing their instrumentalisation to 
serve the ends of the bourgeoisie alone.37 In fact, Marx sees an emancipatory potential in 
the normative and technical development of modern society. The bourgeois ideology of 
change and growth, as opposed to a traditional ideology of order and stability, is seen 
positively as a feature not to be overcome, but extended to all.38 For Marx, the economy 
and the industry are human creations that should be brought under human control and 
serve the common good.39 Marx builds his works from a range of different influences: 
apart from Hegel, Kant, and French socialism, his philosophy is also influenced by 
British political economy,40 and an emphatic focus on political economy dominates his 
work. 
Marx‟s work is majorly influential in the political and intellectual movements of 
the 20th century. Despite the failure of the totalitarian strand of socialism of the Soviet 
regime, Marxism still remains influential –mostly in revised forms – in many academic 
and political circles. The critical theory of the Frankfurt School, through its 
reinterpretation of Marx‟s work contributed to this ongoing influence. Two of the most 
important Marxian themes reviewed by the Frankfurt School are: (a) Marx‟s philosophy 
of history, and (b) Marx‟s materialistic interpretation of Hegel‟s concept of reification.  
(a) Marx conceives human beings as free and creative beings who shape the 
world beyond mere physical need. Through creative, purposeful labour, human beings 
become fully human. Echoing Hegel, labour is for Marx the vital essence of human 
beings, the media for self-development and for world constitution. Furthermore, truly 
human labour is not done out of physical necessity, but done as an end in itself. The 
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work of art, in particular, is for Marx the highest expression of the human essence.41 In 
addition, through labour, human beings not only produce goods and creatively shape 
material objects, but they also produce social categories such as language, family and 
justice.42 According to Habermas, because Marx focuses on the critique of the economy, 
he does not capture the role that other social domains play in sustaining and in resisting 
capitalism; this failure eventually limited his construction of an alternative to 
capitalism.43 
In tune with Hegel, Marx sees the modern condition under capitalism as a barrier 
for the fully human realisation through labour. Capitalism alienates humans from the 
world and from themselves. Humans receive no satisfaction from their labour, and 
productive and creative life is distorted. Apart from the alienation from labour, workers 
are also alienated from other human beings, as their relations are now relations of 
competition for labour. More than that, struggling to maintain their physical existence, 
and only merely so, workers are ultimately alienated from their vital essence of human 
beings.44 
Whereas for Hegel the solution lies in the overcoming of the bifurcation of 
ethical life, for Marx it lies in the overcoming of capitalism through the reappropriation 
of the social wealth accumulated by capitalism and put it at the service of human ends.45 
Although Marx incorporates Hegel‟s philosophy of history as the necessary unfolding of 
stages towards the ultimate freedom, he does so materialistically. Rejecting the idealism 
of Hegel‟s Geist, Marx conceives history as the unfolding of the dialectical relationship 
between forces of production. Following Hegel‟s dialectics which argues that every 
stage in history develops its own contradictions and the principles of its dissolution, 
Marx argues that the contradictions of capitalism will lead to its own dissolution, 
ultimately ending in the communalisation of the social and material wealth accumulated 
by capitalism. At this stage, the state, the political, and the juridical will become 
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redundant.46 In Marx, thus, the subject of history is not Geist, but humanity, and the 
revolutionary agent in the overcoming of capitalism in name of humanity is not the 
bourgeoisie, but the proletariat. 
(b) In The Capital, Marx introduces a materialist version of Hegel‟s concept of 
reification: the fetishism of commodities in which socio-historical developments present 
themselves to social actors as natural orders. In Marx‟s interpretation, in capitalism the 
relationship between human beings acquires the logic of a relationship between things. 
To make exchanges possible, capitalism needs to establish the value of qualitatively 
different products and human labours in relation to a form of equivalent. Money, as the 
universal equivalent in capitalism, thus regulates all exchange relations, including 
human labour for wages. As everything has its value measured according to the 
universal equivalent of money, even social relations become mediated in the form of 
commodities. The rules regulating this process, notes Marx, appear to exist apart from 
themselves,47 and as a result, human beings conceive themselves as commodities, and 
their consciousness become „commodity consciousnesses‟. Undermined of the 
possibility of self-determination, the individual becomes the economic individual.48 
Marx aims with this critique at „defetishising‟ reality and returning it to the control of 
individuals. This materialistic interpretation of Hegel‟s reification will be taken up by 
Western Marxists, the Frankfurt School, and by Habermas. Habermas will reinterpret 
the category of reification in the light of his dual concept of society. 
2.3 Modernity and the pathologies of reason – Weber 
Weber‟s influence in Habermas‟s work is in great part due to his theory of modern 
differentiation, including the differentiation of reason in two forms, formal and 
substantive. This differentiation allows Weber to explain dysfunctions in social life in 
terms of the misplacement of these forms of reason, an insight that Habermas 
incorporates. According to Weber, processes of Western modernisation and 
industrialisation are marked by a progressive rationalisation of the formal kind, and it is 
the growing dominance of this form of rationality that leads to social dysfunctions.  
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Formal, or purposive, rationality, which becomes progressively dominant in 
modern life, is characterised by practical assessments of reality and by an objectifying, 
means-to-an-end attitude towards it. With modernisation, reality is progressively 
apprehended and formulated abstractively, allowing the prediction and the control of 
phenomena. Ends become precisely calculated and achieved. The systematisation of 
means to desired ends, then leads to the development of laws, rules, and regulations that 
make possible the technological control over nature and strategic control over human 
beings.49 This purposive rationality is also progressively extended to ethical life at the 
expense of a substantive, or value, rationality. Substantive rationality, involves moral 
and expressive assessments of reality, in which the conformity of an action is evaluated 
according to accepted values, without a necessary regard for the consequences of the 
action.  
The progressive formal rationalisation results in loss of meaning and loss of 
freedom. Analysing the effects of rationalisation in the realm of religion, Weber argues 
that mystical and metaphysical processes are progressively subjected to rational 
assessment; their own propositions are required to become consistent internally and with 
a world thinking in terms of causal relations.50 This process leads to a loss of meaning, 
or „disenchantment‟ with ethical life. The realm of culture also suffers with a 
progressive differentiation between art, religion, sciences and ethics. Gradually, the 
social mediation among these spheres fails, and social meaning is also lost. 
Disenchantment, then, spreads to everyday life.51 When formal rationality progressively 
spreads to the realms of law, the State and social organisations, it subjects the social to 
processes of increasing bureaucratic control, which individuals cannot avoid, reverse or 
control, being therefore condemned to live within an „iron cage‟ of bureaucracy.52 A loss 
of freedom then ensues. 
Weber‟s tone is ultimately pessimistic as he perceives disenchantment as an 
irreversible process in which nothing seems to make sense to individuals. His 
pessimistic tone towards modern rationality and towards the insidious 
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instrumentalisation of all spheres life is later echoed by the first generation of the 
Frankfurt School, most notably in the post-war period.  
2.4 Reification – Lukács and the Frankfurt School 
The rise of the totalitarian socialist regime in the Soviet Union, the failure of the 
revolution in other European countries, and the gloomy political situation of the early 
20th century in Europe led many Marxists theorists to reformulate classical Marxian 
premises and to include non-Marxist theses into their work. That included parting ways 
with the economic orthodoxy and embracing a cultural interpretation of capitalism. 
György Lukács and the Frankfurt School represent this development in Marxist thought, 
and their broadened analysis of reification is an example of this paradigm change.53 
Lukács criticises Marx for failing to grasp the capitalist power of social control 
that reaches beyond the economic realm.54 According to Lukács reification is the 
distorted perception of all relations within capitalism as being relations between things. 
Bringing together Marx and Weber, Lukács abandons the orthodoxy by arguing that the 
Marxist concept of fetish of commodities and Weber‟s theory of formal rationalisation 
are aspects of the same process.55 Beyond economic relations, in capitalism all spheres 
of social relations become reified.56 Yet, contrary to Weber and closer to Marxism, 
Lukács argues that reification is not irreversible but a feature of capitalist society that 
can be overcome.57  
The development of history and society is, for Lukács, a typical example of 
reification: being constructed along thousands of years of human activity, it is 
nonetheless perceived as the result of natural forces beyond human control.58 Yet, the 
highest level of reification is manifested in the incapacity of human beings to realise the 
preconceptions of their own thought; the reification of thought in bourgeois philosophy 
and social sciences being a especial case in point.59 
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Although Lukács tries to adjust Marxist theory to the new contexts of capitalism, 
he is still attached to its orthodoxy for seeing the proletariat as the revolutionary agent. 
Although both are reified, the bourgeoisie and the working class perceive crises 
differently. According to Lukács, because the bourgeoisie leads a comfortable life, it is 
less able to realise its own objectification.60 In contrast, the theorists at the Frankfurt 
School abandon the thesis of the proletariat as the revolutionary subject. Despite sharing 
with Lukács the importance of grasping capitalism beyond its economic realm, they are 
less confident than Lukács that capitalism is in crises. On the contrary, their focus of 
concern turns to its continuing stability.61 The pervasiveness of modern instrumental 
reason is the main phenomena they associate with the possibility of the growing strength 
of capitalism.  
For Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno, modern reason is committed to the 
instrumental achievement of ends, and in such a way that it becomes subjective to the 
choice of ends, validated in reference to their achievement, and refractory to criticism 
based on meanings and values.62 Instrumental reason is so pervasive that it also becomes 
internalised by the super-ego. Because of this internalisation of an instrumental logic, 
Horkheimer and Adorno argue that self-preservation becomes the only rational choice to 
individuals. For self-preservation, the individual has to alienate itself from its natural 
impulses by submitting to and incorporating the logic of a technocratic, „administered 
world‟. In so doing, the individual too, just as reality, becomes predictable and subject to 
control and manipulation.63 The manipulative power of the mass media and of the 
culture industry is an example of the manipulation of individual choices.64 
Finally, the pervasiveness of instrumental rationality and its internalisation as 
super-ego impede individuals to critically apprehend reality and its reification. 
Contrarily to Lukács, Horkheimer and Adorno do not see reification as a feature of 
capitalism, but the very reason why capitalism becomes a historical possibility.65 As they 
conclude, instead of freeing the world from the mythical, the Enlightenment itself 
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„relapse into mythology‟. Despite its claims of the power of reason to challenge 
metaphysics and traditions, the Enlightenment itself becomes dogmatic and ultimately 
self-destructive:66  
Enlightenment, understood in its widest sense as the advance of thought, has always aimed at 
liberating human beings from fear and installing them as masters. Yet, the wholly enlightened 
earth is radiant with triumphant calamity. Enlightenment‟s program was the disenchantment of 
the world. It wanted to dispel myths, overthrow fantasy with knowledge.
67
 
For Adorno, freedom requires the recognition of the internalisation of authority 
and repression by the subject and the overcoming of the narcissistic self-relation through 
the reconciliation of self with „nature‟, the otherness of society and reason.68 Ultimately, 
however, neither Adorno nor Horkheimer hope that this disenchantment can be 
reversed. Overcoming this nihilism and conformism, while at the same validating 
elements of their powerful critique, is one of the purposes of Habermas in developing 
his communicative action theory. Freedom and reconciliation in Habermas will be 
construed as „sociation without repression‟ through intact intersubjectivity and relations 
of mutual understanding and recognition.69 
2.5 Philosophy of consciousness 
Before discussing how Habermas proposes a change of paradigm in critical theory, a 
brief discussion about the concept of the philosophy of consciousness is needed. 
Philosophy of consciousness is a set of methodological presuppositions about the 
subject of enquiry that is shared by all the thinkers above and that Habermas seeks to 
overcome.  
One characteristic of the philosophy of consciousness is the primacy given by 
theorists to the individual or the subject, who in relation-to-itself mentally represents 
and manipulates objects or the world external to itself. Two aspects of this perspective 
are important. The first aspect is its social atomism, which is the conception of 
individuals in separation from others and the social context. The interactive sphere of 
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individuals and the role of society in constituting the subject are therefore not 
contemplated.70 Typical examples of this paradigm are the natural law metaphors of 
fully constituted individuals that come together with the objective of forming 
associations. In these metaphors, individuals are logically constructed as prior to society. 
Accordingly, the attachment of the individual with its social medium tends to be seen as 
instrumental to their natural and individual purposes. Kant is another example of this 
primacy attached to the subject. His moral theory, for example, is wholly based on the 
self-reflexive capacity of the individual, who is able – in monologue – to grasp the 
moral point of view. Habermas overcomes this monological construction of the moral 
point of view by locating it in the plurality of voices of interacting individuals. 
The second important aspect of this perspective is the way in which the subject 
relates with the world: through a subject-object pattern of interaction. The subject 
objectifies and manipulates the world – external, social and internal – in order to grasp 
it.71 Hegel‟s and Marx‟s concept of work are examples of this view. As seen above, both 
thinkers see work, the manipulation of the external world, as the way through which the 
individual overcomes bifurcation towards reconciliation or realises her full human 
essence. Habermas disagrees with this view that through objectification subjects 
constitute the world. He defends that it is in fact through interacting with each other that 
subjects constitute their world.  
The lonely self of the philosophy of consciousness, therefore, makes sense of the 
world either by thinking and interpreting it – a cogitative self – or by working and 
transforming it – an acting self. In either case, the self is conceived abstractly, it is 
detached from its social peers, and it characteristically performs an objectifying 
(subject-object) interaction with the world, others and even oneself. The world, 
therefore, is seen as an object of the self‟s acts or interpretations.72 
 Finally, another form of manifestation of the philosophy of consciousness is the 
focus not on the subject, but on a macrosubject. In this case, individuals are merged into 
the unity of a single macrosubject. Hegel‟s and Marx‟s philosophy of history illustrate 
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well this concept of a macrosubject. For Hegel the macrosubject of history is Geist in 
the process of reconciliation with itself, whereas the macrosubject of history for Marx is 
humanity in its course of overcoming capitalism towards the ultimate utopia of 
freedom.73  
According to Habermas, from Kant to Adorno and Horkheimer, all the thinkers 
discussed above subscribe, in different forms, to the philosophy of consciousness. This 
paradigm limits their analysis of social and political problems insofar as it prevents them 
to fully explore the role of interaction, of intersubjectivity, and of communication in 
shaping and maintaining social life. This shortcoming in their theories is what Habermas 
aims at overcoming through a paradigm change towards mutual understanding. This 
new paradigm allows him to reinterpret central critical theoretical themes in a broader 
and more positive light. This endeavour culminates in A Theory of Communicative 
Action and it profoundly shapes his subsequent works. 
3 Habermas’s discourse theory 
Habermas‟s work is grounded on modernity, its ideals and its unfinished project. He 
identifies the emancipatory potentials at the heart of modern ideals and accounts for the 
social pathologies that have hindered their full realisation. Ultimately, his aim is to 
uncover the necessary conditions for the completion of the modern project of radical 
democracy.  
Inspired by the philosophy of language, Habermas proposes a paradigm change 
in critical theory from the foundationalism of the philosophy of consciousness to the 
pragmatism of communication theory. Communicative action is the central concept that 
results from this paradigm shift. It is based on the role that language and communication 
play in structuring social interactions and coordinating actions. The development of the 
concept of communicative action, by its turn, is dependent on two other important 
frameworks that underpin Habermas‟s theories: intersubjectivity and post-conventional 
world orientation. Together these frameworks help Habermas reinterpret classical 
themes in philosophy and sociology, most notably critical theory‟s critique of capitalism 
and of modern rationality.  
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A Theory of Communicative Action is Habermas‟s seminal work on the subject 
and it shapes his subsequent works in moral, legal and democratic theory. In this work, 
he accounts for the duality of modern rationality and proposes a dual model of social 
analysis based simultaneously on the methodologically distinct perspectives of lifeworld 
and systems theory. The goals are to reconstruct a critical theory that is better suited to 
the study of modern society in its growing complexity and set a proposal for social 
redirection guided by the concept of communicative action. 
From a methodological perspective, A Theory of Communicative Action consists 
in the reconstruction of major works of the three thinkers whom Habermas‟s calls „the 
founding fathers of modern sociology‟, namely Weber, George Herbert Mead and Émile 
Durkheim.74 From Weber, and his Marxist commentators Lukács and the Frankfurt 
School theorists, Habermas incorporates perspectives on modern rationality; from Mead 
he incorporates insights from the theory of the communicative foundations of society; 
and finally, from Durkheim he incorporates analyses on social solidarity.75 Habermas‟s 
reconstructions of these theories aim at freeing them from the shortcomings of the 
philosophy of consciousness.76 A critical interpretation of Adorno‟s ideas of freedom 
and reconciliation, through which Habermas projects an ideal community of 
communication and of undamaged intersubjectivity and mutual understanding, adds an 
element of utopia and idealism to his theory of communicative action.77 
The engagement with Weber, Mead, Durkheim and Adorno also leads to critical 
analyses of the works of a number of other influential thinkers in a broad array of fields, 
among which are: Ludwig Wittgenstein, Charles Sanders Pierce, John L. Austin, John 
Searle, Jean Piaget, Talcott Parsons and Niklas Luhmann. In fact, these critical 
„dialogues‟ with classical and contemporary thinkers and the mediation of antagonisms 
between their contrasting theories are hallmarks of Habermas‟s method. As Thomas 
McCarthy describes, for Habermas these thinkers are  
still very much alive. Rather than regarding them as so many corpses to be dissected 
exegetically, he treats them as virtual dialogue partners from whom a great deal that is of 
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contemporary significance can still be learned. The aim (…) is to excavate and incorporate their 
positive contributions, to criticize and overcome their weaknesses, by thinking with them to go 
beyond them.
78
 
The result is a combination of historical and systematic reconstructions of ideas that if 
sometimes challenging to the reader, also brings a fascinating breadth and depth to his 
work. This richness is one of the reasons that make his work promising to the analysis of 
healthcare, its social role, and its relationship with justice. The elements of Habermas‟s 
work that are most relevant to this project are introduced bellow. 
3.1 Critique of modern individualism and the intersubjective turn  
In contrast with anti-modernist critical theory, Habermas does not regard the crises of 
modernity as resulting from the ideals of the Enlightenment. Rather, Habermas contends 
that these crises arise from the one-sidedness in their application.79 The much-criticised 
individualism that flows from the liberal interpretation of modern ideals is one important 
example of this. While many critics claim that the modern focus on the individual has 
led to the egoistic and domineering practices that characterise Western culture, 
Habermas does not locate the problem in the process of modern individuation per se, but 
in the narrow understanding of what it entails.80 He welcomes modern processes of 
individuation and the modern ideal of individual freedom to pursue one‟s life projects. 
Bringing the individual to the centre of the moral focus facilitated, for example, the 
break with the authority of rules imposed by aristocratic power, kinship ties, tradition, 
and religion in favour of reflexive sources of authority.81 The problem arises when this 
process of individualisation is stretched so far as to detach the individual from her social 
background, as classical liberalism is a case in point. 
In its classical expressions, liberalism has accounted for the process of 
socialisation through metaphors of pre-social individuals, who come together with the 
objective of forming associations in the name of prudence, stable conditions for trade, 
peace, or cooperation. These metaphors illustrate the centrality of the individual and the 
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derivative and instrumental character of society in the liberal school of thought. 
Habermas is critical of this theoretical self, who prior to socialisation is already 
constituted and fully aware of her interests.82 For Habermas, this conception misses the 
point that the self can only become an „I‟ by interacting with others.83 According to this 
insight, individuals only form their personal identity through socialisation processes, as 
it is in the web of interpersonal relations that the self shapes and maintains its unique 
identity, from which therefore flow its own conceptions of the good. In other words, for 
Habermas, individualisation follows socialisation and not the other way round.84  
The methodological solipsism of the „unencumbered self‟, which liberals share 
with many other theories is, as seen above, an expression of the philosophy of 
consciousness. Habermas‟s intersubjectivist insight, in contrast, understands that the 
subject relates to others in a subject-subject pattern of interaction, and this interaction is 
fundamentally grounded in communication. He replaces the objectifying stance of the 
subject for a model of interaction in which subjects taking the alternating roles of 
hearers and speakers meet each other in a non-objectivating fashion. More specifically, 
it is in communicative practices of reaching an understanding with others that subjects 
interact to establish their relation with the world, with others and with themselves.85 As 
he explains, 
In order to reach an understanding about something, participants must not only understand the 
meaning of the sentences employed in their utterances, they must also be able to relate to each 
other in the role of speakers and hearers – in the presence of bystanders from their (or from a ) 
linguistic community. The reciprocal interpersonal relations that are established through the 
speaker-hearer perspectives make possible a relation-to-self that by no means presupposes the 
lonely reflection of the knowing and acting subject upon itself as an antecedent consciousness. 
Rather, the self-relation arises out of an interactive context.
86
 
Intersubjectivity through linguistic communication, therefore, constitutes 
Habermas‟s dialogical answer to the methodological monologue of the philosophy of 
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consciousness.87 Importantly, the theory of the intersubjective constitution of the self 
allows the critique of liberal individualism without forgoing the gains of individual 
freedom and individuation. More than that, this necessary mediation between the 
individual and her community also overcomes the old opposition between 
communitarianism and liberal individualism.88 This is because relinquishing the 
monological self did not lead Habermas to embrace the view from the other end of the 
spectrum which accords the priority of the community or of an ethics of the good life. 
On the contrary, he rejects that in conditions of modernity it is possible to formulate an 
overarching conception of the good.89 It is no longer possible to rely on sources of 
normativity based on tradition, religion, or metaphysics to provide a set of rules of 
conduct or a comprehensive view of what a worthwhile life is. In modernity, there is no 
pre-given and privileged standpoint enjoying the ability to grasp totality and the 
supremacy to conceive definitive claims to truth or rightfulness.90 Rather, the modern 
plurality of world-views calls for the recognition of individual autonomy and demands 
that conflicting interpretations of reality and the definition of accepted standards of 
behaviour be solved in dialogical reflection.91 As Habermas clarifies his standpoint, 
Discourse ethics occupies an intermediate position, sharing with the „liberals‟ a deontological 
understanding of freedom, morality, and law that stems from the Kantian tradition and with the 
communitarians an intersubjective understanding of individuation as a product of socialization 
that stems from the Hegelian tradition.‟92 
 In A Theory of Communicative Action and subsequent works classical concepts 
are reconstructed intersubjectively. The reconstruction of modern rationality, in which 
reason is grounded in communicative processes of reaching an understanding with 
others, is an important example of the centrality of the concept of intersubjectivity.  
3.2 The theory of communicative action 
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Underpinning the political and economic transformations brought by modernity, such as 
civil liberties, the political power of free public debates, and private freedom of pursuing 
one‟s own concept of the good life, lies the concept of modern reason.93 According to 
Habermas, it was modern reason what stood in opposition to taken-for-granted beliefs 
and the force of traditions of pre-modern times.94 This modern process of 
„rationalisation‟ was marked by the substitution of a once unified worldview – grounded 
on the sacred, hierarchical or traditional sources of authority – by differentiated, 
decentred and independent social spheres, such as the economy, politics, law, religion, 
and sciences. In becoming differentiated, these spheres started operating according to 
their own internal logic and independently from the other spheres. If on the one hand 
this process of progressive differentiation permitted an unprecedented accumulation of 
wealth and knowledge, on the other hand it posed a serious threat to social integration 
by failing to put in place alternatives to maintain a social cohesion previously secured by 
traditional forms of life and religious authority. 95 As critics of modernity point out, what 
resulted from these transformations promoted by modern reason was not fulfilment of 
the emancipatory promises of modernity. On the contrary, these transformations came at 
a cost of progressive loss of ethical meaning, loss of freedom and social disintegration.96 
 As seen above, most influentially Weber, later followed by Horkheimer and 
Adorno, develop this line of critique against modern rationality. While incorporating 
elements of Weber‟s critique, Habermas does not share Weber‟s negativity towards 
modern reason. Contrarily to most critics of modernity, in criticising modern 
transformations and their pathologies he does not reject the concept of reason altogether. 
Rather, he reclaims its emancipatory potentials.97 As McCarthy points out, for Habermas 
„the real problem is too little rather than too much Enlightenment, a deficiency rather 
than an excess of reason‟.98 It is a narrow understanding of modern reason and its lack of 
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self-critical reference what prevented its emancipatory potential to be unleashed.99 The 
project of modernity, he argues, needs to be critically completed and not abandoned.100  
Habermas‟s project entails a reconstruction of the modern concept of reason. To 
do that, he reinterprets Weber‟s methodological distinction between the two forms of 
reason and differentiates reason into instrumental and communicative. Instrumental 
rationality is construed by Habermas as the goal-oriented rationality guiding the 
reasoning behind calculations of better means to given ends. Its inherent goal is, 
therefore, to produce a desired end. Communicative rationality, in contrast, is the 
rationality guiding communicative processes of reaching consensual agreement among 
social actors. Its inherent telos is mutual understanding. Unlike Weber, Habermas does 
not see the dominance of a goal-oriented rationality as an irreversible process or its use 
always undesirable. Under certain circumstances, the use of a goal-oriented rationality 
may be appropriate, as in the cases of technical-scientific studies and economic 
calculations. More fundamental to his reconstruction of modern reason is that he locates 
in communicative rationality the critical element of the project of modernity and places 
in it the possibility of social change.101 
 To better understand how Habermas justifies communicative reason and how 
reason is related to social pathologies, it is necessary to discuss Habermas‟s pragmatic 
theory of language in use – a „universal pragmatics‟ that focuses on role that language 
plays in structuring the social world. This pragmatic account of language, when linked 
with the concepts of post conventional thinking and moral-cognitive development, 
grounds the concept of communicative action, to which communicative rationality is 
attached. Communicative action, by its turn, will be the guiding framework of his social, 
moral and legal theories. As it will be seen, Habermas uses the philosophy of language 
„to save a concept of reason that is sceptical and post-metaphysical, yet not defeatist‟,102 
by pointing towards the insight „that the unity of reason only remains perceptible in the 
plurality of its voices.‟103  
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3.2.1 Universal pragmatics and communicative action 
„Reaching an understanding is the common telos of human speech.‟104 This central 
insight of Habermas‟s account of language is a fundamental step towards his theory of 
communicative action. This is because it helps explain what makes rational agreements 
not only morally desirable, but possible. Furthermore, it is in the inherent structure of 
linguistic interaction that Habermas locates the unavoidable, intuitive, and „always-
already‟ orientation towards universality and impartiality. 
Language, for Habermas, is the medium for the possibility of reaching an 
understanding, for social cooperation, and for the learning processes of the self.105 It 
follows that language, or more specifically communication, is the fundamental medium 
for social generation. He builds from the premise, inspired by Mead, that it is through 
the development of our communicative competence, made possible by socialisation, that 
we relate with the objective world of affairs, with others and with ourselves.106 Going 
beyond the competence for constructing sentences that make grammatical sense, 
individuals master the use of language as a means to relate with others. In everyday life, 
individuals make use of language not only to describe facts; they also agree and disagree 
about the rightness of norms and actions and the sincerity of claims. By making claims 
regarding the objective world, regarding values or norms, and regarding the speaker‟s 
own feelings and desires, participants interact with other.107 Independently of whether 
participants agree on, challenge, or reformulate these claims, the pragmatic features 
revealed in the interaction are the orientation towards reaching an understanding with 
others and the inclination for coordinating actions in the light of reached agreements. 
This orientation towards mutual understanding and cooperative coordination of 
action are inherent in the use of language. This is because our competence to use 
language entails the mastering of universal structures and rules that makes it possible for 
individuals to understand the meaning of what is being said. These „transcendental‟ 
rules command the use of language for a wide range of different expressions, such as 
explanations, descriptions, arguments, evaluations, and commands, as each of these 
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different expressions requires the mastering of rules that are specific to their task. These 
rules are acquired through socialisation and are known to the individual at the intuitive 
and pre-theoretical level, i.e. individuals are able to follow them without being 
consciously aware that they are doing so. 108 That means that in communication, 
participants are „always-already‟ using this pre-conscious know-how and cannot avoid 
using it if their goals are to be understood and to coordinate actions with others. 
Uncovering, or reconstructing, these sets of rules and „always-already‟ 
knowledge of them is the focus of Habermas‟s pragmatic approach to language – 
universal pragmatics. In contrast with semantics, which appreciates only the 
representational aspect of language, universal pragmatics aims at revealing how 
language structures society. According to the theory, linguistic meaning does not exist 
outside the interaction of participants. It depends on the speaker‟s utterance together 
with the position taken toward the utterance by the hearer, which can be a simple yes or 
no reply. Despite the utterance having an explicit content that refers to something in the 
world, the interpretation or understanding of its full meaning requires more than 
grasping this content alone. The full meaning of an utterance also depends on how this 
utterance is put forth by the speaker, i.e. whether it is an assertion, an explanation, a 
promise, a request, an advice, etc.109 This „intent‟ behind the utterance is its illocutionary 
component,110 or the performative component of the speech. As Habermas summarises, 
„understanding what is being said demands not only observation, but participation‟.111 
Furthermore, according to universal pragmatics, the meaning of sentences cannot 
be separated from language‟s inherent relation to validity. Validity in this context means 
that good reasons can be given and agreed upon in support of a statement. Participants 
cannot grasp the meaning of what is being said without being able to differentiate 
between a valid and invalid utterance.112 This condition of acceptability,113 or validity, of 
an utterance is linked with reasons – defining its rational core. As Habermas argues, 
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individuals evaluate utterances not by directly comparing its content with a state of 
affairs, but by evaluating the reasons given by the speaker in support of her statement. 
That means that a statement is only valid if good reasons can be given in support of it. 
Furthermore, the evaluation of the good reasons does not rely on the speaker alone, but 
also on the position that the hearer takes toward it. An argumentative process of mutual 
giving and taking of reasons, then, forms this interaction. Habermas further adds that „in 
this process of evaluating reasons individuals cannot avoid appealing to standards of 
rationality, which they consider binding on all parties‟.114  
This varied and complex communicative interaction between participants implies 
that specific social and/or moral relationships are being established between them115 – 
and that amounts to specific social actions. For example, certain types of speeches are 
regulative in character and establish obligations on the parties involved, such as 
promises, agreements, advices, and commands. They establish specific obligations on 
either or both participants.116 Due to their performative content, speeches become social 
actions, or in other words, speech acts.117 Speech acts are the basic social actions arising 
from the interaction between a speaker‟s utterance and the hearer‟s position towards it.  
In aiming at reaching an understanding with others about something in the 
world, the speaker‟s utterance establishes a three-fold relation: (a) a reference to 
something in the world, (b) an interpersonal relationship with the hearer, and (c) the 
expression of the speaker‟s intentions or beliefs. 118 In other words, in aiming at reaching 
an understanding with others, the speaker (c) expresses her beliefs by communicating 
(b) with the hearer (a) about something in the world.119  
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Claims to validity120 Truth121 Rightness Truthfulness 
World perspective Objective world Intersubjective world Subjective world 
Domains of reality External nature Society Inner nature 
Linguistic function or 
speaker/hearer perspective 
Expressing   
something about the 
world 
Establishing 
interpersonal 
relationships 
Expressing the 
speaker‟s intention 
World attitudes Objectivating Norm-conformative Expressive 
Mode of language use Cognitive Interactive Expressive 
Classes of speech acts Constative Regulative Representative 
Moments of reason Cognitive-instrumental Moral-practical Aesthetic-
expressive 
Issues dealt with 
 
Truth Justice Taste 
Type of knowledge 
embodied 
Technical, empirical-
theoretical 
Moral-practical Aesthetic-practical 
Form of argumentation (in 
mending disturbances) 
Theoretical discourse Practical discourse Therapeutic and 
aesthetic critique 
Model of transmitted 
knowledge 
Technologies, theories Legal and moral 
representations 
Works of art 
Table 2.1 – Claims to validity in communicative action and their associated domains.122  
                                                 
120
 There is still a fourth type of validity claim, namely a claim to comprehensibility, which domain is 
language itself, and refers to whether an utterance is linguistically comprehensible (Habermas, 2000b). 
However, only the analysis of claims to truth, rightness and sincerity are emphasised by Habermas due to 
their pragmatic connotations. 
121
 Claims to truth, despite their association with a goal-oriented rationality can be distinguished in 
relation to their action orientation into strategic and aiming at reaching an understanding (Habermas, 
1989a). Here only the claims to truth linked with communicative (thus non-strategic) form of action is 
represented. 
122
 See Habermas1989a, Chapter 3, 1992a, pp 25 and 116-94; 2000b; and also Outhwaite 1994, p. 49.  
44 
This three-fold relationship established by an utterance is connected with a three-
fold world perspective as speech acts serve to (a) represent states and events in the 
(objective) world; (b) establish and renew relationships (social/intersubjective world) 
and (c) manifest personal experiences and beliefs (internal/subjective world).123 By its 
turn, this three-fold relation between utterances and world perspectives makes 
simultaneously and implicitly three different „validity claims‟ that are: (a) truth, (b) 
rightness or (c) sincerity. 124 This structure of action give participants a choice between 
(a) cognitive, (b) interactive and (c) expressive modes of language use, which 
correspond to three different classes of speech acts: (a) constative, (b) regulative and (c) 
representative.125 These classes of speech acts by their turn permit participants to focus 
on issues of (a) truth, (b) justice or (c) taste. Finally, the attitudes adopted by participants 
in relation to the world are: (a) objectivating, (b) norm-conformative, and (c) expressive. 
In this complex communicative structure, the validity claims to truth, rightness and 
sincerity „can then serve as guiding threads in the choice of theoretical perspectives for 
distinguishing the basic modes of language use, or the functions of language, and 
classifying the speech acts that vary with individual languages.‟126 Table 2.1 enlists these 
concepts and their associations in idealised cases. 
The above is an account of idealised or „pure cases‟ of speech acts. In the context 
of everyday life, however, language is used in still more intricate ways. Cognitive 
interpretation, moral expectations, and expressive statements tend to overlap and 
interpenetrate. Claims to truth, rightness and sincerity are usually made simultaneously, 
even if implicitly, and even if only one of them is chiefly thematised. In addition, the 
different rationalities, goals and perspectives of the other domains can sometimes serve 
good use: agents can approach the external world not only in objectifying but also in 
norm conformative or expressive ways, confront society in an objectifying or expressive 
way, and confront inner-nature in an objectifying or norm-conformative way. To 
illustrate this, Habermas cites non-objectivists approaches in human sciences which 
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bring moral and aesthetic criticism into play without undermining the primacy of truth; 
of utilitarian calculations of consequences playing a role within ethics; and of art used as 
political criticism. In fact, Habermas sees these counter-movements as potential agents 
of mediation mitigating the radical differentiation of reason.127 
Having described this intricate account of language in use, the next step is to 
understand how it helps Habermas build his social theory. The concept of 
communicative action is what establishes the link between universal pragmatics and 
Habermas‟s social theory. Communicative action arises from the differentiation of 
social actions according to whether participants in performing them adopt a success-
oriented attitude or an attitude oriented to reaching understanding.128 The former 
characterises strategic action, through which participants adopt an objectifying, 
egocentric, attitude towards the world and others. The goal is to achieve one‟s desired 
ends and convince others to do what one desires. 129 Communicative action, conversely, 
is oriented to mutual understanding; it aims at a shared understanding of situations, 
establishing relationships, and maintaining a meaningful intersubjectivity.130 In 
communicative action participants coordinate their plans cooperatively. As Habermas 
explains: 
I distinguish between communicative and strategic action. Whereas in strategic action one actor 
seeks to influence the behaviour of another by means of the threat of sanctions or the prospect of 
gratification in order to cause the interaction to continue as the first actor desires, in 
communicative action one actor seeks rationally to motivate another by relying in the 
illocutionary binding/bonding effect of the offer contained in his speech act.
131
 
Furthermore, this cooperation is achieved through practices of freely engaging 
with others in giving and listening to reasons for and against given claims. These 
interactions are characteristically free from coercion and grounded on the rationally 
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motivating force of reaching mutual understanding.132 For Habermas, it is only in 
intersubjective processes of reaching an understanding with others that agreements 
become reflexive and legitimate. 
This distinction between strategic and communicative action is fundamental in 
Habermas‟s reconstruction both of the Weberian account of modern differentiation and 
its pathologies and of the critical theoretical concept of reification. More importantly, 
the concept of communicative action will be the central thread of Habermas‟s social, 
moral and legal theories. An illustration of how communicative action shapes 
Habermas‟s work will be presented below in a discussion of its role in moral discourses. 
Before that, however, it is important to locate the concept of communicative action 
within the horizons of what Habermas calls post conventional worldview, as it is at this 
level of individual (and social) development that communicative actions can unfold.  
3.2.2 Communicative competences, post conventional worldview and moral-cognitive 
development  
As presented above, Habermas‟s work flows within the horizons of modernity. 
As a corollary, his theories are always developed within the boundaries of post-
metaphysical presuppositions, which reject unifying principles and ultimate truths in 
favour of reflective and pragmatic perspectives. Completed self and world decentrations, 
which make room for these perspectives, characterise a post-conventional worldview.133 
This is because it is within the horizons of post-metaphysical presuppositions that both 
self and morality become fully autonomous; i.e. identity is formed and recognised in its 
„irreplaceable singularity‟ and morality is detached from the authority and constraints of 
the contextual and the traditional. Habermas‟s moral, political and legal theories – based 
on the concepts of communicative action and rational discourses – rely heavily on these 
achievements of autonomy. To understand these theories it is important to understand 
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how post-metaphysical thinking and the self and world decentrations that it presupposes 
support Habermas discourse theory. 
The use of the different structures, categories and attitudes available to 
participants in communication, as discussed above, imply that participants have 
achieved a post-conventional worldview. That means that participants master the 
differentiation of validity claims that are unavoidably raised in speech acts and are able 
to competently mediate between them. As Outhwaite explains, „interactive competence 
is central to ego identity and moral consciousness, liberating the adolescent from both 
ego centrism of early childhood and from sociocentrism of tradition-bound role 
behaviour.‟134.The mastering of the use of language with the goal of reaching an 
understanding, however, is not a given or a natural trait of the species. Rather, it consists 
in a set of competences that must be acquired by the child in actual interaction with the 
world and others in the course of her socialisation processes. As it will be seen below, 
the development of interactive competences is an important element for Habermas‟s 
discourse theory. In studying the development of these communicative competencies, 
Habermas explore the theories of cognitive and moral development of Piaget, Lawrence 
Kohlberg and Robert Selman.135 
Habermas, therefore, adopts a constructivist approach towards the development 
of competences: competences are acquired through dynamic learning processes that 
follow a pattern of stages in which the child progressively replaces the interpretation of 
a particular situation in favour of a new or revised interpretation that proves to be 
superior. Furthermore, Habermas construes morality, like cognition, as a type of 
knowledge. The acquisition of cognition and morality result from problem-solving 
empirical-analytical or moral-practical situations that arise from the child‟s interaction 
with the objective world and with others. 136 The objective world and the normatively 
world of interpersonal interactions are presented to the child as resistances. These 
resistances constantly challenge and problematise previous interpretations and require 
the development of new ones.137 These interpretive exercises also become progressively 
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more complex, abstract, and general. The post-metaphysical end point of these 
developments is competent perspective-taking. That means that the individual is able to 
reach an understanding with others by competently adopting a participant, an observer 
and a hypothetical perspective. 
A complex structure of „world‟ and „speaker perspectives‟ characterises the 
decentred worldview. 138 As seen above, in aiming at reaching an understanding with 
others participants must be able to adopt different attitudes to the world (objectivating, 
norm-conformative, expressive). At the same time, they are required to adopt these 
attitudes by taking turns in playing the roles of speaker, listener and by-stander.139 This 
is the speaker perspective. These three roles correspond to the first and second person 
perspective of participants (speaker and hearer) as well as the third person perspective of 
the neutral observer. As Habermas explains, this complex and dynamic structure of 
perspectives 
develops from two roots: the observer perspective, acquired by the child as a result of his 
perceptual-manipulative contact with the physical environment, and the reciprocal I-thou 
perspectives that the child adopts as a result of interactions with reference persons (during 
socialization processes).‟140  
From the „I-you‟ perspective, the child learns not only to perceive a situation 
from the perspective of the other: in this interaction, the child and her interlocutor 
realise and recognise they are a „we‟. The inclusion of the observer perspective to the 
interaction will allow the child to perceive (and objectify) this „I-you‟ interaction, 
including her own participation, from the more abstract perspective of a social world. 
This perspective enables her to go beyond the reciprocity entailed by the second person 
perspective and to judge whether actions conform to generally recognised norms or 
expected roles. These shifting speaker perspectives are fundamental for the development 
of the self and moral identity of the speaker. While the first person perspective allows 
for the self-expression of the speaker, the adoption of a (objectivating) third person 
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perspective enables her ability for self-description and the reciprocity of the second 
person perspective enables her ability for self-explication.141  
A further stage of growth in this complex perspective structure is achieved when 
the participant perspective of the first and second person combined with the social 
observer perspective of the third person is complemented by a hypothesising 
perspective. This hypothesising perspective finally completes the transition to the post-
conventional worldview. At this stage, the interaction becomes more abstract and 
reflexive, and the decentration allowed by the completed speaker‟s perspective enables 
the child/young person to look critically at recognised social norms and roles 
expectations and to judge not only whether actions conform to these recognised norms 
but also whether they are valid in the first place. This perspective, which „undermines 
the normative power of the factual‟, is suited for the identification of general and 
universal principles that merit general recognition. In other words, norms of action 
become subordinated to principles and not to conventional role expectations. Moral 
discourses are examples of interactions that demand from the speaker the mastering of 
this hypothetical perspective.  
The post-conventional stage, thus, becomes the domain of principled morality, 
and apart from discourse theory, Habermas also includes in this domain other forms of 
Kantian moral theories, utilitarianism, natural rights theories, and contractarian theories. 
Habermas proceeds cautiously from this point: the difference between discourse 
morality and the other theories does not concern the stage of moral development that 
they presuppose, but in their location of the moral point of view. In contrast with these 
competing theories, the moral point of view of discourse theory is not located in an 
ultimate principle or justification, but is procedural. These differences, however, have to 
be dealt with through philosophical argumentation and not through the establishment of 
their place in constructivist stages of moral development.142 
In addition, Habermas alerts to the risk of a naturalistic fallacy attached to 
conceiving moral development in the same naturalist perspective as cognitive 
development. Although both are conceived constructively, they are not similarly seen as 
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natural developments of the child. Habermas does not see the progression to a complete 
moral decentration as a natural or necessary development. Rather, he sees it as a 
development that depends on historical, local, and individual experiential contingencies. 
Although the intrinsic constructivist logic of the development of cognitive-moral 
competences is universal, Habermas argues that due to the specific patterns of their 
interactions different cultural traditions can either promote or hinder the full 
accomplishment of these competencies. As he observes, „reaching an understanding 
requires a cultural tradition which communicative practices range across the whole 
spectrum of validity claims, world and speaker perspectives.‟143 Here, the importance of 
the lifeworld to processes of moral decentration starts becoming clear. The lifeworld is 
not only the source of contexts for practices of reaching an understanding and moral 
decision-making; the lifeworld also offers the resources for the realisation of these 
practices. This insight is particularly relevant to the thesis as it helps with the analysis of 
the social role of health, construed as a specialised sub-system of the lifeworld, in 
supporting conditions for justice (Chapters 4 and 5). 
3.2.3 Communicative action and moral discourses 
The more differentiated the world becomes the greater are the possibilities for 
dissent and conflict.144 Adding to that, a post conventional world orientation offers no 
privileged standpoint from which to judge issues of truth and rightfulness.145 In the light 
of the need for non-violent conflict-resolution, Habermas tries to answer the question of 
how moral judgments are possible in a post conventional world. The interactive answer 
cannot rely on substantive moral principles. Rather, in using the presuppositions of 
universal pragmatics and communicative action, Habermas aims at demonstrating that 
the answer lies in procedural – as opposed to prescriptive – mechanisms of conflict-
resolution. Habermas then introduces the concept of moral discourses as the procedures 
through which moral questions and questions of justice are legitimately dealt with. The 
normativity „always already‟ embedded in forms of communication aimed at reaching 
an understanding grounds these discourses, and it is this inherent normativity what 
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justifies discourses as mechanisms of moral conflict resolution in post-conventional 
conditions. 
Habermas‟s focus, as a result, is not on anticipating the substance of the outcome 
of moral conversations but on reconstructing the rules that regulate the form of such 
conversations.146 Substantive moral principles, or principles of justice, have to be 
debated and justified in real discourses by participants themselves. What is relevant for 
the construction of Habermas‟s moral theory is that whichever principles participants in 
moral discourses agree on, they will „always-already‟ do so by making use of implicit 
rules of argumentation. As Habermas argues, „it is these rules alone that transcendental 
pragmatics is in a position to derive.‟147  
These rules are not conventions, but inescapable pragmatic presuppositions of 
rational discourses. As seen above, in taking part in communication participants 
implicitly recognise each other as participants. There is also a symmetry and reciprocity 
implicit in the acknowledgement that they all have to follow the same rules if they aim 
at being understood.148 Furthermore, if the aimed consensus is to be based on the 
normative force of the better reasons, then only the inclusion of all involved in the 
dispute at hand, as well as the absence of all coercion, can guarantee that all relevant 
reasons are exposed so as to secure that the better argument is mutually built.149 As 
Habermas argues, in agreements obtained by force, „what comes to pass manifestly 
through outside influence or the use of violence cannot count subjectively as agreement. 
Agreements rest on common convictions.‟150 Robert Alexy is also interested in 
reconstructing these normative presuppositions of argumentation, and he suggests that 
from these presuppositions follow rules such as: everyone is allowed to take part in 
discourses, everyone is allowed to question or introduce any assertions and express their 
needs and desires, and no speaker may be prevented from exercising these rights.151 
The participants‟ orientation towards reaching an understanding with others is 
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also an important requirement of moral discourses. This is because reaching an 
agreement with others without appealing to coercion or manipulation implies not only 
the mutual recognition that all are free and equal members of a moral community, but 
also the openness to temporarily set aside one‟s own convictions and self-interests in 
order to perceive things from the point of view of others. In moral discourses a 
mediation is sought between „one‟s inalienable right to say yes or no‟ and the concern 
for the position of others. In that, discourses are not so much exercises of balancing 
needs and interests, as they are an opportunity for shaping and reshaping new values, 
needs and interests.152 This process of exchanging of reasons and perspectives does not 
amount to strategically trying to convince others of the rightness or truth in one‟s 
conviction; it is rather a process of cooperative and mutual development of convictions.  
In other words,  
(...) nothing better prevents others from perspectivally distorting one‟s own interests than actual 
participation. It is in this pragmatic sense that the individual is the last court of appeal for 
judging what is in his best interest. On the other hand, the descriptive terms in which each 
individual perceives his interests must be open by others. Needs and wants are interpreted in the 
light of cultural values. Since cultural values are always components of intersubjectively shared 
traditions, the revision of the values used to interpret needs and wants cannot be a matter for 
individuals to handle monologically.
153
 
Disputing claims and reaching moral consensus are dynamic and ongoing 
processes. Despite enjoying the momentary binding strength of truth, agreements are 
always subject to further disputes and revaluations whenever new contexts and conflicts 
demand so. For Habermas, „the moment of unconditionality that is preserved in the 
discursive concepts of a fallibilistic truth and morality is not an absolute, or it is at most 
an absolute that has become fluid as critical procedure.‟154 In being fluid and always 
open to reconsideration, they also become ongoing learning processes. Furthermore, 
sometimes agreements cannot be reached, and the disputes at hand may need to be 
temporarily settled by other forms of fair compromises until a consensus can result from 
these ongoing debates.  
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The emphasis on moral consensus, however, does not mean that discourses aim 
at making people to think homogenously. On the contrary, the maintenance of 
differences is the very assumption behind discursive settlements of disputes. As 
Habermas argues, „(t)he intersubjectivity of linguistically achieved understanding is by 
nature porous, and linguistically attained consensus does not eradicate from the accord 
the differences in speaker perspectives but rather presupposes them as ineliminable.‟155 
In fact, the relationship between rational discourses and differences exhibit in Habermas 
a positive character. Discourses contribute to differentiation and individuation in 
society. As he remarks, „for the transitory unity that is generated in the porous and 
refracted intersubjectivity of a linguistically mediated consensus not only supports but 
furthers and accelerates the pluralisation of forms of life and the individualisation of 
lifestyles‟.156 Furthermore, communicative practices play an important role in integrating 
plural societies and it is in the intersubjectivity of communication that individuals form 
their own identity and secure the recognition of this identity by others. As Habermas 
argues, 
Communicative action is not only a process of reaching an understanding; in coming to an 
understanding about something in the world, actors are at the same time taking part in 
interactions through which they develop, confirm, and renew their memberships in social groups 
and their own identities. Communicative actions are not only processes of interpretation in which 
cultural knowledge is „tested against the world‟; they are at the same time processes of social 
integration and of socialization.
157
 
Granted, the imposition of authority, use of force, or use of manipulation can 
also strategically settle disputes – and frequently do so in the reality of the everyday life. 
However, they can also be settled by means of communicative interactions. As seen 
above, the use of language with the orientation of reaching an understanding is the telos 
of human speech;158 it is „the original mode of language use‟, upon which the 
instrumental use of language is parasitic.159 Therefore, although the empirical conditions 
are repeatedly a reminder that not all forms of moral conflicts resolutions are 
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communicative, Habermas insists that a plural society that chooses to renounce 
violence, oppression, and manipulation in favour of peaceful conflict resolution, these 
intrinsic rules to the communicative use of language are unavoidable.  
It is also important to clarify that these rules of argumentation are idealised 
conditions to guarantee the legitimacy of the outcomes of discourses. They are 
elaborated at a level of abstraction that does not match imperfect empirical conditions. 
Habermas acknowledges the limitations imposed by the reality of everyday life. He is 
aware that „participants are not Kant‟s intelligible characters but real human beings 
driven by other motives in addition to the one permitted motive of search for truth‟. 160  
The practical difficulties of getting everyone involved to participate, the impossibility of 
making sure that participants step aside their own interests, and securing that there is no 
resort to coercion and manipulation are examples of the difficulties imposed by the 
contingencies of everyday life. However, these ideal conditions are not supposed to be 
projected as a utopia to be realised. Rather, their role is to stand as normative points of 
reference. Habermas alerts to the dangers of incorporating transcendental illusions into 
the concept of these ideal conditions of communication.161 He insists that such idealising 
presuppositions „must not be hypostatized into the ideal of a future condition in which a 
definitive understanding has been reached (...) this concept must be approached in a 
sufficiently skeptical manner.‟162 Although reality can only approximate these 
conditions, the projection of their ideal content provides participants with a critical 
reference of what a post-metaphysical moral point of view entails.163 As critical 
references, they can also „point to practices that without which strategic action will 
result.‟164 
There is a final limitation regarding these ideal conditions for discourses. They 
can only answer „the epistemic question of how moral judgments are possible‟. 
However, they cannot answer „the existential question of what it means to be moral,‟ 
and they cannot obligate participants to engage in moral argumentation or motivate them 
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to act morally. The capacity of moral judgments to motivate action, thus, does not 
depend only on itself. The motivating force of good reasons is only too weak to 
guarantee that participants act accordingly. Habermas is aware of that and argues that 
motivation to act also depends on other contingencies, such as participants‟ identity 
formation, particular circumstances, interest positions, and types of social institutions 
involved.165 This is another link to the concept of the lifeworld, and its role in motivating 
action is used in the analysis of health and the role it plays in society. 
3.3 Lifeworld, system, and the pathologies of modernity 
The second objective of A Theory of Communicative Action is the development of a 
two-level model of society that integrates the insights of two different paradigms in 
social theory: lifeworld theory and systems theory. This integration aims at a broader 
analysis of modern society and its crises. Habermas ties this two level model of society 
to his theory of communicative action in two steps. First, Habermas establishes the 
complementary status of the concept of lifeworld to the concept of communicative 
action insofar as the lifeworld is conceived as the space in which communicative 
practices are embedded (3.3.1). In a second step, Habermas demonstrates that the 
concept of lifeworld alone cannot account for the complexity of modern transformations 
and different mechanisms of social integration. The concept of system is then introduced 
as a complementary analytic tool (3.3.2). In this dual perspective account of society, 
communication plays the important role of the medium through which the lifeworld is 
stabilised, since different types of discourses, validity claims and rationality operate 
within its different spheres and contribute in distinctive ways to its reproduction. That is 
set in contrast with the reproduction of the system, which is steered by the non-linguistic 
media of money and administrative power of the state. These differentiated steering 
media and their associated rationalities operate in society simultaneously, and they help 
Habermas account for the different modes of social integration, for social pathologies, 
and finally also for the locus of potential solutions to modern social crises (3.3.3). As it 
will be seen, this account represents Habermas reinterpretation of two classical critical 
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theoretical themes: the Weberian critique of modern rationalisation and the „Weberian-
Marxist‟ concept of reification. 
3.3.1 Communicative action and the lifeworld 
The lifeworld can be described as the world as lived, perceived and experienced by 
participants.166 As Edgar further describes it, it is „the stock of skills, competences and 
knowledge that ordinary members of society use, in order to negotiate their way through 
everyday life, to interact with other people, and ultimately to create and maintain social 
relationships.‟167 The lifeworld is linked to communicative action as not only it provides 
participants with a symbolic space within society in which conflicts arise and 
communication unfolds, but it also provides participants with the resources they make 
use of when evaluating and solving conflicts. In addition, through everyday 
communication and amendments of broken common understandings, the lifeworld is 
reproduced and stabilised. In short, communicative action is a medium for the 
reproduction and stabilisation of the lifeworld.168 Because of this link between the 
lifeworld and communicative action, the lifeworld becomes also the link between 
communicative action and society: „the connection of action theory to the basic concepts 
of social theory can be rendered secure by means of the concept of the lifeworld‟.169 
The lifeworld as the symbolic space within society that constitutes the common 
background of convictions, values, assumptions, and customary practices and skills 
about the world of participants, represents their contextual horizons of action.170 These 
shared taken-for-granted background assumptions work at the subconscious, pre-
reflexive, level and they allow individuals to navigate their everyday lives without 
having to establish and re-establish the validity and meaning of every fact and 
circumstance they face. 171 These unproblematic internalised assumptions only become 
conscious and thematised when particular assumptions of commonality breaks, leading 
to a conflict-situation in which the establishment of new common understandings 
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become necessary. According to Habermas, individuals can never fully grasp the 
lifeworld as the meaningful social whole, and just as language, individuals can never 
completely step out of it and objectify it in order to understand it in its totality.172 On the 
contrary, individuals rely on common background assumptions to be able to deal with 
conflicts. While certain assumptions become problematised, others will serve as 
resources that participants make use of to negotiate new common understandings. In 
characterising the lifeworld as a pre-reflexive background, Habermas quotes 
Wittgenstein: 
The child learns to believe a host of things. I.e. it learns to act according to these beliefs. Bit by 
bit there forms a system of what is believed, and in that system some things stand unshakeably 
fast and some are more or less liable to shift. What stands fast does so, not because it is 
intrinsically obvious or convincing; it is rather held fast by what lies around it.
173
 
Having established that communication is the medium through which the 
lifeworld reproduces itself, Habermas places communicative action‟s complex linguistic 
interactions of speaker and world perspectives within the concept of lifeworld, so that 
they can be analysed from the lifeworld‟s perspective too. By linking different 
communicative perspectives with different spheres of the lifeworld, it is revealed that 
communication serves three functions in society: (a) reproducing culture and keeping 
traditions alive, (b) social integration or the coordination of the plans of different actors 
in social interaction, and (c) socialisation and interpretation of needs.174 As Habermas 
explains: 
In coming to an understanding with one another about their situation, participants in 
communication stand in a cultural tradition which they use and at the same time renew; in 
coordinating their actions via intersubjective recognition of criticizable validity claims, they rely 
on memberships in social groups and at the same time reinforce the integration of the latter; 
through participating in interaction with competent reference persons, growing children 
internalize the value orientations of their social groups and acquire generalized capabilities for 
action […].175  
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Claims to validity Truth Rightness Truthfulness 
Relation to structural 
components of the 
lifeworld 
Culture176 Society177 Personality178 
Domains of 
knowledge 
(differentiated expert 
cultures)179 
Modern-science Law, politics, ethics, 
morality 
Arts, art criticism 
Contributions of 
communicative action 
to the reproduction of 
the lifeworld 
Reproduction of 
culture 
Social integration Socialization: 
identity and 
motivations for 
actions 
Contribution to „self‟ 
development 
Cognitive capacities Interactive capacities Ego development; 
development of 
affections and 
motivations 
Pathologies (due to 
disturbances in the 
lifeworld‟s 
reproduction) 
Loss of meaning Anomie, alienation Psychopathologies, 
withdrawal of 
motivation 
Dimension from which 
to evaluate crises 
Rationality of 
knowledge 
Stabilisation of social 
solidarity 
Personal 
responsibility 
Resources that become 
scarce in crises 
Meaning Social solidarity Ego strength 
Table 2.2 – Communicative action and its relationship with the lifeworld using different 
claims to validity as a guide.180  
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Table 2.2 demonstrates schematically some of these language-lifeworld 
relationships and their contribution to the reproduction of the lifeworld. As observed, 
three structural components divide the lifeworld analytically, namely culture, society, 
and personality. These three structural components are associated with three different 
functions of language, three validity claims (truth, rightness and sincerity respectively) 
and three different world perspectives (objective, intersubjective and subjective 
respectively). These associations demonstrate the link Habermas establishes between 
communicative action and the concept of society through the concept of the lifeworld. 
As each component of the lifeworld is associated with different types of discourse and 
its different moments of reason, these different lifeworld-communication interactions 
serve a different role in social reproduction and integration. Crises – perceived by the 
lifeworld through manifestations such as loss of meaning, crises of legitimation, and 
confusion – arise from disturbances in these reproductive processes. 
Under the aspect of cultural reproduction, new situations of a semantic 
dimension are placed in continuity and coherence with current stock of knowledge, 
which can be measured in terms of the rationality of the knowledge accepted as valid. 
Disturbances in cultural reproduction can be manifested by a loss of meaning. Under the 
aspect of social integration, legitimate processes of regulation of interpersonal relations 
deal with new situations of a social dimension. Disturbances can be manifested by 
anomie, dissolution of social solidarity, and social conflicts. Finally, under the aspect of 
socialisation, new situations associated with personal interactive capacities or integrity 
of individual life-histories are managed through the acquisition of general competences 
for action and harmony with collective forms of life. Disturbances in the socialisation 
process can be manifested by psychopathologies and alienation, in which „the 
personality system can preserve its identity only by means of defensive strategies that 
are detrimental to participating in social interaction‟.181The resources that become scarce 
during crises in these three reproductive levels are respectively: meaning, social 
solidarity, and ego strength.182  
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The lifeworld and its reproductive dynamics can be further analysed from the 
perspective of specialised action-systems and from a division into public and private 
spheres. Specialised action-systems result from the modern process of differentiation in 
the spheres of knowledge. In becoming specialised, these different action-systems tend 
to remain attached to specific patterns of interactions between the lifeworld and 
communicative action; as a result, they contribute distinctively to the reproduction of the 
lifeworld. Habermas divides these systems into two categories: (a) systems like science, 
morality, and art, which tend to specialise in different validity aspects of everyday 
communicative action (truth, rightness, or sincerity), and accordingly contribute 
differently to the reproduction of the lifeworld (see Table 2.2); and (b) systems like 
religion, education, and the family, which generally contribute to the reproduction of the 
lifeworld at all levels, i.e. cultural reproduction, social integration, or socialization. 
Action systems belonging to the latter group, although individually specialised for 
cultural reproduction (education) or socialization (family) or social integration (law) are 
not totally differentiated in their operation. According to Habermas, each of these 
systems „also concomitantly satisfies the function of the other two and thus maintains a 
relation to the totality of the lifeworld‟.183 In Chapter 4, health is placed along this group 
of action-systems too instead of located within the domain of modern-science. This 
allows the analyses of its broader social reproduction and stabilisation functions, and 
ultimately its relationship with justice. 
Finally, two subsystems can further divide the lifeworld: the public and the 
private spheres. Interpersonal relations of intimacy between relatives, friends, and 
acquaintances characterise the private sphere. The public sphere has a complementary 
relation to the private sphere, from which the public is recruited. The public sphere is 
not specialized in any reproductive function per se, rather it is the social space generated 
in communicative action.184 The private and the public spheres too take part in the 
production of social meaning and in social integration. Their interaction with society 
from the perspective of the system is further analysed below. 
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3.3.2 The mediation between two paradigms: system and lifeworld 
The participant and the social observer perspective are classical analytical paradigms in 
social theory. These two different paradigms refer to the different perspectives social 
theorists adopt when studying society. The participant perspective, which in Habermas‟s 
work is represented by the lifeworld perspective discussed above, looks at society from 
the internal perspective of the social actors themselves. From this perspective, society 
and its developments are interpreted from within, from the internal perspective of the 
acting subjects who try to make sense of their world and understand how their identities, 
pattern of interactions, commonalities and conflicts shape and transform society. The 
focus is on social meaning, and the objective is to interpret from within how participants 
perceive society and its transformations, and how these transformations impact on 
participants‟ everyday lives. 185 Additionally, as seen above, in Habermas the lifeworld 
goes beyond being the space for internal interpretations; it is also the space in which 
processes of socialisation and social integration take place.186  
The social observer perspective, conversely, looks at society from the external 
perspective of a detached social observer who analyses society as a complex whole. 
From this perspective, the functional mechanisms and driving processes of society take 
place independently from social actors‟ conscious control. The focus is on 
understanding the operating logic of macrostructures – such as culture, the economy, the 
state and the legal system – and how they shape society. 187 Systems theories of society 
exemplify this approach. Typically, this school of thought analyses society as a complex 
system composed by distinct, independent, self-perpetuating, and self-regulating closed 
systems such as economy, state administration, law, and scientific knowledge.188 
According to this perspective, the lifeworld becomes redundant in the face of the 
increasing complexity of society and growing differentiation of systems that become 
refractory to external influence. In Habermas, the system perspective is constructed as a 
complementary perspective to the lifeworld, which allows him to account for the 
material reproduction of society. Material reproduction operates through the medium of 
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instrumental rationality and through interconnections and action consequences that are 
not intended or even perceived by individuals.189 For the system‟s reproduction 
purposes, norm-conformative attitudes are neither necessary nor possible.190 
 In Habermas‟s view, however, either perspective is insufficient to interpret the 
complexity of modern society. The internalist or the lifeworld view runs the risk of 
never being able to see beyond a particular context, failing to appreciate causes, 
connections, and consequences that lie beyond the horizon of a particular everyday 
practice and beyond the conscious control and understanding of participants. „This 
internal perspective screens out everything that inconspicuously affects a sociocultural 
lifeworld from the outside;‟ and as he argues, it cannot be expected that in the modern 
society individuals fully grasp or intentionally maintain its complex material 
reproduction.191 On the other hand, an exclusively external or systemic view fails to 
appreciate that the functional domains of the system need to be institutionalised in the 
lifeworld. It also fails to appreciate the impacts and constraints imposed on these 
domains of functional reproduction by the lifeworld. Either view, therefore, can only 
provide a partial account of the crises of modern society.192  
Habermas therefore aims at overcoming the limitations of the antagonism 
between lifeworld and system by developing a perspective that mediates between them. 
He proposes that society should be conceptualised simultaneously as lifeworld and 
system. Only this way Habermas finds it possible to account for the growing complexity 
of modern society, appreciating not only functional differentiation and its impacts at the 
macro level, but also the meanings, impacts and resistances to these transformations 
from the perspective of participants at the micro level of everyday life. This dual 
approach to society also accounts for different mechanisms of social integration and 
analyses the patterns of interaction between the system and the lifeworld as the potential 
loci of social crises. In distinguishing social and system integration, he explains: „in one 
case the action system is integrated through consensus, whether normatively guaranteed 
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or communicatively achieved; in the other case it is integrated through the normative 
steering of individual decisions not subjectively coordinated.‟193 
It is worth noting that his distinction between lifeworld and system is not a 
factual account of modern society but a methodological approach to the study of society 
and its crises.194 It offers a broader perspective from which to look at the question of 
how society and its reproduction and integration are possible in conditions of growing 
complexity, pluralism and post-conventional thinking. This dual-methodological 
approach is observed throughout Habermas‟s work. An illustration of this approach can 
be observed in the following quotation, in which he analyses liberal and social rights 
simultaneously from both perspectives: 
Historically speaking, liberal rights crystallized around the social position of the private property 
owner. From a functionalist viewpoint, one can conceive them as institutionalizing a market 
economy, whereas from a normative viewpoint they guarantee basic private liberties. Social 
rights signify, from a functionalist viewpoint, the installation of welfare bureaucracies, whereas 
from a normative viewpoint they grant compensatory claims to a just share of social wealth. 
(...)
195
 
Analytically, this dual perspective also arises as a necessary tool in the study of 
social transformations. As seen above, in the course of modernity, a de-unification of the 
world and a growing complexity and differentiation of spheres of knowledge occur. In 
these processes, two levels of differentiation can be devised. First, the growing 
complexity of society leads to the development of a domain specialised in material 
reproduction of society –the system – which becomes uncoupled from the lifeworld. The 
second level of differentiation is observed with the increasing differentiation that occurs 
within the lifeworld and the system themselves. The increasing rationalisation of the 
lifeworld leads to its differentiation into the three structural components of culture, 
society and personality, and the growing complexity within the system leads to the 
formation of the sub-systems of economy and state administration. 
According to Habermas, two sub-systems emerge from the growing internal 
differentiation that occurs within the system: (a) the economy, which is steered by the 
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medium of money, and (b) the state administration, which is steered by the medium of 
power. Although increasingly specialised, these two subsystems are interdependent and 
share the function of maintaining the material reproduction of society. They do so 
through the regulatory role of the economy and public administration and in contrast 
with the reproduction of the lifeworld, which is guided by communicative rationality, 
these two functional subsystems are guided by the logic of instrumental rationality.  
Characteristically then, the system‟s contributions to social stabilisation occur „at 
the back of the participants‟, 196 i.e. without the need of their conscious will. As 
Habermas explains, 
Modern societies are integrated not only socially through values, norms, and mutual 
understanding, but also systemically through markets and the administrative use of power. 
Money and administrative power are systemic mechanisms of societal integration that do not 
necessarily coordinate actions via the intentions of participants, but objectively, “behind the 
backs” of participants. Since Adam Smith, the classic example for this type of regulation is the 
market‟s “invisible hand”.197 
It is worth noting that the system is not an entity that regulates society through 
its self-generated laws. It represents the space in which complex nets of activities of 
material reproduction of society take place. These activities characteristically do not 
require or involve the conscious and continuous rational reflection and consensus 
reaching of participants. In fact, they relieve participants from the burden of dealing 
with this growing complexity and therefore overtaxing their communicative resources. 
In this way, participants can devote their communicative resources to areas that require 
mutual understanding and communicative regulation. This already points to the fact that 
the system, contrarily to the lifeworld, does not generate or reproduce social meaning, as 
it is merely the space for material reproduction.198 Whereas effectiveness guides 
systemic mechanisms of regulation, legitimacy guides communicative mechanisms of 
regulation that operate at the level of the lifeworld.199 
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The system, therefore, relies on the lifeworld and its structures of 
communication to generate legitimacy, influence and commitment.200 This can be 
achieved, for example, through the exchanges between the system and the public and 
private spheres of the lifeworld. From the perspective of the system, the public and the 
private spheres interact and have a relationship of interdependence with the 
corresponding functional spheres of state administration and economy. The public and 
the private spheres generate respectively social commitment and political influence, 
which they exchange for goods, services and organisational accomplishments of the 
administrative and economic systems.201Law and democracy, as it will be seen, also 
have an important role to play in this mediation between lifeworld and system, 
especially in the legitimation of the latter.202 
Finally, a corollary of this dual social-perspective is that the instrumental 
rationality that runs the system‟s activities is not conceived a priori as detrimental. On 
the contrary, it constitutes the appropriate form of rationality that this space has to rely 
on in order to maintain its material integration functions. As Habermas argues, here in 
contrast with Weber and Horkheimer and Adorno, it is not the system‟s instrumental 
rationality per se which is responsible for the crises of modern society. Crises only arise 
when the logic of the system‟s steering media of money and power are extended beyond 
the boundaries of the system and colonise the lifeworld at the expense of communicative 
rationality.203  
3.3.3 The colonisation of the lifeworld 
According to Habermas, pathologies arise when (a) the penetration of economic 
and administrative rationality in areas of action that specialises in cultural transmission, 
social integration and child-rearing/socialisation occur at the expense of mutual 
understanding as the mechanism of coordinating action, and when (b) the differentiation 
of expert cultures of the lifeworld becomes split-off, in an elitist fashion, from 
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communicative action in everyday life.204 The development of social pathologies 
associated with modern differentiation, therefore, can result from two different 
processes: the colonisation of the lifeworld by systems‟ media, and the increased 
rationalisation of the lifeworld itself.  
Crises arising from the first process are seen as an irony of processes of societal 
differentiation in which „the rationalization of the lifeworld makes possible a 
heightening of systemic complexity, which becomes so hypertrophied that it unleashes 
system imperatives that burst the capacity of the lifeworld they instrumentalize.‟205 The 
fact that system and lifeworld become uncoupled, however, does not mean that the 
lifeworld unavoidably becomes dependent on the system. The uncoupling implies at first 
only that there is a differentiation in types of action coordination – consensus or 
functional interconnections. From this point, both directions of dependency are possible: 
in one direction the system maintenance can be subject to the normative restrictions of 
the lifeworld, and on the other direction the lifeworld can be subjected to systemic 
constraints of material reproduction.206 However, when the latter direction occurs, i.e. 
when systemic mechanisms through their inner logic constraints and instrumentalise the 
lifeworld, they inevitably give rise to a „structural violence‟ that hinders intersubjective 
understanding by distorting and restricting communication.207 Ultimately, this structural 
violence lead to the development of social pathologies such as apathy, cultural 
impoverishment, loss of meaning, and dysfunctional personality constitution translated 
by psychopathologies.208 
The incorporation of functional media into the lifeworld generates crises and 
pathologies because these media cannot create or substitute meaning to the lifeworld. In 
other words, the economy and state administration cannot compensate for the 
breakdown in communicative rationality.209 These distortions in the symbolic 
reproductive capacities of the lifeworld leads to situations associated with the objective, 
intersubjective and subjective worlds being pre-judged, or „reified‟, by participants. This 
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process of functional instrumentalisation of the lifeworld Habermas calls the 
colonisation of the lifeworld.210 To avoid it, the lifeworld needs to hold to the role of 
defining the pattern of the social system as a whole, and for that, the lifeworld needs to 
anchor the system in its communicative institutions.211 
Distortions arising from the second type of societal differentiation do not involve 
the unbalance between system and lifeworld, but unbalances within themselves. The 
rationalisation of the lifeworld or the increased complexity of functional systems, have 
no pathological connotations per se. Pathologies only arise from them in cases when (a) 
the increased differentiation within the mechanisms of system integration leads to the 
fragmentation of individuals who are split into a variety of different functional roles 
they have in society, and (b) the differentiation of the lifeworld‟s spheres of knowledge 
into expert cultures leads them to become isolated from everyday communication and 
unmediated with each other. Habermas argues that „[t]he lifeworld must be defended 
against extreme alienation at the hands of the objectivating, the moralizing, and the 
aestheticizing interventions of expert cultures.‟212 The mediation between the cognitive-
instrumental, moral-practical, and aesthetic-expressive dimensions as well as the 
overcoming of the isolation of science, morals, and art without detriment to their 
internal rationality can only be achieved through incentives to the mediating role of 
everyday communicative practices.213 
Habermas‟s theory also points at the potential solution to these modern 
pathologies. Rejecting the claim that the dominance of instrumental rationality is an 
irreversible process, he argues that society has an alternative: the decolonisation of the 
lifeworld.214 This decolonisation can be achieved by exposing the colonisation of the 
lifeworld and by creating the conditions for communicative rationality to flourish. The 
reconstruction of a vibrant public sphere is a key element to this project. According to 
Habermas, thriving debates and opinion-formation grounded on communicative 
rationality can influence the development of laws and policies that are legitimate and 
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meaningful to the lifeworld. By their turn, these legitimate laws and policies contribute 
towards creating and maintaining conditions of communication within this vibrant 
public sphere by keeping the system under normative influence and control of the 
lifeworld.215  
In summary, the fundamental goal for Habermas towards a new form of social 
integration is the creation and support for the conditions for rational communication. As 
the next section analyses, mutual recognition and social solidarity are fundamental steps 
towards this end. 
3.4 Communicative action, justice and solidarity 
3.4.1 Habermas’s theory of justice and the moral point of view 
Kantian moral theory and the theory of communicative action are the two frameworks 
guiding Habermas‟s theory of justice. From Kant, Habermas incorporates a deontologic 
universalism. From communicative action he brings the idea of a communicative reason, 
which allows the „pragmatisation‟ of the Kantian moral point of view. Whereas in Kant 
the moral point of view is located in the individual autonomous self-reflection, the moral 
point of view in Habermas is located in dialogical argumentative deliberation between 
autonomous individuals. 
Following Kant, Habermas considers morality the domain of what is right or 
just. Following the pragmatic insights of communicative action, communication is seen 
as the medium that regulates conflict-resolution on matters of what is right or just. As in 
Kant, morality is an autonomous sphere of knowledge. That means that morality 
requires a form of argumentation distinct of its own, in which what is at issue is not 
whether a claim is true, correct, truthful, artistic or scientifically sound; what is at issue 
is whether the norms a claim makes reference to are just or right.216 Morality then, serves 
the purpose of solving conflicts that involve universalisable interests in matters of 
justice, i.e. conflicts about what actions are right or just, which relevance applies to all 
individuals irrespective of contingencies of time and place.  
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Discourse theory conceives morality as a mutually constituted source of 
normativity that serves to protect the vulnerability of individuals and the net of 
intersubjectivity in which they are socialised.217 This is because this identity-constituting 
net of intersubjectivity gives rise to the mutual dependence of individuals who rely on 
each other for mutual recognition. It explains how exposed and vulnerable they are to 
being harmed by others. Habermas states that: 
I conceive of moral behaviour as a constructive response to the dependencies rooted in the 
incompleteness of our organic makeup and in the persistent frailty (most felt in the phases of 
childhood, illness, and old age) of our bodily existence. Normative regulation of interpersonal 
relations may be seen as a porous shell protecting a vulnerable body, and the person incorporated 
in this body, from the contingencies they are exposed to. Moral rules are fragile constructions 
protecting both the physis from bodily injuries and the person from inner or symbolical 
injuries.
218
  
To protect the individual, and also the net in which she stabilises her personality, 
Habermas‟s conception of morality requires the cooperative search for consensus on 
matters of justice. This cooperation, by its turn, also serves as a mechanism of social 
integration. As it will be seen, this cooperation is embodied in the concept of solidarity. 
Solidarity, thus, is closely tied with justice.219 
Habermas‟s reconstruction of the Kantian moral point of view maintains that 
conflicting claims must be adjudicated fairly and impartially. Impartiality translates the 
idea that a moral judgment requires the freedom from external coercion and 
manipulation (force of traditions, attachments to particular groups) as well as from 
internal compulsions and self-deceptions (such as emotions, conceptions of the good, 
self-interests).220 Furthermore, Habermas‟s moral point of view is deontological, 
universal, cognitive, and formal. It is deontological because it focuses on the binding 
character of ought claims, i.e. it specifies what is the right or wrong action through 
commands and norms of action. It is universal because it specifies norms that every 
rational being must be able to will and these norms apply to all, prevailing over local or 
conventional norms. In Habermas‟s words, „justice determines the perspective from 
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which certain ways of acting and interacting are judged to be “equally good for all 
members”‟.221 The moral point of view is also formal because it does not specify 
substantive moral principles, but only the procedure which test the legitimacy of such 
principles. Finally, it is cognitivist because in conceiving morality as a form of 
knowledge, the scrutiny of reasons given to accepting norms grounds their justification. 
222 In other words, nothing coerces participants except for the force of the better 
argument.223 
Although most Kantian moral theories share these characteristics, there are two 
fundamental differences that discourse theory sets from them. First, the moral point of 
view is not located in the individual self-reflection or in the reflection of the expert 
theorist; it is located instead in actual processes of moral argumentation that requires the 
participation of all involved. Accordingly, only participants in actual moral discourses 
can define the substance of moral norms. Habermas‟s theory, therefore, can be seen as a 
dialogical reinterpretation of Kant‟s categorical imperative. Second, the procedure 
reconstructed by Habermas also requires from participants the „other-perspective-
taking‟, which helps secure the universality and impartiality of the process. In other 
words, what is distinctive to discourse theory is that the moral point view requires not 
only the actual participation of all, but the mutual concern of all for all involved.224  
As the discourse principle (D) states: 
Only those norms may claim to be valid that could meet with the consent of all affected in their 
role as participants in a practical discourse.
225
 
To this principle that conflicts should be dealt with through argumentation, Habermas 
adds a rule of argumentation (U) that emphasises and secures the universalist character 
of moral norms: 
For a norm to be valid, the consequences and side effects of its general observance for the 
satisfaction of each person‟s particular interests must be acceptable to all.226 
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Whereas D translates the general communicative action intuition that valid norms, 
whether moral or legal, must secure agreement of all, U captures the moral insight that 
norms must pass the test of universal validity; i.e. that they are not just „a reflection of 
the prejudices of adult, white, well-educated, Western males of today.‟227 
Habermas emphasises that U is not a moral norm per se; it is a validity test, 
which finds its justification on the analysis of the presuppositions of argumentation. He 
argues that „the idea of impartiality is rooted in the structures of argumentation 
themselves and does not need to be brought in from the outside as a supplementary 
normative content.‟228 Another way in which U is fundamental to the impartial 
justification of norms is its demand for an exercise of mutual perspective taking in 
which the interests, needs, and position that others occupy must be considered before a 
norm is mutually agreed upon. As Regh notes, without this perspective taking, it would 
be difficult to differentiate the discourse theoretical point of view from forms of 
consensus that admit of strategic considerations and coincident individual purposes.229 
This radical inclusiveness – i.e. the inclusion of others both at the sphere of actual 
interaction and at the sphere of moral concern – secures the impartiality of the process.  
Here too Habermas‟s theoretical assumptions need to be placed within his post-
metaphysical framework. Post-conventional morality cannot provide participants with a 
comprehensive set of norms and establish the hierarchy between them, but it expects 
participants to reach cooperatively their own – even if fallible – judgements. With the 
transition from conventional to post-conventional forms of life, the focus on substantive 
conceptions of justice has shifted to the focus on the procedure for impartially judging 
competing claims to justice.230An implication of this post-conventional moral point of 
view is that in the process of modern differentiation, the moral and the ethical spheres 
became differentiated and autonomous. The moral sphere involves moral discourses, in 
which participants jointly evaluate the rightness of norms. The ethical sphere, on the 
other hand, involves ethical discourses, including issues of recognition of individual or 
group identities and their self-realisation and conceptions of the good life. These ethical 
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discourses can only be assessed and dealt with from the internal perspective of a 
particular form of life.231  
In contrast with discourses involving concrete forms of life, moral discourses in 
conditions of pluralism and post-conventional thinking require a decentred attitude from 
participants. That means that participants have to abstract the problematised norm or 
broken common understanding from their contextual roots so that they can be evaluated 
and ultimately validated through the projection of their conditions of validity to a 
universal community of moral agents. This decentration entails not only that participants 
put aside their own interests, but also that they take the perspective of every other 
participant in discourse. This ability of abstraction and other-perspective taking allow 
both the validation of norms that are equally good for all, but also allows the critical 
attitude towards the norms or practices of one‟s own particular society.232 Furthermore, 
this differentiation between the moral and ethical sphere favours a growing tolerance 
towards different forms of life and the recognition of every individual‟s uniqueness at 
the same time that it makes possible the cooperative search for universal interests and 
nonviolent conflict resolution.233 A post-conventional morality, however, also comes at a 
cost. In the separation of morality from the substance of the ethical life the motivation 
for action is lost. In other words, although decentred argumentation can generate 
conviction, it cannot ensure that participants act upon the norms they established. This is 
the motivational deficit problem that post-conventional moralities face.234  
Before discussing how Habermas deals with this motivational deficit, it is 
important to approach yet another important aspect of Habermas‟s theory justice: 
solidarity. After analysing that solidarity too suffers from the same motivational 
problem it will be addressed how the interplay between justice, solidarity and lifeworld 
can address the motivational deficit of a post-conventional morality. 
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3.4.2 Solidarity 
Modern society has three major forces of macrosocial integration: money, 
administrative power and solidarity.235 Of those, only solidarity is rooted in the 
lifeworld. For this reason, solidarity is the one at risk of disintegrating because of the 
social differentiation and the growing colonisation of the lifeworld by the system‟s 
media in modern capitalism. Society, therefore, needs to cultivate new forms of 
solidarity if still committed to non-oppressive conflict-resolution.236 The way forward, 
according to Habermas, is to strengthen communicative practices of mutual 
understanding: 
In complex societies, the scarcest resources are neither the productivity of a market economy nor 
the regulatory capacity of the public administration. It is above all the resources of an exhausted 
economy of nature and of a disintegrating social solidarity that require a nurturing approach. The 
forces of social solidarity can be regenerated in complex societies only in the forms of 
communicative practices of self-determination.
237
 
To be sure, not any form of solidarity is appropriate for the task of modern social 
integration. The concept of solidarity that Habermas is appealing for is post-
conventional. Society can no more rely on conventional concepts of solidarity, 
commonly grounded on benevolence,238 on charity (what Houtepen and Meulen describe 
as „asymmetrical helping relations‟),239 or on exclusivist identities (such as kinship, 
nationality or religion). This later connotation, in particular, concerns Habermas the 
most: the tragic history of the 20th century is an alert to the dangers of forms of solidarity 
grounded on group membership. In a decentred and plural society,  
solidarity loses its merely particular meaning, in which it is limited to the internal relationships 
of a collectivity that is ethnocentrically isolated from other groups – that character of forced 
willingness to sacrifice oneself for a collective system of self-assertion which is always present 
in premodern forms of solidarity. The formula, “Command us Führer, we will follow you,” goes 
perfectly with the formula, “All for one and one for all” – as we saw in the posters of Nazi 
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Germany in my youth – because fellowship is entwined with followership in every traditionalist 
sense of solidarity.
240
 
Habermas‟s concept of solidarity is radically inclusive; it is necessarily extended 
to strangers in time and space. This decentration redefines solidaristic attachments based 
on common identity into a universalist solidarity „with everything wearing a human 
face‟.241 It is grounded on the recognition of individuals‟ co-dependence in a lifeworld 
they shape and share and that form their identities and secure their autonomy. The 
commitment to solve conflicts peacefully through communicative practices is the basis 
for the regeneration of a post-conventional solidarity. As Habermas argues,  
in a secularized society that has learned to deal with its complexity consciously and deliberately, 
the communicative mastery of […] conflicts constitute the sole source of solidarity among 
strangers – strangers who renounce violence and, in the cooperative regulation of their common 
life, also concede one another the right to remain strangers.
242
  
This moral inclination towards the recognition of others and their needs links 
solidarity with justice. Justice and solidarity, thus, are intertwined concepts; it is not 
possible to conceptualise one without resorting to the other. This is because justice can 
only be achieved through moral discourses if the intersubjective web which relates 
individuals with each other and which secures mutual recognition is intact. If the 
individual relies on intersubjective interactions to develop and protect her individuality, 
justice cannot protect the individual without also protecting this important web of 
intersubjective relationships.243 Habermas argues that from the perspective of discourse 
theory, „justice requires solidarity as its reverse side;‟244  
[i]t is a question not so much of two moments that complement each other as of two aspects of 
the same thing. (… ) Justice concerns the equal freedoms of unique and self-determining 
individuals, while solidarity concerns the welfare of consociates who are intimately linked in an 
intersubjectively shared form of life – and thus also to the maintenance of the integrity of this 
form of life itself.  Moral norms cannot protect one without the other: they cannot protect the 
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equal rights and freedoms of the individual without protecting the welfare of one‟s fellow man 
and of the community to which the individuals belong.
245
 
Justice and solidarity have the same root – the vulnerability of subjects who individuate 
through socialisation.246 
  According to Habermas, two conditions make discursive agreements possible: 
the individual‟s inalienable right to say yes or no and her overcoming of her egocentric 
viewpoint. Without the first, consensuses are merely factual rather than impartial and 
universal. Without the latter, no „other-perspective-taking‟, and therefore, universal 
agreement can emerge. These two conditions, representing the respect for the individual 
autonomy and the recognition of individuals‟ interdependence, are internally connected 
and accounted for by discourse theory.247  It is also bridges Kantian justice with the 
communitarian insights on the embeddedness of individuals.  
The importance of solidarity to the possibility of justice and social integration in 
modern society is also emphasised by Hauke Brunkhorst. He argues that only solidarity 
can solve the two inclusion problems that arise from the process of functional 
differentiation of modern societies: the de-socialisation of the individual that results 
from a growing process of individualisation, and the exclusion of whole segments of the 
population from the benefits achieved by modernity, characterised by social and 
economic deprivation.248 The role solidarity plays in addressing questions of justice and 
social integration in modern society is crucial to the analysis of the relationship between 
healthcare and justice.  
 This important contribution of social solidarity to justice, however, also faces the 
post-conventional motivational problem. The question about what motivates participants 
to act based on what is moral, right or just rather than on what is individually convenient 
or profitable, here takes the shape of the question about what motivates participants to 
act also based on the consideration for the interests and welfare of others. Furthermore, 
as Seyla Benhabib notes, the difficulty that discourse ethics faces, as well as any 
procedural and abstract theory of morality, is that it presupposes a concern for others as 
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a fundamental condition for conflict-solving procedures, yet in conflict-situations it is 
precisely mutual understanding what has been broken.249 In other words, if mutual 
understanding can be a difficult achievement at the best of times, how to expect, or even 
demand it, during times of conflict? To address this question the next section links 
discourse ethics to the lifeworld. 
3.4.3 Justice, solidarity and the lifeworld 
The purpose of this section is to address the criticism that the formalism of Habermas 
moral theory and the decentration it demands is far too detached from everyday life‟s 
contexts to be meaningful to individuals. As seen above, the motivation deficit is one 
unwelcome consequence of his narrowed view of the moral domain. 
 The understanding that ethical and moral spheres are completely separated in 
Habermas, which generate many criticisms, is probably only partly accurate. His 
argument that morality and ethics became differentiated with the transition to a post-
conventional worldview does not imply that these spheres became refractory or closed 
to each other. On the contrary, in different opportunities Habermas signalled the 
importance of ethical forms of life for the achievement of justice. Here, the concept of 
lifeworld becomes once more relevant to the discussion. This is because it is in the 
lifeworld that the mediation between the two spheres of morality and ethical life takes 
place.  
First, moral conflicts arise amidst the ethical horizons of the lifeworld. They 
arise in situations in which different and equally legitimate moral principles, which are 
already internalised into the ethical understandings of a form of life, seem to be equally 
relevant yet in conflict. In these cases, although the decentration required by the moral 
point of view will be necessary to re-validate these principles in the light of the new 
circumstances, the application of these abstract principles to concrete contexts of action 
will require a different form of clarification. Habermas introduces, after Klaus Günther, 
the concept of discourses of application that work as a complement to discourses of 
justification.250 In discourses of application, the principle of appropriateness takes the 
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place that (U) occupies in discourses of justification.251 What must be decided at this 
stage is not the validity of the abstract principles relevant to the case (their validity has 
already been ascertained during the justification stage), but the appropriateness of each 
in the light of all relevant features of a particular situation.252  
Habermas gives the example of different and legitimate principles of distributive 
justice that exist, such as „to each according to his needs‟, „to each according to its 
merits‟, and „equal shares for all‟. Although these principles of justice can be justified 
from the perspective of universalisability, they may not be equally appropriate in all 
situations involving distributive claims; if anything because they cannot anticipate all 
future contexts-situations in which they may be relevant. „Only in their application to 
particular contexts will it transpire which of the competing principles is the most 
appropriate in the given context.‟253 As he further illustrates, families tend to decide their 
internal conflicts of distribution based on need rather than merit, whereas at the level of 
society the reversal of this priority may be judged appropriate in certain contexts. „It 
depends on which principle best fits a given situation in the light of the most exhaustive 
possible description of its relevant features‟.254 Discourses of application, therefore, 
serve this task of linking a decentred morality with the ethical context. 
There is a second aspect in which the lifeworld is important in the mediation 
between morality and ethical life. It involves the question of the loss of moral 
motivation in the context of pluralism and post-conventional morality. Facing this 
problem, Habermas argues that post-conventional universalist moralities are dependent 
on forms of life that support the translation of moral convictions into moral action. He 
points out that: „[o]nly those forms of life that meet universalist moralities halfway in 
this sense fulfil the conditions necessary to reverse the abstractive achievements of 
decontextualization and demotivation.‟255 As he adds, moral motivation depends on the 
affective psychological development of individuals, which by its turn is contingent on 
socialisation in forms of ethical life that foster and reinforce sensitivity to the claims of 
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others. „There has to be a modicum of congruence between morality and the practices of 
socialization and education.‟256 They must promote the necessary superego controls and 
social competence of ego identities. 257 In other words, the horizons of an ethical form 
life are what make decentred morality possible. It is also the space where individuals 
find the motivation to act morally.  
Furthermore, morality also depends on the socio-political institutions of the 
lifeworld, i.e. they must be compatible with a post-conventional morality. For 
Habermas, certain institutional arrangements simply will not foster this compatibility: 
„[m]orality thrives only in an environment in which post-conventional ideas about law 
and morality have already been institutionalized to a certain extent.‟258 As he argues,  
Often lacking are institutions that would facilitate discursive decision-making. Often lacking are 
crucial socialization processes, so that the dispositions and abilities necessary for taking part in 
moral argumentation cannot be learned. Even more frequent is the case where material living 
conditions and social structures are such that moral-practical implications spring immediately to 
the eye and moral questions are answered, without further reflection, by the bare facts of 
poverty, abuse, and degradation. Wherever this is the case, wherever existing conditions make a 
mockery of the demands of universalist morality, moral issues turn into issues of political 
ethics.‟259 
In other words, the processes of socialisation and acquisitions of ego 
competencies are strong links to justice conceived discursively. Fundamentally, what 
this insight reveals is that the everyday practices and institutional arrangements of the 
lifeworld are also accountable to the very possibility of justice. This insight plays an 
important part on the argument developed in Chapters 4 and 5 about the relationship 
between health and justice. 
Finally, Habermas seems to reverse what is only an apparent primacy given to 
morality at the expense of the ethical life when he answers the question of why should 
we want to be moral? His reply is that the importance of morality is not in itself a moral 
judgement. Rather, it is a judgement that is part of the ethics of what it is to be human: 
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Without the emotions roused by moral sentiments like obligation and guilt, reproach and 
forgiveness, without the liberating effect of moral respect, without the happiness felt through 
solidarity and without the depressing effect of moral failure, without the „friendliness‟ of a 
civilized way of dealing with conflict and opposition, we would feel, or so we still think today, 
that the universe inhabited by men would be unbearable. Life in a moral void, in a form of life 
empty even of cynicism, would not be worth living. This judgment simply expresses the 
„impulse‟ to prefer an existence of human dignity to the coldness of a form of life not informed 
by moral considerations.
260
  
Moral universalism, therefore, is a historical achievement of ethical forms of life that 
facilitated this development. The implication of that is that the incorporation of moral 
principles into concrete forms of life is an achievement of collective efforts of political 
movements. Viewed as such, it places the choice and possibility of maintaining the 
conditions for justice on our shoulders, and the weight of this demanding autonomy, 
although challenging, seems to point towards emancipation and reconciliation. 
3.5 Law and the system of rights 
Against the charge of idealism directed to his discourse theory of morality, Habermas is 
aware of the difficulties that such demanding account of morality encounters in being 
applied to the real world. A post-conventional-morality according to Habermas has only 
a weak force in motivating action and its capacity for regulating and integrating 
complex societies which do not rely on a unifying worldview is limited. Habermas 
identifies, for example, three unprecedented difficulties that moral agents face in the 
process of appropriating and putting into practice post-conventional moral norms. First, 
post-conventional morality only provides a procedure for impartiality judging conflict 
situations, and while in these discursive processes certain abstract principles may not be 
fundamentally disputed, their subsequent contextual application in the light of the 
complexities of each case may overtax the individuals‟ analytical capacity. Second, 
individuals are required by a post-conventional morality to act according to moral 
insights mutually and rationally agreed on, yet if these insights are against individuals‟ 
immediate interests or inclination, motivation to act upon them may fail. Third, as 
societies become more complex, putting in practice moral duties, especially positive 
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ones, may require an organisational effort that individuals alone, despite favourable 
inclination, cannot meet.
261
 
Uniquely suited to address these weaknesses or morality is modern law.
262
 In 
Between Facts and Norms, Habermas presents a positive interpretation of law and its 
fundamental roles in modern society. In this work, the legal system is not construed as 
one more colonising force which strips the lifeworld from meanings through a process 
of juridification of everyday life.
263
 Instead, law is presented as an important medium 
for social integration and stabilisation of behaviour expectations in societies that are too 
complex to secure integration through morality and systemic media alone:  
Today legal norms are what is left of the crumbled cement of society; if all other mechanisms of 
social integration are exhausted, law still provides some means for keeping together complex and 
centrifugal societies that otherwise would fall to pieces. Law stands in as a substitute for the 
failures of other integrative mechanisms – markets and administrations, or values, norms, and 
face-to-face communications. 
264
  
Furthermore, law contributes to social integration as a mediator between lifeworld and 
system. According to Habermas the legal system can channel communication, opinion-
making, and influence from the public and private spheres into the special codes of the 
system as well as translate these codes to the communicative spheres of the lifeworld.
265
 
Even more positively, if successful in securing communicative liberties and in 
encouraging and channelling public debate and opinion formation in complex societies, 
law is contributing to social integration by taking advantage of „a permanent risk of 
dissensus to spur on legally institutionalized public discourses‟.266 
The reason why modern law is seen as uniquely suited to complement morality 
rests in its formal properties. According to Habermas, modern law has a dual character: 
on the one hand it is positive, i.e. it consists in a system of rules that is backed by threats 
and can be enforced, and on the other hand it is legitimate, i.e. it embodies appeals to 
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reasons that all citizens could find acceptable. As a result, it may secure compliance 
through two mechanisms:
267
  
The double reference of legal validity to de facto validity as measured by average acceptance, on 
the one hand, and to the legitimacy to the claim to normative recognition, on the other, leaves 
addressees with the choice of taking either an objectivating or performative attitude toward the 
same legal norm.
268
 
Therefore, from the perspective of the actor who acts strategically, legal norms stands as 
external constrains (securing de facto recognition), whereas from the perspective of the 
actor acting communicatively, law is respected because it embodies norms that deserve 
recognition. Therefore, the legal validity of a norm implies that two elements are 
simultaneously guaranteed: the legality of the behaviour, which can be enforced, and the 
legitimacy of the rule, „which always makes it possible to follow the norm out of respect 
for the law.‟269  
The structure and form of modern law, therefore, are capable of dealing with the 
cognitive indeterminacy of a post-conventional morality which is based on abstract 
principles and which nevertheless requires appropriate application to real and complex 
conflict situations. The coercive power of law makes up for the motivational deficit of 
post-conventional morality, and the institutional framework of the legal system, apart 
from defining rules and systematising decisions, produces a system of accountabilities 
that refers to individuals and to corporations and public agencies, addressing this way 
the need for combined and cooperative implementation of duties.
270
  
Yet, the inevitable question posed to modern law in its supplementary function 
to a post-conventional morality regards its source of legitimacy. To answer that, 
Habermas derives the legitimacy of modern law from the principles of discourse theory. 
In bringing the discourse principle
271
 into play in legal discourses, the principle assumes 
the form of the principle of democracy: 
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Only those laws count as legitimate to which all members of the legal community can assent in a 
discursive process of legislation that has in turn been legally constituted.
272
 
This principle, which arises from the interpenetration of the discourse principle and the 
legal form, 
273
establishes a procedure for legitimate law-making and for guiding the 
establishment of basic rights that makes possible a community‟s self-organisation under 
the rule of law.
274
 This interpenetration leads to the conceptualisation of a logical 
genesis of a system of rights,
275
 a circular process in which the legal form and the 
mechanism for producing legitimate laws are co-originally constituted.  
In this conceptual, logical, reconstruction of the system of rights, Habermas 
arrives at the rights citizens must grant each other if they want to legitimately organise 
and regulate their interactions under the medium of positive law. The first three 
categories of rights generate the legal form itself by awarding citizens the status of legal 
persons. They include: (1) rights to the greatest possible measure of equal individual 
liberties; (2) rights of membership in a voluntary association under the rule of law; and 
(3) rights to legal protection. These rights establish the horizontal relationships that 
citizens must have with each other before any introduction of a functionally necessary 
state authority and before the establishment of further rights to which all are subject to, 
i.e. at this first step citizens grant each other the status of addressees of the law. Only in 
a second step legal subjects become authors of the legal order by granting each other (4) 
rights to equal political participation. These rights, therefore, enable citizens to change 
and expand their rights and duties. Finally, to secure citizens‟ equal opportunities to 
exercise rights form (1) to (4), another category of rights is implied: (5) „basic rights to 
the provision of living conditions that are socially, technologically and ecologically 
safeguarded‟.276 These five categories of rights are purposively general and abstract, 
lacking more specific contents. Although to be effective and actionable, specific 
contents must be given to rights; this is a task that must be democratically left to citizens 
themselves to fulfil.
277
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Two important issues are attached to this reconstruction of rights: the 
relationship between rights and popular sovereignty and the relationship of rights with 
morality. First, the development of these five categories of rights represents an attempt 
at bridging the gap between the internal relation between human rights and popular 
sovereignty. Here Habermas refers to the age-old tension between the classical liberal 
moral reading of human rights (going back to John Locke) and the emphasis on popular 
sovereignty of classic republicanism (going back to Aristotle and Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau), both of which provide normative frameworks that legitimise legal orders. 
The first framework emphasises private autonomy and individual liberties (equivalent to 
rights 1 to 3 of Habermas‟s reconstruction) whereas the latter emphasises the civic 
autonomy of individuals and their practice of self-determination (emphasising category 
4 of Habermas‟s reconstruction). As the reconstruction of the system of rights reveals, 
however, private and public autonomies presuppose each other:
278
 
The internal relation between democracy and the rule of law consists in this: on the one hand, 
citizens can make appropriate use of their public autonomy only if, on the basis of their equally 
protected private autonomy, they are sufficiently independent; on the other hand, they can realize 
equality in the enjoyment of their private autonomy only if they make appropriate use of their 
political autonomy as citizens. Consequently, liberal and political basic rights are inseparable.
279
 
Second, as Habermas‟s reconstruction of the systems of rights already signals, 
human rights are conceived as legal rights. Despite their legal status, rights maintain 
fundamental links with morality; as Habermas explains, human rights are „Janus-faced, 
looking simultaneously toward morality and law‟.280 Habermas traces the modern 
understanding of human rights back to the Virginia Bill of Rights and to the 1776 
American Declaration of Independence, and to the 1789 Declaration des droits de 
l‟homme et du citoyen‟, which were inspired by modern natural law and principally that 
of Locke and Rousseau.
281
 Despite seeing human rights as the basic rights that constitute 
the legal orders of constitutional democracies, and structurally belonging therefore to a 
positive legal order, for Habermas rights share with morality their form of validity. First, 
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like morality they are addressed to persons as human beings and nor as citizens, 
claiming a universal validity, i.e. a validity that goes beyond the boundaries of legal 
communities. In addition, both moral norms and rights are justified by moral 
argumentation. That means that at the level of justification, rights are not subject to 
pragmatic and local cultural constraints; they have to project norms that are equally 
good for all. Yet, just as other legal rules, rights also enjoy the dual character of de facto 
recognition and recognition out of the respect for its normative content.
282
As it will be 
seen in Chapter 5, the interpretation of rights as legal categories has important 
implications in the academic debate about the status of rights, including the status of the 
right to health. 
Finally, Habermas concludes Between Facts and Norms by providing a further 
illustration of the implications of the internal relation between private and public 
autonomy: an account of the inadequacies of the mutually competing liberal and 
welfare-state paradigms of law. The liberal paradigm, privileging the economic 
arrangements of society, crystallises around private law and especially so around 
property rights and contractual freedom. The welfare paradigm, which was developed as 
a response to the distortions resulting from the untamed capitalist system, aims at 
compensating citizens from growing inequalities of the capitalist system through 
regulation of the economic and through granting citizens with social rights. Yet, in 
doing so, the welfare paradigm creates distortions of its own by generating welfare 
dependencies and over intrusive bureaucracies. Despite their differences, for Habermas, 
the inadequacies of both paradigms have the same origin: both paradigms focus on the 
private autonomy of individuals at the expense of the internal relation between private 
and public autonomy.
283
 In his words, 
Between the two received paradigms, the only controversial issue is whether private autonomy is 
best guaranteed straight away by negative freedoms, or whether the conditions for private 
autonomy must be secured through the provision of welfare entitlements.
284
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To address this common failure, Habermas proposes a third paradigm of law; a 
procedural paradigm that „crystallises neither around the private competitor on markets 
nor around the private client of welfare bureaucracies‟.285 His procedural model 
emphasises a heightened democratic participation in law-making and administration. As 
he justifies: 
In highly differentiated societies with an intransparent diversity of interests, it is an epistemic 
requirement for the equal distribution of liberties for everybody that those citizens affected or 
concerned first get themselves the chance to push their cases in public, and articulate as well as 
justify those aspects which are relevant for equal treatment in typical situations. Briefly, the 
private autonomy of equally entitled citizens can be secured only insofar as citizens actively 
exercise their civic autonomy.
286
  
In more democratic law-making processes, deliberation must be open to the input from 
civil society and to sufficiently inclusive informal public opinion.
287
 Only by having the 
space for influencing policies and laws modern subjects can abide by legal rules they 
accept; only then citizens can also see themselves as authors of the laws to which they 
are subject.
288
  
4 Conclusion 
Habermas‟s work is surely broader and more complex than what could be presented 
above. For this reason, this chapter had only the limited task to introduce the reader to 
the aspects of Habermas‟s work that are relevant to the arguments developed in the 
thesis regarding health and its relationship with justice. To achieve that, the role that 
health plays in society also needs to be explored. In discourse theory, the sociological 
concern for understanding society and its integration and reproduction is never detached 
from questions about the right and the just. These two enquiries – the sociological and 
the philosophical – are interdependent. To that end, the next chapter starts by exploring 
the debate regarding the meaning of health. Understanding the debate surrounding this 
concept is fundamental for understanding the analysis of what health, conceived 
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intersubjectively, means and what social roles it plays in society (Chapter 4). The 
answers to these enquiries provide the base for the analysis of the relationship between 
health and justice in Chapter 5. The links between the theoretical aspects of Habermas 
discussed above and the arguments developed in this thesis are briefly presented below. 
 To analyse the debate about the meaning of health, Chapter 3 relies on 
Habermas‟s theory of the roles of language, speech acts, and the different validity 
claims and relationships with the world that they establish. This analysis leads to the 
conclusion that health has no categorical definition. There are a multitude of definitions 
and interpretations of its meaning and their validity are dependent on their rational 
justification and appropriateness to the context. Furthermore, the diversity of accounts 
of health is seen as positive, allowing the critical mediation between the different 
moments of modern rationality. In addition, this analysis about the different meanings of 
health points to the intersubjective conceptualisation of health that is appropriate to the 
purpose of analysing its relationship with justice. 
 Having analysed the different meanings of health, an intersubjective 
interpretation of the concept is developed in Chapter 4. To understand the social role of 
health, Habermas‟s theory of society – in its dual interpretation as system and lifeworld 
– is relied upon. This dual interpretation makes it possible the conceptualisation of 
health as a sub-system of the lifeworld which contributes to social integration at the 
level of the lifeworld‟s three structural components. Here, Habermas‟s insights on 
processes of socialisation of the individual and her moral development are also 
employed to argue that health has an important role in fostering the conditions for moral 
discourses, insofar as it consists in a system in which relationships of solidarity and care 
for others are nurtured. The lack of mediation between the different valid discourses that 
permeate the health system and the increasing encroachment by the system‟s media 
permit the analysis of crises in health. 
 Finally, in Chapter 5 the relationship of health and justice is explored, and the 
role health plays in social integration will serve as the basis for this analysis. The 
concept of the right to health and its controversies are thus analysed in the light of this 
relationship. Habermas‟s moral and legal theories form the guide to the analyses of this 
concluding chapter. 
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Chapter 3 
A DISCOURSE THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE ON THE DEBATE 
ABOUT THE DEFINITION OF HEALTH 
1 Introduction: what is health?  
Health enjoys no uncontroversial definition. As many other concepts relevant to 
the human condition in modern capitalism, such as happiness, needs satisfaction, dignity 
and even freedom, its definition seems to lie in the worldview of the beholder. Whereas 
some may define health as a condition of normal functioning of the human body, others 
may define it as broadly as to encompass a state of physical, mental, social and even 
spiritual well-being of the individual and the collective. In debating the meaning of 
health, some may value conceptual rigour and concepts that can be operationalised, 
whereas others may be interested in widening its scope and linking it to wider social 
issues. More than an illustration of the conditions of pluralism in society, these 
differences also reveal different political agendas and the different normative 
assumptions that follow from them. The importance of understanding the debate 
surrounding concepts central to health, such as healthcare and illness, is that the ways of 
defining such concepts influence health policies and bioethical standards worldwide.289 
As Robert Hahn illustrates,  
a society in which sickness is thought to be defined by human experience and caused by human 
interactions – physiological as well as social – may attend more to its social organization and the 
understandings of its patients in addressing prevention and cure. How we think of sickness and 
different kind of sickness shapes our response, diagnosis, and treatment.
290
 
Yet, defining health is no easy task. As Lennart Nordenfelt observes, health is a 
notoriously vague concept.291 It is an idea difficult to conceptualise without an appeal to 
other concepts that can themselves be vague. Many find it hard to define health without 
appealing to concepts such as normality or to „opposites‟ of health such as disease or 
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illness. Normality, for instance, is not an uncontroversial concept. It raises more 
questions than answers: normality for what or for whom? It can also convey a variety of 
different meanings, such as average, most representative, most common, optimal, 
habitual.292 In sum, it only seems to transfer the controversy from one concept (health) to 
another (normality).  
The tendency to define health through its opposites, as in the classical „health is 
the absence of disease,‟ illustrates a negative construction of the concept, in which 
health is defined by the absence of something else, such as disease or illness. Here 
again, concepts such as disease, illness, and sickness are not easily definable and many 
theorists do not use them interchangeably. As Mildred Blaxter describes, disease is more 
commonly associated with the medical equivalent of a condition, i.e. the pathology. 
Illness is associated with the subjective experience of such a condition, and sickness is 
associated with the social role taken by those who are defined as diseased or ill. These 
three concepts, however, are not always symmetrical. One can, for instance, have a 
medical diagnosis of a condition, say, hypercholesterolemia,293 and not feel ill at all. On 
the other hand, one may be feeling ill, say, tired and sad, without having any recognised 
medical diagnosis to associate it with it. In addition, when diseased or ill, people may 
not always assume conventional and expected sick roles. Whereas some may assume the 
role of patient and seek medical help, others may choose not to do so. In the same way, 
society may treat a diseased person as a less functional member independently of 
whether she feels ill or disabled at all.294 
In contrast with the „absence of disease‟ framework, many prefer to construct 
health as a positive concept that also encompasses values such as happiness, balance, 
and wellbeing with oneself and one‟s community. This characterisation of health as a 
positive state has broader social connotations in comparison to accounts that tend to 
focus on diseases and that limit health to the realm of science and medical practices.  
The debate between these two opposing views is not a modern development. The 
history of this antagonism is long, dating back to the classics. The term hygiene, for 
                                                 
292
 See more in Blaxter, 2004, p. 4. 
293
 High blood cholesterol levels. 
294
 See Blaxter, 2004, pp. 20-2. 
89 
example, derives from the Greek goddess Hygeia. Hygeia, according to the medical 
historian René Dubos, watched over the health of Athens and symbolised the „virtues of 
a sane life in a pleasant environment, the ideal of mens sana in corpora sano.‟295 The 
myth of Hygeia is juxtaposed by Dubos to the myth of Asclepius, the Greek god of 
healing, who according to the legend was the first physician. In contrast with Hygeia, 
Asclepius did not teach wisdom and virtues but mastered the use of knives and the 
curative benefits of plants.296 For Dubos, the two ancient Greek myths symbolise the two 
classical approaches to health and medicine that still have currency today; one focusing 
on the positive relationship between health and virtue and between the individual and 
the environment and the other focusing on the cure of diseases.297 
Classic Greek thinkers profoundly influenced this old dichotomy. The parallel 
influences of Aristotle via Galen and Atomists via René Decartes contributed to the 
Western dichotomical holistic and scientistic approach to health. Aristotle described 
health as an important factor leading to the state of eudaimonia,298 and his work heavily 
influenced Galenic medicine299 and its theory of the balance of humours (yellow bile, 
black bile, phlegm and blood), the disruption of which would explain patients‟ 
conditions.300 This theory, which was influential in medical practice until at least the 18
th
 
century, was based on Aristotle‟s account of the four qualities – hot, cold, moist and dry 
– belonging to the four elements – earth, air, fire, and water. Health and balance with 
nature were then seen as closely linked and part of the same thing. It was in 
contraposition to the works of Greek Atomists that Aristotle developed his views of 
nature. Greek Atomists believed that the property of objects could be explained in 
relation to their ultimate particles (atoms) and that the particular arrangements of these 
particles composed the observable characteristics of objects. This atomistic view 
influenced the mechanical philosophy of Descartes, whose approach to nature, including 
the human body, was characterised by the explanation of events in terms of matter and 
motion. Illustrative of his approach to nature is his view of the heart as an engine 
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responsible for distributing tiny particles (the blood) around the body.301 According to 
his critics, the (negative) impacts of Cartesian philosophy are still pervasive in 
biomedicine with its „mechanistic‟ view of the body as a machine which can be repaired 
or have its parts replaced.302  
The holistic approach is then more inspired by the ideals (or illusions) of perfect 
health and happiness and of harmony with nature that flourished throughout history; 
echoing myths of paradise on earth and passionate appeals for a return to nature.303 
Rousseau, for whom man in the „natural state was good, healthy, and happy‟ and for 
whom „hygiene‟ is „less a science than a virtue‟,304 is an example of such idealisations. 
Contemporary alternative medicine movements, with their focus on „natural‟ therapies 
and the criticism of the biomedical model are another example of the search for a lost 
harmony with nature.305 
A different approach is taken by those who feel more inspired by the medical 
developments of the 19
th
 century, especially on the field of microbiology. The discovery 
of microorganisms informed the development of the theory of specific aetiology and the 
associated philosophy that all diseases have causes and patterns of presentation and 
evolution, creating bodily disturbances that can be categorised, identified and treated.306 
This is also the moment that represented the shift from medical care being offered at 
home by different healing practitioners – bedside medicine307 – to the era of the 
institutionalisation of care, in which medical treatment became centred in hospitals 
under the guidance of formalised medical professionals.308 Today, it is this approach to 
health which prevails with the formalisation and institutionaliation of healthcare, and it 
is of special appeal to those that reject the inclusion of holistic values such as happiness 
and social wellbeing on the definition of health.309 
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The objective of this chapter is to address this dichotomy between a scientific 
and a social model of health with a view to construct an approach to the concept 
informed by discourse theory. To do that, this chapter analyses the debate from the 
perspective of Habermas‟s theory of language in use. The result of this analysis (a) 
concludes that apart from their rational justification, the validity of these different 
claims about health depends on the appropriateness of the claims to the context and (b) 
proposes a mediation between these conflicting approaches. It is argued that different 
approaches to health can be valid and that this diversity should be seen as a positive 
feature and not a hindrance to the development of health policies. Furthermore, 
distortions arise when one form of discourse becomes dominant and refractory to the 
critical outlook of the other. 
The chapter starts with an analysis of different accounts of health. Starting with 
lay accounts it is argued that they can provide an important contribution to the 
understanding of the intersubjective dimension of health. An analysis of biomedical 
accounts of health will follow with a focus on the agenda that lies behind their assumed 
value-neutrality. It is argued that a value-neutrality will not be able to protect the 
internal logic of biomedicine against the influences of the economic and administrative 
system. Next, the social model of health is also analysed with a special focus on its 
critique of biomedicine. The WHO definition of health is then presented as an 
illustration of the social model and the controversy that it generates serves as an 
illustration of how this controversy operates in actual context. The concluding analysis 
places the controversy created by the WHO definition within Wittgenstein‟s theory of 
language-games and Habermas‟s universal pragmatics. This analysis points to the 
conclusion that in the context of the WHO‟s constitution, the appropriate interpretation 
of the definition of health should involve the recognition that it is a claim to rightness as 
opposed to a claim to truth, i.e. it should be interpreted as a normative statement as 
opposed to a descriptive one. It is argued that this does not invalidate the use of 
cognitive-instrumental approaches to the concept in the context of everyday activities of 
the organisation. The substantive content of the definition, however, is criticised due to 
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its lack of focus on the justice of the interactions among social actors and how these 
interactions affect people‟s health. However, it is proposed that the definition should 
stand due to its important historical normative reference. Finally, it is concluded that a 
discourse theoretical interpretation of health with the objective of exploring its 
relationship with justice should focus on the intersubjective dimension of health and its 
normative implications. The development of this intersubjective account of health is the 
subject of the next chapter.  
2 Exploring different accounts of health 
2.1 Lay accounts 
People have different conceptions of what health means and their conceptions normally 
exhibit a combination of ideas stemming from traditional knowledge, personal 
experiences, and more scientific accounts. Information about health and diseases 
provided by different actors, such as formal healthcare providers, governmental health 
institutions, patients‟ associations, drugs and alternative therapies industries, are widely 
available and filtered into individuals‟ reservoir of cultural knowledge. This process has 
been powered by the use of the internet as a source of healthcare information by patients 
and the public at large. Because of this broad array of sources of information about 
health that lay individuals have access to, as Blaxter defines, „lay beliefs can be better 
defined as commonsense understandings and personal experience, imbued with 
professional rationalisations.‟310  
Blaxter reached this conclusion after a 1990 survey, in which 9,000 people in the 
UK were interviewed about their understanding of health.311 A qualitative analysis of a 
randomly selected 10 per cent sample revealed that people had a variety of 
understandings about the meaning of health and that these understandings tended to 
change during the life course of the individual. Understandings also tended to vary 
according to age, gender, class, and education. Furthermore, the respondents commonly 
had more than one understanding of health. Blaxter divided the results into five main 
categories. (a) The first category represented those who defined health as not being ill, 
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which was more common in individuals who thought that their health was in good 
shape. b) The second category represented those who associated health with physical 
fitness or vitality. This association was more commonly made by younger people, and in 
fact, „fit‟ was the most common word used by men under 40. c) The third category 
expressed the view of health as social relations. This association between health and 
social relationships was mostly made by women. Younger women tended to link health 
as good relationships with family and children, whereas elderly women tended to 
emphasise the link between health and the ability to retain an active place in the social 
world and care for others. d) The fourth category represented those who associated 
health with function. Health was linked by them with the ability to do things, and in this 
group the respondents tended to place less emphasis on feelings. Elderly people tended 
to emphasise retaining mobility, self-sufficiency, care for oneself, and continuing work 
despite one‟s age. Young men tended to emphasise health as the ability to do hard work. 
Finally, e) the fifth category represented the most common definition of health provided 
in all age and gender groups except for young men. In this category health was viewed 
as psychosocial well-being. Happiness, confidence and emotional stability were all 
feelings and states associated with health. Apart from these five categories, Blaxter also 
identified a group who felt unable or less motivated to answer the questions, and most 
individuals within this group tended to think that their health was in poor condition. 
Further findings were that the poorest and disadvantaged showed to be more likely to 
say that their health was poor, and that the holistic view was more commonly conveyed 
by higher educated people or people on less manual jobs.  
An interesting aspect revealed by Blaxter‟s findings is that lay people‟s different 
concepts of health are not dissimilar to the different categories of definitions of health 
given by experts.312 As observed, some constructed health broadly whereas others 
associated it more with not being ill or maintaining the capacity to function. As it will be 
seen, experts too define health in terms of the absence of disease, as functioning 
capabilities, or associate it with states such as happiness and wellbeing and relationships 
with others. An important difference, however, is the flexibility of lay individuals in 
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incorporating, simultaneously, different accounts of health. It is possible that the 
different information they are exposed to and the great impact of personal experiences 
of health and disease allow their views to be more fluid and open to changes.  
The critical potential of lay ideas about health may reside precisely on this 
openness to different accounts. Gareth Williams and Jennie Popay, for example, defend 
this thesis and argue it is at this level that the experiential domain of health takes place, 
which can provide not only important insights about the forces that influence health but 
also a source of challenge to professional and systemic hubris.313 As they remark, „the 
knowledge people have of the impact of social forces upon them contains an 
understanding of the complex interplay of biography, history, locality and the broader 
social divisions of class and gender.‟314 Employing a Habermasian framework, they 
conclude that there is a „range of ways in which lay knowledge embodies resistance to 
the colonisation of the lifeworld by either the state or market forces.‟315  
A similar discussion on the interface between health, the lifeworld and system is 
advanced in Chapter 4, where people‟s experiences of health, illness and healthcare are 
further discussed, although with a focus on the experiences of illness. These experiences 
help us explore and uncover the intersubjective meaning of health, which allows us to 
reinterpret the relationship of health and justice in Chapter 5. The expert definitions of 
health are the focus of the next sections. These expert accounts are divided into 
biomedical and social.  
2.2 Scientific accounts: the biomedical model 
In most Western societies, the dominant concept of health follows the scientific model, 
and more specifically, the biomedical. As Blaxter points out, in practice, the definition 
of health has always been the „territory of those who define its opposite‟,316 i.e. the 
practitioners of medicine as a science. This is because theirs is the perspective which 
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becomes institutionalised in law and administration.317 Characteristically, this 
institutionalised account of health is more strongly focused on the concept of disease 
than in the concept of health. One of the results of this negative construction318 is that 
biomedicine assumes as the main role of health promotion the treatment of diseases. 
This leads critics to point to another shortcoming of the biomedical model: by focusing 
on diseases, biomedicine tends to approach them independently of patients, who are 
conceived as their „carriers‟.319  
In its classical form, the main principles of biomedicine are: (a) the doctrine of 
the specific aetiology, or the idea that all diseases are caused by an identifiable cause, 
such as bacteria, parasites, toxins, metabolic disturbances, and traumas; (b) the 
assumption of the generic disease, or the idea that within the human species each disease 
has universal and distinguishing features; (c) the view of ill health as deviation from 
normal measurable biological variables; and more importantly, (d) scientific neutrality 
or the belief that it is a value-free science.320 Blaxter points out that in reality, 
contemporary biomedicine tends to be less mechanistic than its classical principles 
suggest, having incorporated, for example, the idea of multiple and interacting causes as 
well as accepted that diseases can also have psychological and social causes.321 Yet, 
these changes did not fundamentally challenge the biomedical paradigm, especially its 
scepticism towards values and towards „the social‟. But should the biomedical paradigm 
change at all? To address this question, different biomedical definitions of health are 
explored followed by the identification of the common agenda behind them. The next 
chapter will give us the opportunity to further this analysis by positioning biomedicine 
within Habermas‟s account of the lifeworld. 
The contemporary biomedicine‟s shift from claims to a solidly scientific and 
value-free approach to one more accommodating of values can be illustrated in the 
works of two of the most influential thinkers within the debate on the scientific 
definition of health, namely Christopher Boorse and Nordenfelt. In Boorse‟s work, 
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which precedes Nordenfelt‟s, health is negatively defined as the absence of disease, and 
it is the concept of disease which therefore receives his focus of attention. Nordenfelt in 
contrast, incorporates value-categories in seeing health as a positive concept associated 
with individual wellbeing and capacity to achieve her life‟s essential goals. Furthermore, 
patients‟ values are also included in his theory. Because of their apparent differences, 
their accounts are denominated within the field of philosophy of medicine as naturalist 
and normativist respectively.322 Despite these differences, as George Khushf notes, they 
share the same fundamental aims of forging a definition of health within the scientific 
paradigm and, more importantly, of setting boundaries to what counts as health in order 
to protect medical knowledge and authority against external interferences.323 However, 
as it will be argued, the strategy they use with the purpose of shielding biomedicine 
from external interference, namely the appeal to value-neutrality, is unlikely to succeed 
in modern capitalism.  
Boorse first established his account of health in 1977, arguing that as a medical 
concept, health must be defined by the absence of disease. Furthermore, he states that 
this construction of health is essentially value-free.324 Having established that „health is 
normal functioning, where the normality is statistical and the functions biological,‟325 he 
focuses his attention on what counts as abnormality, i.e. disease:  
[a] disease is a type of internal state which is either an impairment of normal functional ability, 
i.e. a reduction of one or more functional abilities below typical efficiency, or a limitation on 
functional ability caused by environmental agents. 
326
 
Normal functional ability refers to the functionality of bodily organs. Organs are healthy 
when they make their „species-typical‟ contribution to the individual‟s crucial biological 
goals, i.e. survival and reproduction. Species-typical, by its turn, is defined by appeal to 
evolutionary biology and measured in statistical terms. His commitment to the 
establishment of value-free concepts becomes evident when he argues that „[i]f diseases 
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are deviations from the species biological design, their recognition is a matter of natural 
science, not evaluative decision,‟327 and when he further argues that „[o]ur conception of 
disease required no value judgement about what forms of human life are admirable or 
desirable.‟328 The problem with positive ideas of health, he concludes, is that they are 
„not discoverable, but only advocable.‟329  
Nordenfelt takes issue with Boorse‟s definition by claiming that it is not only the 
individual survival and reproduction what is at stake, but also her quality of life and 
welfare. In adding these positive values, Nordenfelt is rejecting the idea that health is 
value-free. He argues that apart from its objective elements, health also encompasses 
evaluative and extra-biological elements, such as the individual‟s ability to reach her 
most vital goals in life. Significantly, these goals are to be established by the patient 
herself; although the word vital is carefully used as a qualifier in order to avoid 
counterintuitive conclusions such as that any need, however uncommon or unrealistic, 
would count as much as basic needs or that the individual needs to realise all her goals 
in life in order to be considered healthy.330 Furthermore, in going beyond Boorse‟s 
concept of diseases, a broader range of patients‟ problems, such as pain, suffering, and 
disabilities, which may also impact in the patient‟s ability to achieve her goals, are 
accounted for in his definition.331.  
This is how Nordenfelt positively defines health: 
 A is completely healthy if, and only if, A has the ability, given standard circumstances, to reach 
all his or her vital goals.
 332
 
It is only after defining health that he proceeds to define disease. At this stage his 
scientific focus becomes more noticeable: 
A has a disease if, and only if, A has at least one organ which is involved in such a state or 
process as tends to reduce the health of A. The disease is identical with the state or process 
itself.
333
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It is worth noting that for Nordenfelt health means something different, and broader, 
than for Boorse. By including the extra-biological ends of patients‟ capabilities, he 
potentially expands the number of conditions that would fit into his definition of disease. 
Moreover, in Nordenfelt‟s account a condition would be qualified as a disease even if it 
does not affect the survival or reproduction of the individual, therefore also 
accommodating disabilities and mental conditions. 
Whereas his concept of disease seems to be more in tune with modern 
developments in biomedicine and its new disease trends, some critics are still 
particularly wary of the inclusion of any „extra-biological end‟ to a definition of health. 
Thomas Schramme for example, although agreeing with Nordenfelt that health cannot 
be only descriptive of organs dysfunctions, claims that Nordenfelt‟s definition is too 
demanding. In addition, he claims that Nordenfelt‟s definition leads to implausible 
consequences. He illustrates this criticism with the example of „someone with epilepsy 
whose only vital goal consists in being well respected by others and who happens to live 
in a society where epilepsy is judged as a sign of sainthood is healthy‟.334 
His critique of Nordenfelt reveals the major concern expressed by many in the 
field against any such broad definition of health: that it risks opening the gates of 
„medicalisation of all kinds of problems in life‟.335 For this reason, Schramme supports 
the view that health should be exclusively a medical term:  
Medical normality should be our sufficient criterion of health, and pathology the necessary 
condition of ill health. Both criteria can be vindicated without any relation to subjective goals in 
a naturalist theory.
336
  
Noticeable in his attempt at avoiding the „medicalisation‟ of the social is the typical 
biomedical appeal to „normality‟ and emphasis in excluding „subjective goals‟.  
 The concern against medicalisation with its risk of supporting oppressive 
policies, such as the pathologising of homosexuality and political dissidence, is also 
expressed by Khushf, and this concern brings him to analyse the debate from a very 
interesting perspective. He claims that apart from the risk of medicalisation, there are at 
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present other important threats to „older medical ethical values‟ and practices.337 These 
threats are the increasing pressures coming from the socioeconomic and administrative 
fronts of the medical system, such as managed care and total quality review strategies. 
He fears that pressures coming from these two fronts are affecting the traditional 
scientific and ethical core of medicine.338 
 According to Khushf, medical practice has traditionally been able to insulate 
itself from external challenges by emphasising the fact-value divide. In medicine this 
divide is in „hyper-form‟ and the perpetuation of this dichotomy has been fundamental 
for the self-understanding of biomedicine. As he argues, it is the biomedical assumed 
neutrality and objective facts-based analysis that allow its independence from the 
influence of other systems. In the context of contemporary biomedical practice, this 
dichotomy is perceived by him as key to the biomedical resistance to an ever growing 
„intrusion‟ of administrative and economic strategies in the medical practice. As he 
illustrates, medicine based in evidence helps professionals do the job of justifying the 
cost of treatments to saving-savvy insurers better than the appeal to ethical 
considerations for any individual patient.339 In sum, this dichotomy makes it possible to 
biomedicine to shun external values by framing conflicts in objective-scientific 
manners.340 
 Looking from the perspective of the fact-value divide, Khushf concludes that 
both Boorse‟s and Nordenfelt‟s accounts are actually very similar. He argues that both 
represent and defend a similar model of interaction between science, medicine and 
society, in which the fact-value divide plays the important role of setting the boundaries 
between them. 341 Khushf identifies the fact-value divide expressed in different ways in 
the work of the two theorists. Boorse‟s account is heavily based on the classical 
scientific ideals of traditional medicine. According to this view, health and disease are 
seen as a matter of scientific investigation and they are presented as facts. By being 
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conceived as facts they become free from any biases brought by values.342 As Boorse 
advocates, „we must avoid confusing empirical questions with deep normative issues 
about the goals of human life and the role of health professionals in achieving them.‟343  
Khushf identifies the fact-value divide in Nordenfelt‟s work by reframing it in 
the pure-applied science framework. While pure science is devoid of value-analyses, 
applied science by putting pure science into practice inevitably incorporates evaluative 
questions, such as: what are the objectives of the given application? He places 
Nordenfelt‟s work within the applied science model. In Nordenfelt‟s work, the goals of 
medicine are to facilitate the achievement of individuals‟ life goals through medical 
intervention. Yet, as Khushf identifies, as soon as that end is given, how to achieve them 
becomes for Nordenfelt a matter for scientific investigation and technical procedure: 
„[a]s soon as the matters which are open to evaluation are decided upon a standard is 
established which can be used for purely empirical investigation.‟344 
Khushf then concludes that the expression of the fact-value divide in 
Nordenfelt‟s is superior to Boorse‟s. He argues that Nordenfelt‟s account is more in 
touch with contemporary biomedicine by including the individual and her goals, and 
thus merging medical science with the „bioethical consensus‟ characterised by 
individual autonomy.345 As he claims, „[t]he contemporary ethos supporting more patient 
autonomy thus becomes a vehicle for specifying the ends that are necessary for the 
appropriate technical intervention.‟346 Notably, Khushf identifies the bioethical focus on 
the individual as a welcome help in getting medical practice insulated from 
administrative and economic intrusion. As he adds, „[w]e find here a critical function of 
[Nordenfelt‟s] health concept.‟347 
 There are two very interesting aspects in Khushf‟s arguments. One regards the 
way he, in aiming at protecting traditional medical values, constructs patient autonomy 
and the way he seizes it in defence of the integrity of the internal logic of the biomedical 
model. The second regards the high moral ground he seems to ascribe to traditional 
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medical practice and the consequent negative stand towards influences coming from 
outside its traditional boundaries. 
Patient autonomy and their role in the medical encounter are still framed by 
Khushf in traditional paternalistic fashion. It does not seem to imply a new relationship 
of symmetry between the medical professional and the patient. It seems instead to 
translate a relationship based on a combination of paternalism and instrumentalism. 
Note, for example, Khushf‟s choice of words:  
[p]atient autonomy does not mean they have a say in the science. We allow patients to advance 
their ends, and to guide how such ends might help prioritize possible courses of action. But 
physicians are the masters of the means; they know the science, and have the requisite 
knowledge and skill to instrumentally advance the ends.
348
  
The „bioethical consensus on patient autonomy‟ is used to emphasise the importance of 
medical authority, i.e. patient‟s autonomy seems instrumental to the end of maintaining 
the integrity and authority of biomedicine. Limits to autonomy are promptly put in place 
lest it becomes, along with administrative and socio-economic factors, another source of 
„threat‟ to biomedical integrity: As he observes: 
 [t]he physician-patient interaction is seen as a scientifically grounded practice, directed by the 
clinician. Patients values come in as a second strand, guiding potential „medically indicated‟ 
courses of action towards the advancement of patient ends. Socio-economic factors are in turn, 
seen as necessary, providing the conditions for an effective medical intervention, but they are not 
supposed to intrude into the process of clinical decision-making and distort the integrity of that 
core clinical interaction.
349
 
Also worth noting is Khushf‟s use of language, which could not be more telling 
of his view of the high moral ground of medicine and of the potentially threatening 
character of external influences. Words such as intrusion, distortion, protection, and 
insulation are metaphors used to describe the antagonism between the threat from 
outside and the „integrity‟ of the inside. 
The threats posed to biomedicine by the economic-administrative fronts, and 
although less explicitly, also from (too much) patient autonomy, lead Khushf to 
conclude that the debate between naturalists and normativists should not be focusing on 
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concept definitions, but on how to respond to these threats. As he concludes, it will not 
be possible for medicine to sustain the classical fact-value divide as expressed by 
Boorse, and as a result the debate should move a lot deeper, focusing instead on the 
question of „[h]ow can we sustain older medical ethical values in this altered context?‟350  
The different biomedical accounts of health above analysed share a fundamental 
characteristic, although to a lesser degree in Nordenfelt: a resistance to what cannot be 
dealt with through its own logic and its own language. External influences are not only 
seen as non-belonging, but also as unwelcome interferences in biomedicine. In response 
to the increasing pressures from outside, Khushf presses for a revaluation of the role of 
medicine in society and for ways to protect it from undue outside influence.  
While I agree with his assertion that a debate over the role of biomedicine in 
society is of essence, I disagree that it should start from the premise that the biomedical 
integrity must be protected from other spheres. Although I share with Khushf the 
opinion that the logic of the market in healthcare is destructive, I see empowering 
patients and the call for symmetry in their relationships with healthcare professionals as 
welcome social transformations that can only add to the integrity, but also legitimacy, of 
the system. If we place Khushf‟s concerns about the integrity of biomedicine within 
Habermas‟s theory of the colonisation of the lifeworld, we will conclude that the 
resistance to the colonisation of biomedicine by the economic and administrative logics 
cannot be achieved by sustaining the dominance of instrumental logic and value-
neutrality in biomedical practices. On the contrary, it is in fostering symmetrical 
relations of mutual recognition among professionals and patients and in welcoming 
dialogical value-analysis that biomedicine can find its strength and shelter against its 
colonisation. Furthermore, as it will be seen in chapter 4, the inclusion of moral 
evaluations and the strengthening of patient autonomy do not entail the abandonment of 
the scientific logic per se, but the adjustment of the scope of this logic and of its place 
within the lifeworld. This argument is pursued in more depth in the next chapter. 
2.3 Holistic accounts: the social model 
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Social models of health and illness here represent a series of approaches that contrapose 
the traditional biomedical model. Characteristically to the social model, health is not 
completely defined by its opposite, disease. As Blaxter summarises, according to the 
social model of health „concepts of health and ill health are asymmetrical: they are not 
simply opposites. The absence of disease may be part of health, but health is more than 
the absence of disease‟.351 In espousing a holistic approach to health and illness, a central 
tenet of the social model becomes the rejection of what they characterise as the 
technicist and mechanicist approach of biomedicine and its institutionalised support by 
healthcare systems, government and the law. Typically, holistic accounts focus on health 
and its positive aspects which may include different ideas of individual and social well-
being and the recognition that individuals are not machines or bearers of an aggregate of 
organs, but beings shaped by values, purposive actions, and in continuous interaction 
with the social world.352  
Social model accounts of health and disease are also characteristically sceptical 
of the biomedical assumption of value-neutrality, of its excessive focus on biological 
processes, of its emphasis on „cures‟ rather than on „prevention‟, and of its enthusiasm 
with expensive new technologies. As Blaxter observes, this distrust of a „Frankenstein 
technology that could run out of control‟ guided the new, social model of health.353 The 
social model strongly rejects the mechanicism of the biomedical model and its metaphor 
of the body as a machine, as it sees disturbances in the body of a person as involving her 
whole system, including the complex network linking her biological, psychological and 
social context. 
Another important characteristic of the social model of health, and interestingly 
this is shared with many within the biomedical model, is its criticism against the 
medicalisation of the world. Surely, the threat of medicalisation and its consequences 
are perceived in different ways by these two models. The main difference is that for 
social model, biomedicine is not the victim, but precisely the heart of the problem.  
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The medicalisation of the social world thesis is at the centre of the criticism 
directed to biomedicine by one of its fiercest critic, Ivan Illich. Illich argues that the 
practice of the medical professions, through its mechanistic focus on disease and 
expensive technologies has „become a major threat to health.‟ He points out that the 
biomedical contributions to the improvement of health conditions have been far less 
important than changes in the wider environment such as better housing, work 
conditions, and nutrition. He concludes that more harmful than medical iatrogenesis, is 
the „social and cultural iatrogenesis led by the excessive medicalisation of society.‟354 
The medicalisation of society is frequently associated with the development of 
oppressive social policies under the excuse of health concerns as seen in the infamous 
history of many mental health policies. Works in the area abound, and an oft cited 
example is the Soviet use of psychiatry to control political dissidence. Within the social 
model debate, biomedicine and its claimed value-neutrality are often accused of 
colluding with authorities in making such oppressive practices possible. Influenced not 
only by the works of Illich, but also of Michel Foucault,355 feminists, Marxists,356 and 
post-modernists, the social model encompasses a wide gamut of perspectives. In their 
own ways, different social model positions have in common the criticism of the increase 
in medical authority on everyday life, or „medical imperialism‟. Biomedicine and the 
medical profession are accused, among other criticisms, of being „agents of the state 
control‟; they are blamed for transforming into medical pathologies female conditions 
such as childbirth and menopause; and criticised for the development of pharmaceutical 
„treatments‟ for an ever growing array of psychosocial conditions such as attention 
disorder in children and male erectile (dis)function.357  
However, not every commentator working within the broad umbrella of the 
„social model‟ rejects completely biomedicine‟s contribution to human welfare.358 While 
critical of many aspects of biomedicine, some claim that critics tend to overlook the 
social contributions brought by biomedicine in many areas. They argue that biomedicine 
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also helped offer a better understanding of previously socially stigmatised conditions 
such as alcoholism, post-traumatic stress disorder (as opposed to the social stigma of 
cowardice), infertility (challenging religious explanations), and chronic fatigue 
syndrome (as opposed to the stigma of malingering) 359 The contribution against the 
stigmatisation of certain conditions, however, comes at a cost. For example, 
biomedicine removes the blame from individuals suffering from combat post-traumatic 
stress disorder by transforming these conditions into diseases. Yet, by transforming an 
issue regarding social values into a scientific matter, biomedicine removes the debate 
from the public domain altogether. In doing so, the relevant moral issues involved, such 
as how human beings respond to and are so severely affected by the horrors of war and 
the extent to which society deems these responses „normal‟ or „deviant‟, acceptable or 
shameful, are not discussed, but put aside. In other words processes of communicative 
reflection about social practices and how they affect individuals are by-passed. With 
that, the opportunity to challenge prejudices and foster empathy, toleration, and mutual 
recognition are also lost. In addition, from the perspective of the patient, although she is 
protected from social judgment, it comes at a cost of the delegitimation of her suffering. 
360 As the medical anthropologist Arthur Kleinman puts it, 
 when a psychiatrist transforms the misery that results from political calamity – say, the horror of 
the Cambodian genocide or the numbing routinization of poverty in urban ghettos – into major 
depressive disorders, posttraumatic stress, or sociopathic personality disorder, the anthropologist 
claims that, notwithstanding technical and ethical intentions to the contrary, psychiatry ends up 
delegitimating the patient‟s suffering as moral commentary and political performance.361 
This example also illustrates another important tenet of the social model: that 
health and diseases are not facts but social and cultural constructions. Whether a 
condition is seen as a disease or a socially undesirable trait of character depends on 
particular social contexts. As Blaxter points out, health and diseases have been 
constructed in different ways historically and culturally. Regardless of their biological 
substrate, their interpretations, and more importantly, how societies react to them, vary 
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broadly. As she concludes, „what counts as a disease or abnormality is not a “given” in 
the same sense as biological fact is given. It depends on cultural norms and culturally 
shared rules of interpretation.‟362 Even within the same society, very different cultural 
interpretations are found. From the perspective of current medical knowledge, for 
example, there are different accounts in the official healthcare system, alternative 
practitioners, or lay members of society. The social-construction model of health points 
out that when the individual is ill, she is ill in the eyes of her society and according to 
norms established by it of what counts or not as an illness. Similarly, social norms 
dictate the appropriate responses to her. Furthermore, if what counts as a disease is 
attached to ideas of what is undesirable or unacceptable, then what counts as a disease in 
a given social context, thus requiring appropriate medical intervention, may be seen as 
no disease at all in another context, thus receiving no attention from experts. Moral and 
aesthetic values also tend to play a role in defining what counts as a disease. Blaxter 
cites the example of obesity, seen as a medical condition in Western societies while it is 
seen as an attractive trait and symbol of status in other societies.363 Even within Western 
history, standards always varied of what counts as a desirable body weight and what 
type of body shape becomes a medical condition.  
The association throughout Western history of social deviance with disease is 
also well recorded. Disability, homosexuality, 364 and female physiology and sexuality,365 
have all been considered „deviant‟ from the (male) norm and codified as diseases. 
Feminists, for example, denounce the fact that it is the male body and physiology that 
are seen as the norm against which the female body and physiology are compared. As a 
result, female conditions such as menstruation and menopause are generally constructed 
as deviant or pathological. Another interesting example of how social contexts shape the 
concepts of health and disease is given by the sickle cell trait which happens to 
minimise the impacts of malaria. In areas where malaria has a high incidence, and in 
contrast with everywhere else in the world, this inherited condition is seen less as a 
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disease and more like a protection.366 As Blaxter concludes, „the meaning of health is 
neither simple nor unchanging‟.367 
Social institutions too vary their responses according to the shifting perspectives 
on health and disease. An example, although better applied to the context of more 
industrialised nations, is given by the epidemiological transition in the leading causes of 
death from infectious to chronic and degenerative diseases.368 With the aging of the 
population and increase in life expectancy, there has been a higher incidence of 
disabilities or chronic conditions, which in contrast with the classical infectious disease 
model are not passive of a medical cure. Medical interventions in these cases focus 
mainly on alleviating symptoms, diminishing disability, and increasing adaptability to 
the environment. This illustrates how social developments can change how health and 
disease are conceptualised. The history of mental health and HIV/AIDS policies also 
testify the shifting views of what health and disease entail.369 
The social model of health represents an enormous, varied and fascinating body 
of work in the fields of sociology and anthropology of health and illness.370 Common, 
however, is their belief on the relevance of the social, cultural, and economic factors in 
playing a role in health promotion and disease causation. The WHO definition of health 
epitomises this social model, and the debate it generates, as an illustration of the 
dichotomy between the scientific and social models, are the focus of the next section. 
2.4 A political account: the WHO definition 
The States parties to this Constitution declare, in conformity with the Charter of the United 
Nations, that the following principles are basic to the happiness, harmonious relations and 
security of all peoples: 
Health is a state of complete physical, mental, and social well-being and not merely the absence 
of disease or infirmity. 
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The employment of the highest attainable standard of health is one of the fundamental rights of 
every human being without distinction of race, religion, political belief, economic or social 
condition.
371
 
The delegates to the draft of the constitution of the WHO, motivated by the „never-
again‟ post-war political moment of general condemnation of the atrocities and 
widespread human suffering and destitution caused by the war, chose to define health 
not only broadly but also in distinctively utopian fashion. As Sissela Bok reviewed,372 
the health impacts of the war, including the mass destruction of Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki, and the appalling conditions of extreme deprivation and ravaging epidemics 
around the world, profoundly resonated with the delegates. In face of the horrors 
witnessed,373 an agreement was reached that no account of people‟s health or efforts to 
improve it are possible without considering the broader factors that influence it.374 This 
broad definition takes issue with the reductionist approach to health by rejecting the 
disease-focused interpretation and by ascribing positive qualities to it. It brings into 
view a more holistic conception of people‟s health as a reflexion of their mental state 
and social environment as much as their physical state.  
Particularly representing a unique historical moment of optimism and of a sense 
of new beginning for humanity,375 the WHO definition of health has since its first days 
met strong criticism. It is frequently challenged as being too broad, utopian, abstract, 
and economically unrealistic.376 Common examples of arguments raised against it is that 
it conflates health with factors that may influence it, that it is unrealistic, and that it is 
counterintuitive to believe that a state of complete physical, mental and social wellbeing, 
however defined, can be achieved at all times for any single person, let alone for the 
entire world‟s population. Another common criticism is that this definition does not do 
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well the job of clarifying what health is and that its wide scope and abstractness only 
serves to make the concept of health more difficult to grasp. In addition, controversies 
are only fuelled by the use of the abstract concept of wellbeing, especially when it is 
qualified as „complete‟ and when the physical, mental and social aspects of it are to be 
taken into account.377 How can such a comprehensive state of wellbeing ever be 
measured?  
Cultural sensitivities also come into play: if definitions of wellbeing by and large 
vary among different cultures, which and whose definitions are to be applied to all?378 
As the preamble to its constitution seems to suggest, is the WHO conflating health with 
particular values such as happiness? In stating that health is „basic to the happiness, 
harmonious relations and security of all peoples‟, it incorporates positive values that 
suggest the influence of classical accounts, in which health is important to human 
flourishing and constitutive of the good life. But are these accounts meaningful to all, or 
do they only represent a particular cultural heritage? 
More severe than the criticism against its conceptual confusion is the assertion 
that this abstract and idealised definition of health makes progresses in the field of 
health promotion more difficult. Some critics challenge its applicability to concrete and 
everyday practices of measuring and comparing health data and healthcare policies. The 
WHO definition is thus accused of being counterproductive and of having a dispersive 
effect on efforts and resources directed to health promotion. This line of criticism 
already begins to reveal the central concern about such a broad definition. More than in 
the awareness of the practical impossibility of securing that every person is born healthy 
and stays healthy during her lifetime,379 the main problem of this definition lies in the 
economic viability of such high standards and expectations. Johannes Bircher, for 
example, despite recognising the contribution given by the WHO definition of extending 
health to the mental and social dimensions, maintains that „the unlimited idealistic 
aspect of the definition gives no help, when services for individual health needs have to 
be balanced against available resources‟.380 In justifying his call for a less demanding 
                                                 
377
 See Bok, 2008. 
378
 See Peter, 2001. 
379
 See more on this line of criticism in O‟Neill, 2002. 
380
 Bircher,2005, p. 338. 
110 
definition381 he insinuates that the WHO definition may be contributing to the escalating 
costs of healthcare in developed countries: 
Since the WHO-definition of health requires complete physical, mental and social well-being, in 
today‟s societies everybody is a patient and it is not surprising that the demands made on the 
health care system by the public are unlimited. This presumably is one of the reasons for the 
growing costs of health care in developed countries.
382
 
From the regularity of this line of argument, it comes as no surprise that the 
WHO definition face even fiercer opposition when it is associated with the category of 
rights in the form of a right to health. Awarding such an already demanding definition of 
health the status of an entitlement, only adds to the controversy, fuelling the opposition 
coming from those who consider the WHO definition unrealistic and economically too 
demanding. 383   
Finally, the concern about the medicalisation of the social world also takes part 
in this debate. For many, the inclusion of the social domain in the definition of health 
carries with it the risk of incorporating under the domain of health-promotion policies 
the responsibility for addressing a whole gamut of problems of the social world.384 The 
risk of medicalisation raises the concern that the WHO definition can contribute to 
legitimise oppressive social policies under the excuse of health promotion. Bok, for 
example, considers that: 
We need only look at totalitarian societies, or at any society in which members of one gender, 
religious orientation, political party, or ethnic background have lain down the rules for what is 
and is not social well-being, to see the risks involved – as in the Soviet mental health hospitals in 
which dissidents were imprisoned, classified as „mentally ill‟.385 
Yet, Bok also concedes, despite her disagreement with the substance of the 
definition, that any fair analysis of the WHO definition of health must be located within 
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the historical context in which it was established.386 At that historical moment, technical 
concerns of how to make health promotion policies more efficient were not the driving 
motivation behind the drafting of the organisation‟s constitution. Rather, it was the 
rejection of the moral disasters of war and poverty along with the acknowledgment of 
the richness of human needs and of the complex relationship between health and social 
conditions what received pride of place. Under the spirit of international cooperation 
that characterised the moment, delegates felt motivated to secure the moral and political 
commitment to the protection of people‟s health understood in its wide scope. In other 
words, the WHO definition can be seen as a historically situated political choice to 
prioritise a morally relevant definition over a bio-medically accurate one. 
Critics of the definition, however, could still ask whether it is not the capacity of 
health policies to effectively improve people‟s health the ultimate measure of (moral) 
achievement of such organisations. In the name of such pragmatism and efficiency, 
many defend a „down to earth‟ definition of health. The idea behind this move towards a 
technical definition is to eliminate moral-philosophical disputes in order to make 
assessments, health measurements and policy making more viable and more efficient. 
This strategy of by-passing normative disagreements, however, seems to rely on the 
assumption that problems generated by the lack of an objective or consensual definition 
of health are at the heart of failures in health promotion policies. It does not take a 
political realist or a Marxist, however, to challenge this assumption and consider 
whether such failures do not in fact result from society‟s political and economic 
arrangements. Nonetheless, in a world characterised by diversity and by conflicts, norm-
free definitions and the language of efficiency will always have an appeal. 
In sum, these disputes about the WHO definition of health illustrate the old 
dispute between the social and the technical model of health, also framed as a dispute 
between normativity and efficiency. Placing these disputes within Habermas‟s discourse 
theory, the next section analyses whether the choice between one or the other model of 
health, or between one or the other telos, is necessary and whether, in exploring the 
relationship between health and justice, this thesis should make this choice. To this end, 
Habermas‟s universal pragmatics frames the analysis. 
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3 The appropriateness of different accounts of health  
As seen in the sections above, there are a multitude of accounts of health and disease. At 
the institutional level, these differences give space for controversies such as the debate 
surrounding the WHO definition. The goal of this section is to analyse how discourse 
theory can contribute to this debate. This is accomplished by analysing the controversy 
involving the WHO definition of health using Habermas‟s universal pragmatics. This 
analysis concludes that different accounts of health can be valid,387 depending on the 
appropriateness to the context of their particular validity claims. From this perspective, 
the WHO definition should be relieved from the burden of having to provide a golden 
standard definition of health able to be operationalised and to guide every WHO 
activity. Finally, this section concludes that for the purposes of analysing the 
relationship between health and justice, an intersubjective account of health is 
appropriate.  
The Wittgensteinian concept of language-games388 provides a useful starting 
point to the analysis of the WHO definition of health. The concept of language-games 
translates the idea that what matters in any assertion is less its truth or linguistic sense 
and more the appropriateness of using that assertion in a particular context. Therefore, 
different set of rules govern the use of language in different situations. As Andrew 
Edgar explains, „the rules that govern the use of language in the expression of religious 
beliefs differ from those governing scientific experiments, or poetry or journalism‟.389 In 
other words, in each of these contexts, making a meaningful statement involves the use 
of rules that are appropriate and distinctive to the „language-games‟ that operate within 
each of these areas. Here, the speaker‟s competency in using the language appropriately 
to the context is more important than the knowledge of the linguistic rules that govern 
forming a grammatically meaningful sentence. This is what differentiates „language-
games‟ theory from classical linguistics, and its important insight on the use of language 
is one of the influences of Habermas‟s universal pragmatics. Habermas‟s furthers the 
impact of this theory of competent communication by linking it to social generation. 
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As seen in Chapter 2, according to Habermas, every utterance is also a social 
action (or speech-act) in which the speaker, hearer and „bystander‟ establish a specific 
relationship with others and with the world. Different speech acts, such as advice, 
statements, questions, promises, requests, and commands, have distinct performative 
contents, conveying not only specific information but also creating distinct 
commitments to action among participants. Furthermore, these speech-acts are conveyed 
within the context of specific language-games. The speech-act of giving an advice, for 
example, follows different rules within the language-game of intimate personal 
relationships than in the language-game of professional consultations. In either case, 
however, in communicating participants raise three different validity claims, truth, 
rightness and truthfulness, each of which are more or less thematised according to the 
specific context. 
The application of these theoretical considerations to the controversy about the 
WHO‟s constitutional definition of health suggests that the analysis of the chosen 
definition must include the appreciation of the language-games and nature of the speech-
acts involved in this particular context. From this perspective, the agreement reached on 
the definition of health must be seen as guided by the language-games governing the 
context of political agreements of cooperation among nations as opposed to the 
language-games governing the establishment of technical or scientific definitions. In 
addition, the validity claims made by the delegates and the commitments to action they 
purported to establish must be seen primarily as claims to rightness generating 
normative commitments among the parties involved.  
If accepted that the main claim to validity made by the WHO definition of health 
represents a claim to rightness as opposed to a claim to truth, it follows that its meaning 
makes a reference to a norm rather than a reference to a proposition of a fact. The 
validation of the claim made by the definition, therefore, is not mediated by deductive 
and constative assessments but by norm-conformative and regulative ones. The claim 
„murder is wrong‟ can help illustrate this argument. 390 Here, the chief claim to validity is 
a claim to rightness. The claim does not imply that murder is wrong in the factual sense 
(as in, say, „the victim died‟). The statement that murder is wrong, thus, appeal to a 
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norm of action, which substance can be validated or challenged regardless of the 
specific way it was conveyed. From this perspective, stating that health is not only the 
absence of disease but a complete state of physical, mental and social wellbeing, should 
be understood not as a claim to a factual or objective truth that health is so, but as a 
roundabout way of expressing, for example, the commitment towards the improvement 
of people‟s health conditions by addressing the wider scope of factors that affect their 
health, including social and political institutions and the conflicts they generate. 
Discussing the exact substance of the norm the WHO definition makes appeal to 
is, of course, an interpretative exercise that goes beyond the purpose of this thesis. Here 
it is sufficient to make the point that seeing the WHO definition of health as a norm-
confirmative claim, regardless of the soundness of its substance, is more appropriate to 
the task of evaluating the organisation‟s constitutional definition. An implicit 
assumption is that the main role of constitutional documents is to manifest the normative 
principles (moral, political or legal) guiding its bearers. An account of health in a 
different context, say, within a scientific environment would demand a different 
interpretation. For example, in the context of a scientific debate about the clinical 
follow-up of patients who underwent a particular medical treatment, the definition of 
health employed for the purposes of this evaluation, could be appropriately interpreted 
as a claim to truth. 
The same logic can be applied to the context of the everyday works carried by 
the WHO, in which technical definitions of health may often be more appropriate than 
broader accounts. For the purpose of defining health measurements that would guide the 
actions or monitor the effectiveness of given policies, for example, context specific 
definitions would be more appropriate. As the changing pattern of diseases from the 
infectious model to the disability model illustrates, different accounts of health and 
disease – and as a result also different types of measurements and policy end-goals – 
will be more appropriate to address specific realities. The impacts of most infectious 
diseases may be better evaluated by measurements of morbidity or mortality; however 
whenever chronic diseases are at issue, measures of wellbeing, disability, and functional 
capacities may be more appropriate.  
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This argument has two important implications. First, it relieves the WHO 
definition of an impossible task: setting a golden standard concept of health against 
which every healthcare practice, research enterprise, and policy making in the field can 
be evaluated. While I agree with the argument that the way health is conceptualised 
impacts on how societies respond to it, I do not see as realistic the expectation that the 
WHO should establish a universal understanding of health able to serve the purposes of 
operationalising all of its policies. On the contrary, the definition serves expectations of 
a different kind. Second, accepting that different activities being carried by the WHO (or 
by any other organisation working towards health promotion) demand different 
interpretations of what counts as health, points beyond confusions and focuses on the 
potential benefits of these differences. By operating with different, but rationally 
validated accounts of health, institutions are giving space to a critical mediation between 
different views, avoiding the one-sidedness associated with the modern radical 
differentiation of spheres of knowledge and thus preserving the stock of communicative 
resources of the lifeworld. As seen in Chapter 2, preserving the integrity of the lifeworld 
against the encroachment of system media passes by nurturing communicative practices 
and individuals‟ communicative competencies in dealing with complex conflict 
situations. 
A sceptic or political realist can challenge this perspective on the basis that it is 
utopian and unrealistic. Within the „language-game‟ of international politics, she could 
argue, normative statements should be taken with a pinch of salt, as they serve more to 
pay lip service to moral ideals and less to express a genuine (and practical) commitment 
to them, which from the perspective of discourse theory, would be an instance of the use 
of strategic action by the parties involved. Yet, even if this critique does represent more 
or less accurately the state of affairs in international law and politics at the time (and 
certainly still current), it does not challenge the viability of this communicative 
perspective on the debate. Rather, it gives it an occasion to clarify a few points.  
First, and in reply to the realist challenge, it can be argued that regardless of 
having hidden agendas, the delegates to the WHO constitution chose to make an appeal 
to normative principles, such as peace, cooperation, happiness, wellbeing, and health as 
a right, in order to legitimise these hidden agendas. This suggests that these principles 
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are not empty symbolisms or that appeals to them are merely a formality. On the 
contrary, it supports the view that these principles possess public recognition. Therefore, 
despite the delegates‟ hidden agendas, these principles are always open to be called to 
be realised, even if in revised form, by active and communicatively steered public 
spheres. 
Second, the proposed interpretation of the WHO definition of health as a claim 
to rightness does not amount to a defence of the substance of the claim. This 
interpretation, based on the idea of context-appropriate interpretations of validity claims, 
is a theoretical analysis which simply argues that if claims to validity demand different 
and context-appropriate interpretations of what they entail, then the WHO‟s 
constitutional definition of health should be interpreted as a regulative type of speech act 
that appeals to a norm-conformative understanding of health. This is a different analysis 
from the evaluation of whether the substance of the norm is coherent with any particular 
political theory or whether it has universal assent. In any case, the validation of the 
substance of the norm is subject to its rational justification in a debate with competing 
theories.  
Third, in relation to the substance of the claim, as the appeal to classical accounts 
of health and substantial ideals of the good life demonstrates, the values underpinning 
the WHO definition of health may not find universal appeal. They may, for instance, 
resound better with some ethical-political theories than with others. Communitarians 
and virtue ethics theorists may find it more appealing than libertarians or post-
modernists. From the perspective of discourse theory, the normative substance of the 
WHO‟s definition is also not without its problems. In contrast with the formality of 
discourse theory, the WHO definition emphasises substantive definitions of wellbeing. 
In doing so, it not only invites criticisms directed to the substantive definition of needs – 
always problematic in a plural and multicultural society – but it also fails to place an 
emphasis on whether the patterns of interaction between people and between people and 
social institutions, which affect health outcomes in varied ways,391 are just. Despite these 
criticisms, the WHO definition has the advantage over more technical accounts of 
health, of not only associating health with values but also, and more fundamentally, of 
                                                 
391
 See an analysis of how social arrangements can affect health outcomes in Chapter 5. 
117 
making the political decision of bringing the social to the centre of the debate about 
people‟s health conditions.  
What the discussion about the WHO definition of health hoped to accomplish 
was to illustrate that interpretations of what health entails in any given context requires 
the analysis of what language-games and speech-acts are involved and what kind of 
claims to validity are mainly thematised. As a result, accounts of health and their 
interpretations will vary according to changing circumstances. In the context of the 
WHO constitution, I support the view that it cannot provide a definitive and fully 
operational definition of health, and that its role instead is to provide a normative 
guidance of what health protection and promotion entail. Despite the disagreements with 
the substance of the norm that the definition makes appeal to, I defend that the WHO 
definition should stand as it is; as a witness of a period in history that represented the 
overcoming of a terrible conflict and that made the hope for global cooperation and 
renewal of moral commitments possible, even if this commitment was fragile and the 
period of optimism short lived.  
Bok reaches a similar conclusion. Despite rejecting that the definition can serve 
any practical purposes, she commends its historical value. As she analyses, „[i]t can 
offer a much-needed reminder of the hopes present at the founding of the WHO for all 
that nations could do together to improve health around the world [...].‟392Yet, this 
potentially positive historical role of the definition seems overshadowed by Bok‟s 
concerns about its attached risk of legitimating oppressive social practices disguised as 
health promotion. Despite being also a critic of the medicalisation of the social world, I 
feel less predisposed to accept this argument in defence of a narrower or more 
operational understanding of health. The fear of medicalisation should not curb our 
moral imagination. The appeal to normatively neutral definitions, in its various forms 
and different agendas, is not a „strategy‟ likely to function. Neither the WHO definition 
of health nor the biomedical definition of health will alone be the guardian against 
abuses. The legitimacy of oppressive practices under the excuse of health promotion 
will not be judged solely by whether it is in line with the WHO definition. In democratic 
societies that abide by the rule of law, oppressive social practices, whether disguised as 
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health promotion or any other „public interest‟, will be judged against so many other 
important principles regulating our social and political lives together. This is when the 
ideas of justice and rights are especially resonant. Agreeing with Habermas, I believe 
that only a thriving and communicatively competent public sphere, guided by 
presuppositions of justice and solidarity, can provide the protection against institutional 
oppressive practices. The important role of health in sustaining such presuppositions is 
the core argument of this thesis and it is developed in the next two chapters. 
4 Conclusion  
This chapter began with the discussion of different accounts of health, focusing on the 
debate between biomedical and social accounts. It ends with the conclusion that health 
has no ultimate definition. As Edgar argues, health is „an essentially contested 
concept‟.393 In his words, 
To claim that „health‟ is essentially contested is to claim that debate over the definition of 
„health‟ is possible and fruitful. Definitions are rationally defensible, and insofar as protagonists 
can put forward reasons to support their opinions, the truth, relevance and validity of these 
reasons can be scrutinised, accepted, revised or rejected. 
Different interpretations of health can be debated and validated by participants 
depending on their rational justification, but also on the appropriateness of these 
interpretations to the context in which they are made. From the perspective of 
individuals, as seen above, health can have as many meanings as there are ethical 
orientations, and its meaning and validity is attached to the individual self-understanding 
alone. In contrast, in the context of an international organisation of cooperation among 
nations, and in a context in which issues of rights and universal interests are involved, 
any legitimate analysis of health has to account for its normative implications and the 
claims raised should therefore be primarily understood as claims to rightness. 
Furthermore, from a discourse theoretical perspective, the substance of the norms that 
the definition of health raises should reflect the evaluation of whether healthcare 
practices and the pattern of interactions among the social actors involved are just. In 
addition, taken as a whole, different perspectives can contribute to the ongoing debate 
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about health, and the mediation between their claims has a critical role in avoiding one-
sided and domineering perspectives.  
From these conclusions, it can be concluded that for the purpose of exploring 
how health, solidarity, and justice are related, a normative conceptualisation of health is 
called for. The next chapter argues that a normative conceptualisation of health 
necessarily entails an account of its intersubjective dimension. This intersubjectively 
understanding of health is then placed within Habermas‟s theory of society in order to 
explore its social roles and its relationship with justice.  
120 
Chapter 4 
HEALTH, SOCIAL INTEGRATION AND SOLIDARITY 
1 Introduction 
A three-month-old girl was diagnosed with leukemia and a bone marrow transplant was 
recommended. Despite the availability of two excellent transplant facilities in the area 
she lived, her family‟s health-insurance company referred her to a transplantation centre 
located in another state. The baby‟s family protested, however with no success, against 
the company‟s decision, alleging that relocating to another state for the several months 
long treatment would severely disrupt family life, as it would be financially burdensome 
and it would deprive the baby and her mother from the support of their family and local 
friends. To keep his job, the father could not join his wife and daughter; the mother had 
to negotiate a pay cut; and the baby‟s older sister, who at the time was presenting 
behavioural problems, was separated from her parents and sent to live with relatives in 
another state. The treatment went well initially, and along the six-month‟s treatment, the 
family formed a bond with the transplantation centre. After a relapse, however, the baby 
was sent to further treatment in yet another out of state medical facility, as the 
transplantation centre in which the baby was initially treated was no longer the 
insurance company‟s centre of reference in the region. By the end of the treatment, the 
father had lost his job, the mother had to quit her job, the older sister had her behaviour 
problems aggravated, and the family lost their home and savings.394  
This is a true story; it is a story of a family, living in the wealthiest country in the 
world, and profoundly affected by a severe disease and by their country‟s system of 
„corporate care‟. The physical suffering of the child was but one of the hardships 
endured by her and those close to her, as the experience also affected their family life 
emotionally, financially, and socially. The decision of the insurance company to send 
the child for treatment at facilities that made more financial sense for the company 
deprived this family of the support and comfort of each other and of their friends in a 
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time of crisis. They were driven into financial insecurity. They were led to question their 
social worth, and to question the justice and soundness of a healthcare system 
committed foremost to optimising shareholders‟ profits. 
This story introduces this chapter because it translates well the idea that health is a 
relational concept. Health and its related phenomena – such as illness and healthcare – 
involve the interaction between the ill, their family and friends, carers (professional and 
informal), and social institutions. Experiences of illness and healthcare, therefore, are 
essentially intersubjective; what people feel and how people feel in the face of illness – 
their own or of others, however close or strange these others are – and how we respond 
to these experiences are intersubjectively mediated social actions. If in the last chapter it 
was concluded that health has no ultimate definition, but a number of meanings that can 
be rationally articulated and defended, this chapter concludes that health, as a sub-
system the lifeworld, has an inevitable intersubjective core, capable of shaping selves 
and patterns of social interactions. In addition, by describing the experience of illness 
and healthcare from the perspective of participants, this story supports the argument that 
in the face of illness individuals become even more vulnerable to and dependent on the 
net of interpersonal interactions that form and sustain their inner and their social world.  
This search for an intersubjective understanding of health builds from last chapter‟s 
conclusion that the analysis of the relationship between health and justice requires a 
conceptualisation of health that accounts for its normative dimension, i.e. the patterns of 
interactions between social actors. These patterns of interactions associated with health 
related phenomena can be analysed from the different perspectives of social observer 
and of the participant. In this chapter both perspectives are adopted. The participant 
perspective guides the first part of the chapter, in which individuals‟ experiences of 
illness and healthcare and their moral connotations are explored. The social observer 
perspective is adopted in the second part of this chapter, which places health in 
Habermas‟s dual model of society. Health, as concluded in the last chapter, is a broad 
concept that encompasses a variety of perspectives on the subject, from scientific to 
social models, the validity of which is attached to their rational recognition and 
appropriateness to the context. This chapter further develops this insight and proposes a 
model of interpretation of health that makes room for the analysis of these different 
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perspectives and their respective social locus and social role. That is achieved by 
conceiving health as a specialised sub-system of the lifeworld that affects the lifeworld‟s 
reproduction and at three different levels: cultural reproduction, social integration, and 
socialisation. At each of these levels, analyses of matters involving health related 
phenomena involve different forms of knowledge, different moments of reason, and 
different communicative functions and social contributions. The contribution of health 
towards social integration by nurturing solidarity and relationships of mutual recognition 
informs next chapter‟s analysis of the relationship between health and justice.  
2 The intersubjectivity of health 
2.1 The importance of the perspective of the participant – some anthropological 
insights  
In search for an intersubjective account of health, an interesting starting point is the 
analysis of how the differences between the technically/scientific and the 
socially/normatively oriented approaches to health are represented in the medical 
anthropology of Arthur Kleinman and Robert Hahn.
395
 In their works, the framework of 
the debate is very similar – the efficiency, objectivity, and supposed value-free nature of 
what is technical and scientific being at odds with the complexity, subjectivity, and 
assumed value-laden nature of what is social, cultural, and political. The difference lies 
in the level at which the debate is carried. In contrast with the social observer 
perspective of both the scientific and social models of health discussed in the last 
chapter, Kleinman‟s and Hahn‟s anthropological methodology looks at the micro-level 
perspective of interactions between patients, families, and healthcare professionals, 
placing a special emphasis on how cultural meanings shape these interactions. The 
antagonism between the scientific and social accounts is represented by the antagonism 
between biomedicine on the one hand and individual‟s experiences of health, illness, 
and healing on the other.  
 Both Hahn and Kleinman share a critical view of the biomedical notion of 
health, illness, and healing. By understanding health as the absence of pathologies or of 
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dysfunctions in the body, biomedicine also tends to see healing as the correction of these 
disturbances, and as a result, the role played by socio-cultural factors, if at all 
considered, are of secondary relevance.
396
 Alternatively to the biomedical model of 
health, „which marks its progress in terms of smaller and smaller units of 
observation‟,397  Hahn proposes „a complementary move in the opposite direction to 
include the mind, human relations and society, and the broader environment.‟398 His 
objective is to expand the dominant model of health, allowing for the inclusion of other 
interpretations. In proposing a complementary move he also signals that in this 
expanded interpretation, biomedical accounts are also part of it; one perspective among 
many. Although he acknowledges the contribution of the biomedical model to the 
improvements of health conditions worldwide, he does not assume that biomedicine 
holds the ultimate truth.
399
 His criticism of biomedicine is primarily directed to its 
technicism, which excludes the perspective of the patient, and in doing so, it loses not 
only a critical tool but also the capacity to carry out its activities in a meaningful way to 
patients.
400
  
In contrast with the biomedical account of health and disease, for Hahn, it is the 
perception and experience of the patient what counts. As he argues  
What counts as sickness and health may differ for a four-minute miler, a lower limb amputee, an 
opera singer, and most the rest of us. What causes the sickness may be environmental conditions 
or pathogens, the patient‟s physiology, or harmful behaviours. What defines the event for which 
we seek a cause, however, may be not the patient‟s body, behaviours, or potentially harmful 
environmental occurrences – its possible causes – but rather his or her subjective experience and 
values.
401
 
Kleinman is also critical of the „ethnocentrism and reductionism of biomedicine‟ 
and its disregard for the patient‟s perspective.402 In addition, he criticises biomedicine for 
its recurrent collusion with oppressive social practices. In his analyses, he aims at 
revealing „how clinicians rework patient‟s perspective into diseases diagnosis and 
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treatments that reproduce the health profession and its political-economic sources,‟403 
distorting in so doing the moral world of the patient and of the community.
404
 Similarly 
to Hahn, he uses cultural analysis as a source of critique of social and political practices. 
Concepts of health, illness, and suffering are seen as forms of cultural experiences, and 
more importantly, Kleinman casts them as relationships between person and society. In 
having deep political and moral connotations, Kleinman construes suffering as critique; 
a critique to which biomedicine is blind. In codifying the experience of illness and 
suffering as narrated by the patient and her family into the internal language of 
biomedicine, the biomedical practitioner is denying and discounting the moral reality of 
suffering and the social critique it conveys.
405
 The link between illness and suffering and 
the social-political context is thus lost. Depression, for example, is interpreted by 
Kleinman as an expression of interpersonal stress; „rooted as much in social and 
political processes than in clinical ones‟.406 Having studied depression and its cultural 
expressions both in the US and in China he concludes, „[d]epression, too, I recast as a 
relationship between person and society.‟407 
Both Hahn and Kleinman use cultural analysis to criticise biomedicine and the 
social-political reality. Hahn, for example, criticises the focus on the individuated person 
of biomedicine by juxtaposing Western with non-Western cultures in which persons are 
conceived as „inextricably linked with other beings, human and non-human.‟408 As he 
observes, „whereas disturbances in the capacity for independence may be thought of as 
pathological in the West, disturbances in the capacity for interdependence may be 
regarded as pathological elsewhere.‟409 Cultural analysis, therefore, allows him to turn a 
critical look at Western culture and biomedicine. In addition, in interpreting health, 
illness, and healing as culture-bound concepts, Hahn is sceptical towards universal 
systems for understanding and categorising diseases.
410
 Yet, this cultural analysis does 
not lead him into cultural relativism. On the contrary, in performing cross-cultural 
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analyses, he argues, anthropologists „seek a wider audience for the voice of others;‟411 
and „[b]y representing a broader range of human variation, [anthropologists] may 
expand Western ideas about humanity.‟412 His goal is, therefore, to promote mutual 
respect and communication across boundaries.
413
  
Kleinman too is sensitive to the contextual mediation of meaning and experiences 
while not subscribing to moral or cultural relativism. Just as he criticises biomedicine‟s 
„purely biological metaphor for pain,‟414 he also criticises a purely cultural account, i.e. 
a description of cultural differences that is not also engaged in critically exploring the 
personal and interpersonal meanings of illness and suffering and their relationship with 
the social and political context. As he argues, „if there is no purely „natural‟ course of 
disease, there also can be no purely „cultural‟ symptomatology.‟415 His goal instead is to 
broaden the analysis
416
 so as to reveal the moral and intersubjective resonances of 
suffering. 
Exploring the intersubjective experience of illness and suffering is at heart of 
Kleinman‟s work, and the normative implications of this approach are of great interest 
to this thesis. Kleinman‟s privileging of the intersubjective perspective and his 
interpretation of the relationship between the social, the psychobiological, and the 
personal levels and its moral implications bears similarities with Habermas‟s 
conceptualisation of the intersubjective constitution of self and society and its 
connection with the lifeworld. In Kleinman‟s words: 
„experience (…) is only in part subjective. A developing child in her or his cultural context is 
part of an ongoing flow of intersubjective feelings and meanings; in a sense, the child awakens 
cognitively and affectively within that flow. How to orient him – or herself, what to orient to, the 
child‟s sense of what is most relevant result from the development of moral sensibility to this 
social space. Ethnic as well as personal identity emerge in this process of entering into and 
finding a structured space within the flow of experience. Social status, gender, and the 
micropolitical ecology will inflect those identifications, as will personal temperament. We will 
become ourselves as well as participants at home in the world. And this plurality of influence is 
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the basis of the novelty an indeterminacy of experience. But learning to live within and through 
the vital medium that emerges when symbolic forms interact with psychobiology places our lives 
squarely in the flow of things, bound to others and to the moral meanings that define a world of 
exigency and expediency.‟ 
417
 
As these anthropological insights demonstrate, the importance of exploring an 
account of health from the perspective of patients and their families or carers – i.e. the 
perspective of the participant – is that it contributes to reveal the inevitable 
intersubjective character of health and its moral and social-political connotations. In 
revealing that, it allows a broader understanding of the roles health plays in society, and 
as a result, it also allows a broader understanding of the relationship between health and 
justice. The next section explores the perspective of the participant by analysing 
individual‟s experiences of illness and healthcare and how cultural and social 
arrangements affect these experiences.  
2.2 The perspective of the participant – the experience of illness 
In a 2003 review of researches about the experience of illness in the field of medical 
sociology, Janine Pierret notes an increasing interest on the subject as well as a 
progressive shift on its focus.418 Pierret identifies that since the 1970s pioneering studies 
on the experiences of chronic illness, there has been a move from a focus on the 
subjective experience of the individual to a focus on the interactional aspects of these 
experiences, and more recently, also an increasing interest in exploring how social 
structures affect these experiences. Studies are increasingly taking into account, for 
example, how socio-cultural variables such as age, gender, class, ethnic group, and 
social context shape the illness experience.  
Characteristically, studies on the experience of illness cut cross the boundaries of 
disciplines, benefiting from contributions from the social sciences, anthropology, 
psychology, and public health among others. Sharing an „insider‟s orientation‟ towards 
their subject, these studies focus mostly on chronic and terminal illness, such as 
epilepsy, Alzheimer‟s, heart disease, cancer, and HIV/AIDS, and reveal how these 
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conditions disrupt patient‟s lives, demanding from them mobilisation of resources, the 
renegotiation of their relationships, and the construction of a new biography. Common 
themes that surge in the analysis of the subjectivity of illness experience are the search 
for meaning and causes of the disease (why me now?), the impacts of the condition on 
the self and on identity (including the concept of „loss of self‟, stigma, and shame), the 
withdrawal from the public domain, loss of social status, discredit („Are you sure you 
can do it?‟, „Are you sure you cannot work?‟), and the loss of private bodily boundaries. 
Apart from illness and pain, the experience of a frustrating medical care can also 
contribute to the complete transformation of the subject‟s world of experience and self-
perception.419  
Individuals that have a chronic or life-threatening disease can suffer because of 
their condition either directly – as a result of the pain or of feeling unwell – or indirectly 
because of actual or fear of limitations that the condition may impose on their lives, such 
as physical impairment, dependency on the care of others, social isolation, and financial 
hardship.420 A chronic condition can severely disrupt the routine of patients and of those 
close to them, as it changes their taken-for-granted assumptions and behaviours, 
requiring adjustments and new behaviours.421 It threatens their everyday activities and 
life plans, and the feelings of uncertainty regarding the future can bring anxiety to them. 
In addition, for the often necessary changes that allow the patient to maintain her normal 
activities and receive appropriate care, the patient relies on others – family, friends, 
carers, and co-workers.422  
 These adjustments may involve acquiring the understanding of what the disease 
entails in terms of symptoms, consequences, and treatments. It may also involve 
reconstructing one‟s life history and plans, realigning their past with the present and 
dealing with the uncertainty of the future.423 It may also involve dealing with an altered 
sense of self and taking the challenge of reconstructing a new one.424  In many different 
ways a disease can affect the individual‟s sense of self. It may result from visible 
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changes in the physical appearance (e.g. tumours, skin conditions) or bodily functions 
(e.g. incontinence, use of illeostomy), which threatens the privacy of the body. It may 
involve the stigma and shame attached to certain conditions, such as epilepsy or 
Parkinson‟s, which may lead to a withdrawal from public life and social isolation.  
Stigma and fear of social discrimination are often also extended to family and 
carers (e.g. autism, mental conditions).425 In fact, chronic diseases affect family members 
in varied other ways, usually involving a rearrangement in their daily activities and their 
roles in the family. Apart from providing help with the direct care of the chronically ill, 
family members become an essential source of emotional and financial support. Within 
them, women are most often the first care-givers. In a study describing the experience of 
families in the East End of London, in which a member was terminally ill, Michael 
Young and Lesley Cullen describe: 
Terrible as it was for their wives when their husbands became ill with cancer, at least they did 
not have to change their role of carer, housekeeper, cook, companion. They did not know in 
advance how to do the more demanding nursing they now had to do – this had to be learned the 
hard way, by doing it and failing and taking advice and doing it again; but they did know how to 
look after a home and make a dying husband not only comfortable but feel as much respected, as 
loved, as he had ever been. If anyone in East London could choose the setting in which to endure 
a long-drawn-out illness without too much misery, and with some compensation for the 
inevitable setback, he would be a man and at home.
426
 
Having always assumed the caring role in the family, when they see themselves in the 
receiving end of care, women resent not being able to care for others and struggle in 
renegotiating their new role in the household. 427 
 The way women respond to chronic and terminal illness, both in the role of 
carers and patients, illustrates that the experience of illness, whether lived by the patient 
or by the carer, is closely tied to cultural meanings and role expectations. The role of 
cultural values and attitudes in shaping illnesses experiences is the subject of the next 
section. 
2.2.1 The experience of illness and cultural meanings 
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 As Hahn points out, the experience of illness is influenced by a combination of 
conscious and unconscious meanings attached to it, which result from memories of 
experiences of illness in oneself and others and from the incorporation of established 
social meanings.428 The sense of deligitimation that many patients feel, for example, can 
be a reflection of a society oriented towards ideas of success, independence, strength, 
and winning. As Kleinman observes in relation to American society, „not to rise is a 
threat to social persona and social esteem; it is often experienced by members of the 
American middle class as a shameful moral weakness.‟429 This type of social orientation 
is associated with a social tendency to see the ill as unproductive and resource 
demanding, and as a result, the individual self-worth is affected in the face of chronic 
illness and increased dependency because she feels as a burden on others. Other social 
meanings attached to diseases that can contribute to the chronically ill‟s feelings of 
delegitimation are the ancient and universal tendency to see the patient as responsible 
for her own fortune and at moral fault, and the idea that disease and suffering are 
opportunities to demonstrate the strength of the patient‟s character.430  
The association between disease and weakness or socially unacceptable 
behaviour is more evidently observed in the history of many sexually transmitted 
diseases, including syphilis, AIDS, and more recently cervical cancer.431 In Illness as a 
Metaphor, Sontag describes how a number of diseases have been associated with 
punishment in the social imaginary. In literary metaphors, for example, tuberculosis 
often „provided a redemptive death for the fallen‟.432 More current examples of the 
tendency to associate disease with punishment are the association between smoking and 
lung cancer and alcoholism and liver disease. In addition, in a long history of punitive 
interpretations of diseases, cancer has endured a multitude of myths, including 
psychological theories, still current in various forms, that associate cancer with the 
renunciation of instincts and with repression of feelings such as loss and bereavement, 
depression, rage, dissatisfaction with personal relationships. These accounts, criticises 
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Sontag, have the negative effect of placing the responsibility on the sufferer not only for 
getting ill, but also for getting better.433  
The tendency to expect patients to react bravely and to „fight‟ the disease is a 
common element of the association between diseases and moral character and 
integrity.434 As Edgar points out, Western culture feels uncomfortable with the concept 
of failure, and therefore, tends to encourage stories of survival and „good fights‟.435This 
pervasive military metaphor of „fighting the disease‟, is for Sontag an illustration of how 
culture affects the way society approaches diseases and how it can place further burdens 
on the ill. She describes how the military metaphor, used in a varied of medical contexts, 
begun with the identification of bacteria as agents of disease, which „invade‟ the 
organism and trigger the activation of the body‟s own „defences‟. This metaphor of 
„invasion‟ is still routinely used to address cancer, which „infiltrates‟ the body and 
„colonises‟ other sites (the metastases), thus justifying „aggressive‟ treatments (such as 
radio and chemotherapy) to „win the battle against the disease‟.436 Alongside medicine, 
patients too are expected to rise to the challenge and bravely fight against cancer. 
Sontag‟s main concern with diseases as metaphors is that although not all of 
them are morally reprehensible, they are cultural constructions that create stigmas and 
place undesirable burdens on the ill.437 As she observes, „cure is thought to depend 
principally on the patient‟s already sorely tested or enfeebled capacity for self-love‟.438 
In addition, these views can also be dangerous insofar as they can compromise 
individuals‟ ability to understand and chose available courses of treatment.439 Edgar 
expresses a similar concern in relation to the cultural emphasis on stories of success and 
of courage. He argues that although these stories can be important, „this positive image 
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becomes as oppressive as the old stereotype.‟440 Hopelessness can be oppressive too, but 
images of success and unfailing resilience can place new burdens on those feeling less 
able to adjust to their condition.
441
 He proposes that the collective story-telling of 
chronic illnesses reflect also the uncertainties and anxieties of what these conditions 
entail, including the acknowledgement of the possible „meaninglessness of suffering‟, so 
as to broaden the resources available to patients and the community to understand and 
respond better to these conditions. As he remarks, 
Public story-telling appropriate to chronic illness, and thus stories that can find a way to 
articulate contingency and a disrupted future without the illusions of sentimentality or false hope, 
may be necessary in order to allow chronic illness to be recognised within the community as a 
whole. The struggle to understand illness, and to live well despite it, may thereby be understood 
as a communal task.
442
 
 From the perspective of the sufferer, the importance of broadening cultural and 
communicative resources about chronic diseases is that she relies on these resources to 
rebuild a sense of self as the next section demonstrates. The important insight that 
expanding these resources is a communal task is also emphasised as the intersubjective 
character of health and the role it plays in society are discussed.  
2.2.2 The experience of illness and changes in self identity 
Many studies about the illness experience cluster around the concept of „loss of self‟. In 
a classical study produced by Kathy Charmaz, she describes how patients experience the 
progressive disintegration of their former self-image „without a simultaneous 
development of equally valued ones.‟443 As these patients lose control of their lives, loss 
of self-esteem and self-identity ensue. Major causes of the loss of self are the restricted 
life individual‟s experience, the social isolation, the experiencing of discredit, and 
becoming a burden to others.444 As a patient covered by Charmaz who depended on 
dyalitic treatment describes: 
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This [the dialysis machine] is an ego destroyer. You come, and you‟re depending on a machine 
to keep you going, and if you don‟t, then you don‟t go. I mean that‟s all there is to it … I know 
that sometimes I feel less than human, having to go through the process. And I would like to take 
a vacation from it for 2, 3 or 4 weeks and not have to come for that length of time (...) but I can‟t 
do that. Travelling is very hard, getting away and just normal things that people do. And so it 
makes me think from time to time that I‟m less than human, and again I work my way out of 
that, but it is a constant struggle to [do so].
445
 
The impacts on the self resulting from these restrictions and dependency on others are 
felt even more severely in societies that value individualism, independency, individual 
hard work, and merit.446 
 Yet, the experience of chronic illness does not always lead to permanent loss of 
self; in the process of adjusting to their condition, patients may also find new meanings 
to their lives. This search for new meanings also includes understanding the causes and 
meanings of their condition. According to Blaxter, most chronically ill try to fit their 
condition within their understanding of the world and try to accommodate it in their 
identity and life history. In the process of searching for meanings biomedicine offers 
them only limited help, because although it can elaborate on medical causes, it cannot 
provide a meaning for the disease, it cannot answer the question of „why me?‟.447 As 
Kleinman remarks, „[h]ere the technical rationality cannot contain the participatory 
reasoning of the patient who seeks to understand not how, but why, not causal 
mechanisms but ultimate meaning, not reason for treatment failure but chance for 
salvation.‟448 This gap is filled by the patients themselves, and they do so with the help 
of their personal, interpersonal, and cultural resources.  
 The beliefs that individuals form about their conditions, the (moral) meanings 
they attach to it, are important as they shape the way individuals respond to their 
condition, from the way they relate with themselves and others to the way they interpret, 
validate, and accept medical treatment. In the same way, understanding and validating 
these meanings are fundamental to professionals and carers in their relationship with the 
patient. Kleinman describes a story of a patient of his, whose wife and daughter 
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convinced him to look for medical help.449 The patient was a decorated war veteran who 
could not come to terms with his experiences in the war, in which as he described „he 
was made over into a killer‟. The incongruence between the atrocities he had committed 
and his moral beliefs and ethical self-understanding destroyed his own sense of moral 
integrity; it destroyed his humanity. According to Kleinman, since the patient‟s remorse 
was „accompanied by almost all the cardinal symptoms of depression,‟ an appropriate 
treatment was initiated, to which the patient complied and clinically responded well. 
Yet, the treatment did not change his regret about his past, which the patient identified 
as being his real problem: 
I can put it away again. I don‟t feel the same pressure. I can sleep, and eat, and fornicate again. 
But you know as well as I do that what‟s bothering me can‟t be treated or cured. Job said: „I will 
maintain my integrity. I will hold on to my righteousness.‟ I did neither. I soiled myself as I was 
soiled. I lost my humanity as those around me did the same. You don‟t have any answers. Nor do 
I. Save to live with it. To realize I did the worst is to understand how ordinary men do bad 
things. How ordinary Americans were so anti-Semitic at that time. How ordinary Germans did 
what they did during the Holocaust. How all of us are capable of murder. In the midst of war 
when all hell breaks loose and you are empowered to act with impunity, you can do horror and 
be decorated for it.
450
  
The possibility of having the treatment change the way he felt about his past amounted 
to joining society‟s hypocrisy and moral failure in its denial of what war does: it 
transforms ordinary men into killers. Accepting that he could not change his past and 
that he had to live with it and with its consequences was the moral choice he made. He 
complied with the treatment for the symptoms of depression, but he refused to change 
the moral meaning of his disease. In analysing his patient‟s story, Kleinman wonders 
whether the patient wanted him to acknowledge the same: that his suffering „was not 
disease but tragedy.‟451 To his suffering, there was no healing.  
Apart from searching for causes, establishing biographical continuities, and 
finding moral meanings for their experiences, patients adjusting to chronic illnesses also 
have the task of reworking their lost selves. Arthur Frank famously compared the 
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experience of chronic illness with the loss of the „destination and map‟ that guided the 
individual‟s life plans, 452 and as a result individuals who experience chronic illness have 
to repair this discontinuity by creating a new self. In dealing with their chronic or severe 
illnesses, for example, individuals may refocus on the people and on things that matter 
most to them. In this process they may rediscover relationships, face unsolved issues in 
these relationships, establish new ones, challenge past attitudes and commit to new ones, 
and give a meaning to the rest of the life they have. This is not an easy accomplishment, 
and according to Kleinman, despair, isolation, and withdrawal are more common 
consequences of severe chronic illnesses than fully positive transformations. He 
observes that most commonly individuals oscillate between hope, denial, courage, 
giving up, rage, and submission.453 Kleinman argues that there is a fine line between 
hope and despair; yet, he maintains that the experience of chronic illness have the 
potential for remaking individual‟s lives in a meaningful way.  
He illustrates this point by describing the story of a patient, who years after 
recovering from a severe drug addiction, was diagnosed with HIV.454 Despite her initial 
shock and feelings of shame and all the „big ups and downs‟ that accompany the 
experience of a chronic illness, she managed to reconstruct her broken relationship with 
her sons, daughter, and husband. Since the diagnosis she also became more aware of the 
sheer volume of human misery around her, and she became actively involved in 
activism on behalf of AIDS and drug abuse programmes. In her analysis,  
[...] AIDS has been devastating, no question: a reality check of the most basic kind [...] Yet it‟s 
also been about something else. In some inexplicable but transporting way, AIDS has taken me 
to a different place: a place of truth, deep truth, and kindness – love, really.455 
In reconstructing her lost self, she both looked intently inwardly and outwardly to 
discover the things that were most meaningful to her. Mending relationships and 
fighting human misery became a source of meaning to her life. In analysing and finding 
meaning to her condition she evaluated that beyond a character flaw her former 
selfishness reflected the typical hyper-individualism, narcissism, and blindness to unjust 
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human conditions of her socio-cultural context. In interpreting this story, Kleinman 
concludes that illnesses can provoke the overcoming of self-centredness and of the 
denial of human misery everywhere. The experience of chronic and severe illnesses may 
generate a moment of recognition that for anyone „there can be no secure domain, safe 
from the dangers that beset most people.‟456 This recognition of human vulnerability and 
the recognition that anyone is subject to catastrophic life-changing, point out to next‟s 
section discussion of an important and universal feature of experiences of illness and 
healthcare; namely, their intersubjectivity. 
2.3 The intersubjectivity of experiences of illness and of healthcare 
As observed above, the meanings that are attached to illnesses and to suffering are to a 
large extent mediated by culture. Yet, there is at the core of these experiences an 
element of universality: their intersubjective character. As Kleinman claims, 
The cultural meanings of suffering (e.g., as punishment or salvation) may be elaborated in 
different ways for current-day Sri Lankan Buddhists or medieval Christian, but the 
intersubjective experience of suffering, we contend, is itself a defining characteristic of human 
conditions in all societies.
457
 
In the inevitable intersubjectivity of the experiences of illness and healthcare, no 
one can avoid the shifting roles of first, second, and third person. Not only do the ill get 
to recognise the universal vulnerability of the individual constitution, but also 
potentially all those around them. The way Kleinman‟s client responded to her illness, 
for example, touched many around her: friends, family, colleagues, and even those who 
have only heard about her story. Her illness experience, in different ways and in 
different degrees, affected them all; it not only transformed her former egocentric self, 
but contributed to shape the self of others too.  
The intersubjectivity of illnesses experiences calls into attention that chronic 
illnesses and the prospect of death, apart from the ill, can affect and transform others 
too. In the different roles that individuals assume when interacting with the chronic ill, 
the experience of illness will have some impact, even if a glimpse of reflection. For 
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those close to the ill, the impacts can be deep and long-lasting, and as Kleinman 
remarks, „[e]ven death is followed by bereavement and the further and influential 
trajectory of the remembered past.‟458 Even individuals who are not intimate with the ill 
may feel compelled to partake in the experience by acting on their feelings of 
responsibility towards those who are frail and ill. Young and Cullen, for example, 
describe in a study about dying and caring at home how terminally-ill patients living on 
their own and who had no children or contact with relatives still alive, usually got help 
from women neighbours until the very end. In analysing the significance of responses 
from neighbours and comparing them to responses from family, they conclude: 
What we did not expect – and this is perhaps the most striking conclusion – was that the 
imminence of death could bring out the same kind of solidarity amongst neighbours. Their 
actions belong more to altruism than duty. Such unselfishness is a continuation of what used to 
be ordinary neighbourliness in this district. But as well as that, death is not only an extraordinary 
event for the dying but brings out extraordinary behaviour in other people. The close intimacy 
between carer and cared for generates its own feelings which both take the place of, and 
reinforce, obligation. There can also be something very special and love-inspiring about the 
imminence of death. Death can bring out life-giving qualities.
459
 
These feelings of responsibility towards the ill and vulnerable and the orientation 
towards acting on them can also be motivating factors in the choice of one‟s profession. 
In a study about the nursing profession working in a general medical ward at a hospital 
in the Midlands, David Field demonstrated the high level of emotional involvement with 
the ill, which involved grieving after their deaths and in some cases keeping in touch 
with the families of patients who had died or with terminally ill patients who had been 
discharged to be taken care of at home.460 He observes that there is a certain 
predisposition to care in those who join healthcare professions; yet, a „detached concern‟ 
may be encouraged by their training and in the course of their professional lives. In the 
occasions, however, in which the type of working arrangements facilitated greater 
emotional connection and the care for the „whole person‟, Field analyses that it came as 
mutually beneficial to patients and carers, who felt validated in their role and personal 
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ethical predisposition. This is illustrated in the words of a nurse who cared for a patient 
who had no relatives or friends:  
We had a patient who was there over a year – and we were all very close to „C‟. I saw him from 
when he came in, to getting really better, then going down again. It was awful because there was 
nothing I could do; I just had to sit and hold his hand. At that time we were all taking it in turns 
to sit with him as long as we could cos‟ we just didn‟t want him to die on his own. Nobody 
wanted just to go in and find him dead. [...] So I sat with him and held his hand. And I remember 
the staff nurse coming in and asking me if I had nothing better to do. So I said „No. Not at this 
moment, no.‟ So she said „would you mind going and finding something to do?‟ I remember it so 
clearly. I really hated her, because this man was dying. I‟d been with him all this time and why 
should he die alone? All she was content with was giving him BPO‟s, and he still had an enema 
the day he did die. Well he died that afternoon. I felt awful – this poor little man – and just as I 
went behind the curtains he just said  - he grabbed hold of my arms (he got very little movement 
in that hand), and he just put his hand on mine and whispered „I love you‟. And then he died in 
the afternoon. I thought „well it‟s all worthwhile‟ because at least he realized that somebody 
cared.
461
 
 By acting according to her ethical orientation, and rejecting the staff nurse‟s 
privileging of efficiency over a good death this nurse felt that she reaffirmed humanity 
both in the patient and herself. From this perspective, both the illness and its ultimate 
outcome were intersubjective experiences. For the nurse and the patient, but also for 
„third‟ persons who witnessed or heard about this recount, this experience was filled 
with meaning. Other important features of the intersubjectivity of the illness experience 
that this story illustrates are the relationships of care giving involved in them.  
These relationships of care giving in contexts of health and illness are not limited 
to healthcare professionals or formal carers. Broadly conceived, everyone is a carer; 
everyone is cared for. During the course of their lives everyone experiences different 
and shifting relations of healthcare with others. As newborns, and from there for many 
years, people depend entirely on the general care of others. When they become adults 
and already see themselves as autonomous beings, they once more depend on the care of 
others during either occasional or chronic illnesses. Frailty of age, too, makes people 
reliant on the care from others. Age, biological constitution, lifestyle, social-economic 
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context, and even chance are factors which determine how much people will be 
dependent on healthcare and other forms of support from others. Particular combinations 
of these factors also determine that some people will become more dependent on 
healthcare than others. 
It is not only the ill who have access to the meaning of healthcare. Although the 
ill may come to develop a deeper experiential understanding of what illness and 
healthcare entail, everyone else has access to their meanings too. Again, meanings are 
intersubjectively constituted by first, second, and third persons. Even when individuals 
are not in the receiving end of care-giving, they may participate in different ways in the 
net of healthcare. Individuals can be caring for others, either directly as care givers or 
indirectly by contributing to make the process of care-giving easier or possible. 
Relieving the first care giver of some of his chores is one example of contribution to this 
end. We need to think of a father whose boss allows him to leave work to care for his 
daughter who has a fever, or a neighbour who volunteers to help with the house keeping 
so that a husband can look after his wife. Supporting a healthcare system through the 
payment of taxes or by taking part in cooperative insurance schemes are further 
examples of contributions that make healthcare possible.  
People also participate in healthcare experiences in the role of witnesses. 
Children that grow in households in which one of its members has a chronic condition 
and need special care from others, for instance, are experiencing healthcare by 
witnessing how adults shape and negotiate their interaction under these circumstances 
and how social arrangements contribute to make their experiences of illness and 
healthcare easier or harder. They are witnessing first hand, and also internalising, a 
representation of how society responds to human vulnerability and dependence. The 
same applies at the broader social level: irrespective of their feelings about it, people 
cannot help witnessing the impacts of illnesses on others and how society responds to 
them.  
In addition, experiences of illness and healthcare inevitably involve different 
forms of responses from others. Even healthy adults will every so often experience an 
acute, even if mild, illness which will elicit a response from others. These responses 
may be as simple and positive as the expression of empathy or the exchange of 
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„concoctions‟ that help alleviate symptoms. Yet, they are not always positive. They can 
also be as demeaning as a patronizing attitude or as hurtful as an expression of repulse. 
Therefore, while some people may feel respected and cared for, others may experience 
isolation, neglect, lack of sympathy, and be denied care. The experience of the family 
that introduced this chapter is an illustration of how certain responses can be also 
devastatingly negative. 
In sum, in this net of interactions that shape and give meaning to illness 
experiences and to healthcare, everyone is a participant playing different and shifting 
roles. In the context of health, illness, and healthcare, people always interact with each 
other: people chose whether to take responsibility for others; people may share the 
other‟s pain; people may share the joy of improvements, even if they are only small; 
people may grieve; people may withdraw; people may question the fairness of social 
arrangements; people may stand for others; and people may even chose not to care. 
Whichever way people respond, these responses are meaningful social actions, and they 
are filled with moral connotations.  
It is in the context of their everyday lives that people face „resistances‟, or 
critical junctures, which precipitate profound questionings to what surround them. 
Among the many circumstances that can represent these critical junctures – such as the 
loss of loved ones, unemployment and financial hardships, experiences of violence and 
discrimination – illnesses and the need for healthcare too can break personal and 
interpersonal taken-for-granteds, demanding a reconstruction of meanings at these both 
levels. As Kleinman points out, illnesses threaten the comfort of people‟s existence at 
the most intimate level – their bodies.462 Illnesses can shake people‟s denial of human 
„existential vulnerability‟; they become „resistances‟ to patterns that were previously 
taken-for-granted or unquestioned, precipitating reflections about the meanings of one‟s 
life and of living with others. As the story of the patient with HIV illustrates, because 
through experiences of illness and healthcare the individualistic orientation of the self 
weakens, loosens its grip, they open spaces in which social critique, mutual recognition, 
and solidarity can find fertile soils to flourish. They are personal crises with social 
implications. 
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If this argument is viable, then it is possible to hypothesise whether health 
intersubjectively construed, cannot be seen as a privileged domain for social criticism 
and for the transformation of interpersonal interactions towards relationships of mutual 
recognition and solidarity. This hypothesis, however, requires three interrelated 
considerations. First, to be sure, not everyone reacts to the „resistances‟ posed by 
chronic illness, in oneself or others, by engaging in critical reflection about their 
meaning and about the fairness of the contextual social arrangements that can make 
these experiences more difficult. People do not always look at those who are ill and see 
in that an occasion for self and social critique. People do not always see experiences of 
illness and of healthcare as moral learning processes. The way people reconstruct their 
selves in the face of chronic or severe illness, the way people respond to experiences of 
illness and healthcare, and the possibility for social critique arising from these critical 
junctures depend on resources available to people, including culture, patterns of 
interaction they have with others, and their own personality. Culture, society, and 
personality, therefore, affect the transformation into new selves and they affect the 
possibility for social critique.  
Second, in no way does this hypothesis assume an intrinsic teleology of illness 
or suffering. It does not place this unfair and even instrumental burden on the ill by 
understanding that their suffering serves a broader purpose or by expecting them to 
respond in any particular way. Illness and suffering are not construed opportunities for 
reflection and self-improvement. In asserting that these experiences of illness and 
healthcare are filled with meaning, it considers that as inevitable, even if undesirable, 
constituents of the human condition, these experiences present themselves as resistances 
to the flow of people‟s lives; they are critical junctures, which provoke breaks in 
common understandings, and therefore motivate questionings, rational reflection, and 
the establishment of new understandings. These processes are intersubjective, they are 
mediated by communication, and they can impact differently at different levels. Hence it 
is possible to conceive that transformations can be more important at the level of 
personality and identity constitution and reflect very little in the overall social and 
cultural arrangements. On the other hand, it is also possible to conceive that every so 
often these processes motivate a broader challenge to reality, provoking a significant 
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change in social arrangements, even if some individuals do not incorporate the change at 
the level of identity. The huge contribution of the gay movement towards the de-
stigmatisation, better prevention, and access to treatment of HIV/AIDS through the 
organisation of self-help groups and patients‟ advocacy, the promotion of debates, and 
political activism, is an example of significant ruptures at the social level, provoked by 
the experiences of illnesses of individuals who chose to challenge established meanings 
and attitudes. Despite this fantastic achievement, it is possible that some individuals 
with HIV still think of their condition as a punishment for their sins. To summarise this 
point, the hypothesis that is being raised is not that experiences of illness and healthcare 
are opportunities for change; they are rather critical junctures in which common 
understandings are challenged and in which people may chose to take the responsibility 
for constructing new understandings and new paradigms. Seen from this perspective, 
experiences of illness and healthcare are not void of meaning. Despite having no 
intrinsic purpose, they do have meanings, even if not always positive ones. 
Finally, the third consideration regards the limitation of this perspective if 
analysed solely from the perspective of the participant. Although well suited for 
revealing the multitude of meanings that health, illness, and healthcare have to 
individuals, it fails to fully account for how „macro-institutions‟ such as health policies, 
healthcare services, biomedical technology, associations, and the media, interact and 
affect the experiences at the participant level, and also for how these participants‟ 
experiences can affect these macro-structures. As considered above, culture and society 
do affect these experiences; however, the dynamics of how they do so cannot be grasped 
by the participant perspective alone. That requires the complementary perspective of the 
social observer.  
In fact, in concluding her review about the literature on the experience of illness, 
Pierret observes that the macro-level of analysis has not been studied as much in the 
field and suggests that this is a gap to be bridged. To that end, she further considers that 
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[t]he challenge is to define a paradigm and methodology for handling problems related to the 
social structure. This entails working out theories about the interrelations, reciprocal effects and 
feedback between subjectivity, cultural factors and social structure.
463
 
In response to this call I argue that Habermas‟s communicative paradigm and its 
complementary dual model of society is well suited to provide a framework for this 
analysis. His framework allows both the analysis of how culture, society, and 
personality affect experiences and the analysis of how the challenges posed by these 
experiences can be translated into broader social change. The next section attempts at 
sketching how Habermas‟s framework could be applied to the study of health and 
society, and its implication to the relationship between health and justice.  
3 Health and the lifeworld  
Modernity has been marked by the progressive differentiation of knowledge and value 
spheres. This de-unification of the worldview meant that sciences, law and morality, and 
the arts became spheres of knowledge reproduced by their own specialised logic. 
Medicine is one example of this de-unification of the world. Whereas in pre-modern 
times concepts of health, and the explanation for diseases and their treatments were not 
separated from mythical, religious, and the private and inner world of patients, in 
modernity health becomes progressively more institutionalised, professionalised, closely 
associated with the scientific paradigm, and therefore detached from other spheres of 
knowledge. This is not to say that these differentiated spheres became irrelevant to each 
other. They still interact, however, predominantly in a state of conflict rather than in 
state of mediation. With the development of new medical technologies, for example, 
new ethical conflicts arise; yet, in plural societies debates within the spheres of ethics 
and morality find it difficult to establish consensuses while following the fast pace of the 
development of new technologies, hindering their regulative role. In addition, despite all 
the accumulation of knowledge about diseases and their treatment, biomedicine has not 
always secured that individuals accept its expert knowledge as valid or as more 
important than their personal experiences and accounts, which many times results in 
non-adherence to treatment and failures in health policies. Therefore, if on the one hand 
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the differentiation of spheres of knowledge in health made the extraordinary 
technological advance in biomedicine possible, on the other hand, this advance came at 
a cost of generating increasingly complex conflicts and lack of appropriate mediation 
between biomedicine and the other spheres.  
Alongside this differentiation in the lifeworld‟s value spheres, modernisation 
also involved the increasing detachment of the system from the lifeworld. That meant 
that the system‟s economic and administrative imperatives became progressively 
independent from the control of lifeworld, and in a reversal of this logic, they begun to 
colonise the lifeworld. The effects of this colonisation are also felt by biomedicine. As 
the economic and administrative logics colonise it, conflicts become aggravated, and its 
own logic is threatened. The attempts at holding to the value-neutrality of medical 
practice and of upholding traditional medical values as a way to prevent the interference 
of the administrative and economic logic is an illustration, as discussed in the last 
chapter,464 of this process of colonisation as perceived by medical practice. 
One of the problems with the rationalisation of the modern world, which as seen 
in Chapter 2 has been the focus of critique in social and critical theory at least since 
Weber, is the privilege given to the steering capacity of a means-to-an-end rationality, 
reflected by the positivist and scientific approaches to law, politics, and sciences in 
general. As a result, medicine, attached to a technicist discourse, and eventually also 
encroached by the media of money and power, became the institutionalised voice of 
health and healthcare practices. Yet, as the previous chapter and section analysed, there 
are alternative paradigms of health which mediation with biomedicine can be seen as a 
critical tool against the one-sidedness and distortions provoked by the predominance of 
the biomedical paradigm. This argument needs to be further developed, and this is 
accomplished by placing health and its related phenomena within Habermas‟s theory of 
society. In doing so, the framework developed supports this argument by accounting not 
only for the different forms of discourses in health and for the different forms of 
reproduction of health practices but also for the pathologies that arise when one form of 
discourse and associated practice predominate. Finally, in placing health in Habermas‟s 
theory, it is be possible to address whether the hypothesis developed in the last section, 
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namely that health can be a privileged domain for social criticism and for fostering 
relationships of mutual recognition and solidarity, is plausible. The relevance of this 
argument becomes clearer in the analysis of the relationship between health and justice. 
3.1 Health as a sub- system of the lifeworld 
Starting from the premise that reality is shaped by diverse forms of interactions, in 
Patients and Healers in the Context of Culture Kleinman proposes a conceptual model 
of health care as a cultural system. He observes that in every culture, health and illness; 
individuals‟ beliefs, experiences and responses to illness; and the individuals and 
institutions involved in healing are systematically interconnected. The totality of these 
socially organised responses to disease defines what he calls the healthcare system. In 
addition, how individuals perceive, label, explain, attach moral meanings, and treat 
sickness forms the system and at the same is constrained by it. In his words,  
the health care system, like other cultural systems, integrates the health-related components of 
society. These include patterns of belief about the causes of illness; norms governing choice and 
evaluation of treatment; socially-legitimated statuses, roles, power relationships, interaction 
settings, and institutions.
465
 
Kleinman‟s model places an emphasis on the perspective of the participant and 
on culture. Illness and healing are construed as cultural experiences, and patients‟ and 
healers‟ actions and interactions are interpreted within their cultural horizons. Despite 
the focus on the micro-level, internal, and cultural perspective, Kleinman acknowledges 
that large scale social, political, economic, and epidemiological factors are relevant in 
shaping these experiences, yet he does not aim at explaining them.466 The purpose of his 
conceptual model is rather to facilitate cross-cultural analyses and descriptions of 
variations in content of these beliefs, moral meanings, and patterns of behaviour.  
Kleinman‟s emphasis on interactions as constituters of reality, his expanded 
scope of what health entails, and his focus on the moral significance of experiences in 
healthcare, show similarities with some elements of Habermas‟s social theory, and for 
this reason, his model of healthcare as a cultural system is a good starting point for our 
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broader analysis of health and its role in society. Yet, the purpose of this section is to 
complement the participant perspective discussed in the section above, with the observer 
perspective so as to better account for precisely these large scale phenomena and how 
they affect experiences and patterns of behaviour at the micro-level. To that end this 
thesis proposes that health be placed within Habermas‟s dual account of society and be 
construed as a sub-system of the lifeworld. In this way, it maintains Kleinman‟s insight 
on the interactive – or intersubjective – constitution of a health system that both forms 
and constraints individuals interactions and responses, while at the same time it expands 
the analysis beyond the cultural, internal and micro-level focuses by including in this 
framework the structural components of society and personality and the interplay of the 
health system with the sub-systems of economy and state administration. 
Health as a sub-system of the lifeworld includes, among others, the official 
healthcare system, either public or private; it includes biomedicine but also lay 
knowledge and alternative therapies as domains of knowledge and practices of care; it 
includes nets of informal healthcare, formed by family, friends, volunteers, and 
everyone else who contribute in helping someone who is ill through the period of 
illness; it involves the norms of conduct governing the interactions in the system; it 
includes drug and equipment companies, medical schools, and medical research; and it 
also involves individuals‟ roles (health professional, informal carer, patient) and 
individuals‟ experiences of illness and healthcare. To make sense of this broad and 
complex structure that forms the health system, its different parts are associated with the 
structural components of the lifeworld and their associated communicative rationalities 
and linguistic functions to reveal how the dynamics of the health system and its role in 
society.467 Table 4.1 schematically illustrates some of these associations. 
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Claims to validity Truth Rightness Truthfulness 
Relation to 
structural 
components of the 
lifeworld 
Culture Society Personality 
Domains of 
knowledge 
(differentiated 
expert cultures) 
Biomedicine, lay 
knowledge, alternative 
therapies, social 
sciences specialised in 
health related 
phenomena 
Morality, law, bioethics, 
medical ethics, 
professional codes of 
conduct, healthcare 
regulations 
Narratives, 
personal accounts 
of experiences of 
illness and 
healthcare 
Moments of reason Cognitive-instrumental Moral-practical Aesthetic-
expressive 
Health-negative 
phenomena 
disease Sick role, pattern of 
interactions with others 
illness 
Linguistic function Development of 
theories, diagnostic and 
treatment protocols, 
measurements of 
responses 
Establishment of care 
relationships (patient and 
professional or informal 
carer), inter-professional 
relationships, patient 
support groups, 
development of bioethical 
consensus, laws, and 
regulations 
Expressing actor‟s 
experiences of 
illness and 
healthcare 
Breaks in common 
understandings 
Falsification of medical 
knowledge and cultural 
beliefs about diseases 
Social critique: Challenge 
posed to healthcare 
policies, stigmas, meaning 
of right to health 
Biographical 
disruption, loss of 
self, self-critique 
Contributions to the 
communicative 
reproduction of the 
lifeworld 
Reproduction of medical 
knowledge 
Sustaining social 
solidarity, mutual 
recognition 
Self-
transformation: 
motivations for 
actions  
Contribution to 
„self‟ development 
Cognitive capacities Interactive capacities, 
support for healthcare 
structures and practices 
Ego development; 
development of 
empathy and 
concern for others 
Table 4.1 – The health system, communicative action, and the lifeworld using claims to validity 
as a guide.  
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As seen in the last chapter, according to Habermas the lifeworld is reproduced – 
i.e. its meanings and values are communicatively stabilised among individuals and 
transmitted from generation to generation – through three forms of actions: a) cultural 
reproduction – through which traditions, cultural meanings, expert knowledge, and skills 
are passed on; b) social integration – through which we legitimise norms of cooperation 
and interaction; c) socialisation – through which individuals form their personal and 
collective identity. In addition, different sub-systems are specialised in contributing 
towards these forms of reproduction in different ways. Therefore, although 
interconnected with others sub-systems, law and the arts, for example, tend to be more 
specialised in contributing towards, respectively, social integration and socialisation. In 
contrast, other sub-systems may contribute to all three forms of lifeworld‟s 
reproduction, such as family and education. I propose that health be construed as a sub-
system of the latter type, i.e. specialised in all three forms of reproduction. Contrarily to 
a narrow association of health with biomedicine or health services in general, the health 
system is here broadly conceived; as a result, its role in the reproduction of the lifeworld 
goes beyond the cultural transmission of medical knowledge and also encompasses 
social integration and socialisation.  
Taking the association between communicative action‟s claims to validity and 
the structural components of the lifeworld as a guide, it is possible to differentiate 
between expert domains of knowledge in health, and from there identify its different 
functions and contributions to the reproduction of the lifeworld. Thus, biomedicine 
alongside lay knowledge, alternative therapies, and the social sciences specialised in 
health constitute the domains of knowledge associated with culture and with its 
cognitive instrumental rationality and claims to truth.468 At this level, knowledge serves 
to the development of theories about health and disease, treatments, and measurements 
of health status or of effectiveness of interventions. Breaks in common understandings 
motivating new consensuses, therefore, are characterised by the falsification of 
knowledge. New research, for example, can challenge current medical theories and 
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treatments, provoking the development of new consensuses on medical protocols. At 
this level of culture, health interacts with communicative action and contributes to the 
reproduction of the lifeworld through the reproduction of medical, lay, alternative, and 
social scientific knowledge.  
 Society and its associated claims to rightness are associated with domains of 
knowledge specialised in establishing the norms of interaction among actors in the 
system. This is the domain of interpersonal relationships in health; it is responsible, for 
example, for establishing care (between patient and professional or informal carer) and 
inter-professional relationships. Law, morality, bioethics, professional codes of conduct, 
are examples of expert knowledges associated with health and society. These expert 
knowledges are guided by a moral-practical rationality and make claims to rightness. 
Breaks in common understandings at this level are characterised by social critique and 
challenge to norms, including for example, challenges to the fairness of health policies, 
to the rightness of stigmatising and discriminating laws, and to the appropriateness of 
the interpretation given to the substance of right to health. In association with 
communicative action, health contributes to the reproduction of the lifeworld at this 
level by promoting social integration. This is achieved, based on the conclusions of the 
previous section that the intersubjectivity of the experiences of illness and healthcare 
can provide a space for social critique and for social solidarity and mutual recognition to 
be nurtured and sustained.  
 Finally, personality is the privileged domain for the expression of subjective 
experiences and feelings and for development of self-identity. Here, narratives and 
personal accounts are validated according to their sincerity, and breaks in common 
understandings at this level are generated, for example, by the loss of self, by self-
critique, or by biographical disruption, requiring the repair work of creating a new 
identity, a new self. This process of repairing the self characterises the contributions of 
health to the reproduction of the lifeworld by motivating self-reflection and the 
renovation of the self with less egocentric orientation and motivated to act on the basis 
of reaching mutual understandings and of the concern for others.  
To elaborate further on the social roles of health, the analysis based on the 
participants‟ experiences of illness and healthcare developed above needs to be retaken. 
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As demonstrated, health related phenomena provoke challenges to taken-for-granted and 
common understandings about the social and inner world, which demand a process of 
(intersubjective) repair that can have important moral and social-political implications. 
If this analysis is sound, then it follows that health can contribute to a lifeworld-
mediated social integration by fostering social solidarity through its intersubjective nets 
of formal and informal healthcare, through the critique it poses to social arrangements 
perceived as unjust. In the same spirit, it contributes to socialisation by motivating a 
transformation of the self, from a self-focused to a more socially aware orientation, 
contributing thus to the development of personalities capable of participating in 
relationships of mutual recognition and motivated to act upon moral agreements. 
Therefore, the health system‟s contributions to the reproduction of the lifeworld at the 
level of social integration and socialisation are important roles health plays in society, 
and these roles inform its relationship with justice.  
Some important considerations about this health system framework need 
addressing. First, the different domains of knowledge in health although differentiated, 
interact with and influence each other. For example, science can contribute to the moral 
debate about the link between deprivation and ill health by providing useful empirical 
data. The development of technology can affect individuals‟ experiences of illness and 
healthcare; the development of a safer drug or user-friendly portable equipments, for 
example, can make it possible to patients to receive chronic treatment at home instead of 
at hospital, making the experience less burdening for the patient. Dialysis done at home 
is an example of that. A given collective‟s self-understanding can place through law 
limits in technology, such as Japanese laws which still express the Japanese cultural 
estrangement with the scientific diagnosis of brain-death, affecting thus the practice of 
organ transplantation in the country. 
Secondly, the logic of these different domains often operates simultaneously. 
During the health professional and patient encounter, for example, different forms of 
discourses and validity claims are raised. A technical account regarding the details of a 
treatment is provided while at the same time respecting the patient‟s autonomy and 
validating her fears and anxieties. In public health, too, different types of discourses may 
overlap in the analysis of a particular policy, involving technical considerations and 
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objective measures, moral or ethical aspects of the policy; and issues of how the policy 
affects or is affected by a particular group identity.  
These two considerations point towards the importance of mediation between 
different types of discourse. As discussed in the last chapter, different language-games 
and validity claims may be at play, therefore, the rational validation of different 
discourses and their appropriate use in relation to the context can define their legitimacy. 
Furthermore, their mediation offers a critical tool in guarding against the predominance 
of one form of expert knowledge over the other. 
Another consideration regards the idealised character of the model. This model, 
of course, is only an analytical tool from which to study health and society. Admittedly, 
in the way it was presented it does have an idealised content, however only in relation to 
the direction of changes facilitated by health and its related phenomena. This is because 
it is also possible to conceptualise experiences of illness and healthcare as reproducing 
the lifeworld not in its communicative capacities, but in its colonised form. In other 
words, it is possible that the distortions observed in the field of health serve only to 
reinforce the deficiencies in social integration and socialisation by corroding solidarity 
and supporting egocentric individualism. In this scenario, health would be a substratum 
facilitating the reproduction of these distortions. The direction of the contributions of 
health to the reproduction of the lifeworld, therefore, can take the opposite direction 
than the one presented above. Yet, the argument that health has a role in the 
reproduction of the lifeworld that goes beyond the transmission of medical knowledge 
remains untouched. Health would still contribute to the reproduction of practices at the 
level of society and personality, although in a disintegrative way. What is crucial, 
however, is that whatever direction this contribution takes, the conclusion is the same: 
that fostering solidarity, provoking social critique, and nurturing relationships of mutual 
recognition also passes by the resistance against the colonisation of the health system by 
the system‟s imperatives and against the encroachment of the logic of one form of 
expert knowledge, i.e. biomedicine, in the spheres mediated by communicative 
rationality. 
There are two ways in which distortions and pathologies can arise in the health 
system: the colonisation of the health system by the system‟s media and the 
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encroachment of technical and scientific discourses on the spheres mediated by moral-
practical and self-expressive moments of reason. As any sub system of the lifeworld, 
health interacts with the system. It relies on the system for money and regulations, and 
in return, it contributes to providing the system with legitimacy. Yet, this balance can be 
altered, and the health system can become colonised and reliant on the strategic 
rationality that steers the system. The results of this colonisation are distortions in the 
health system, which affect the participants‟ experience of illness and healthcare. The 
bureaucratisation of the welfare state and the rise of the managerial and corporate 
approach to healthcare services are examples of this colonisation. Reforms towards 
fitting these services into the managerial-corporate logic are introduced with the 
justification of making services more effective and within budget. The language 
employed by healthcare systems illustrates the new logic taking over. As Sue McGregor 
observes,  
language and metaphors reflecting this philosophy prevail in all public, private and civil 
dialogue, especially in health care policy: spending cuts, dismantling, de-indexing, deficit 
cutting, haves and haves-not, competitiveness, downsizing, declining welfare state, 
inefficiencies, inevitability, closures, chopping services, de-insured, user-pay-fees, two-tier 
healthcare, for-profit healthcare, escalating costs, free markets, erosion of health care, being 
forced to make difficult policy choices, unfortunate necessities and justifiable sacrifices. Indeed, 
neoliberal rhetoric has a plausible ring to the uninformed (...).
469
 
It follows that the incorporation of the steering logic of the system also turns patients 
and future patients into clients. As clients of the state or insurance companies, patients 
do not fully participate in the development of policies and establishment of priorities. In 
either case, they stand mostly passively in the receiving end of services. In one case they 
participate through the exchange of votes-for-services, choosing among different 
manifestos, and in the other case they participate through their power of purchase, 
choosing among different plans. Some extend their participation by complaining against 
the quality of the services or claiming fairer shares of them. The spirit of this cliental 
participation, however, is not of cooperation or mutual recognition of needs but 
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competition for limited resources, and services are seen as entitlements or desert rather 
than social resources.  
Another form of distortion leading to pathologies in the health system is 
represented by the domineering status of biomedicine within the health system. As the 
discussion of the social model of health illustrates, there are a wide range of distortions 
in the field of health attributed to the narrow approach of biomedicine, from the 
medicalisation of the social world to the legitimation of oppression and prejudice against 
the mentally ill, women, ethnic minorities, the poor, and homosexuals.470 Kleinman and 
Hahn too, point out that the predominance of the biomedical account has had the effect 
of alienating patients, promoting an adversarial climate,471 colluding with big business,472 
constraining ethical deliberation about healthcare and medical technology, and of 
distorting the moral world of patient and community by translating patients‟ 
perspectives and suffering into diagnostic categories.473  
The colonisation by the market and the dominance of biomedicine, in fact are 
closely tied phenomena. In commenting about genetic engineering and how it can affect 
the „self-understanding of the species‟, Habermas calls into attention the problems raised 
with the funding of scientific research and the transformation of biotechnology into an 
investment. The dynamic of this association between capital market and biotechnology 
poses a risk to the slow-paced ethical-political public opinion formation.474 The 
association of a renewed Darwinism with a free trade ideology, he argues, threatens to 
supersede the ethical debate and regulation of biotechnology: „[t]he issue today, of 
course, is no longer the overgeneralisation of biological insights by social Darwinists, 
but rather the weakening of the “sociomoral restrictions” placed on biotechnological 
progress for medical as well as economic reasons.‟475 
This is not to say that these sharp critiques of the biomedical model invalidate it 
altogether. On the contrary; both Hahn and Kleinman acknowledge the contributions of 
biomedicine to the improvement of health conditions worldwide, and Habermas too sees 
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the contribution of the sciences. In challenging common sense illusions (traditional, 
mythical, religious), the sciences lead to transformations in individuals‟ self-
understandings and social changes, such was the case with Darwin‟s theory of evolution, 
which seriously challenged anthropocentric and religious worldviews.476 In addition, the 
need for regulations in response to technological innovations tends to be associated with 
the development of post-traditional conceptions of law and morality.477 One of the 
advantages of the framework of health as a sub-system of the lifeworld lies precisely in 
establishing the scope and limits of the biomedical authority and its language games, 
allowing both for the validation of its contributions and for the critique of the distortions 
it creates when its steering logic is misplaced or colonised by the system. 
 In addition to accounting for the pathologies in the field of health and the 
possibility of overcoming them, this framework points to the possibility of social 
changes that go beyond health. It suggests that a decolonised health system steered by 
communicative rationality can be an important locus for the renewal and support of 
solidarity and for the reconstruction of selves capable of and motivated to interacting 
with others in relationships of mutual recognition. In sustaining solidarity and mutual 
recognition, the health system provides the resources to make individuals‟ experiences 
of illness and of healthcare less disruptive, less painful, and less isolating as well as it 
facilitates the reconstruction of new and more positive selves. Beyond that, the nurturing 
of an ethical orientation towards solidarity and mutual recognition contributes to social 
integration and provides participants with the motivation to both join moral discourses 
and act upon their agreements. 
4 Conclusion 
This chapter aimed at constructing an account of health and its role in society from the 
perspective of Habermas‟s discourse theory. This account adopted the participant‟s 
perspective and analysed experiences of illness and healthcare in order to reveal the 
inevitable intersubjective character of these experiences and their potentially self-and 
social transformative nature. This analysis led to the proposal of construing health as a 
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privileged locus for social change. In shifting to the observer perspective and placing 
this intersubjective understanding of health in Habermas‟s dual model of society, the 
chapter proposed a conceptual model of health as a sub-system of the lifeworld, 
associated with the three structural components of culture, society, and personality. In 
doing so it was possible to identify the important roles health plays in integrating society 
by reproducing lay and medical knowledge; fostering social solidarity through nets of 
formal and informal healthcare; and contributing to the development of personalities 
capable of participating in relationships of mutual recognition.  
This discourse theoretical model of a health system can offer an important 
contribution to the analysis of health, its modern pathologies, and its emancipatory 
potentials. It also points to the direction of how these pathologies can be avoided and 
these potentials realised. If the possibility for moral discourses relies on ethical 
orientations of the lifeworld that meet the requirements of a post-conventional morality 
and justice halfway, this model suggests that a decolonised health system can contribute 
to this task by fostering the ethical orientation towards values of solidarity and mutual 
recognition. The impacts of this argument on the analysis of the relationship between 
health and justice and the right to health are the subject of the next chapter.  
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Chapter 5 
HEALTH, JUSTICE AND THE RIGHT TO HEALTH  
Justice is good for our health. This is one of the main arguments of Norman Daniels‟s 
works on the relationship between health and justice. In his later works Daniels reaches 
this conclusion by analysing the findings of a growing body of research on the social 
determinants of health.478 These researches provide important empirical data 
demonstrating that health statuses of individuals and populations are more deeply 
associated with broader issues of social justice than commonly assumed. Of special 
notice in these researches is the identification of the close relationship between social 
inequalities within a society and the poorer health conditions of its population. In 
producing these findings about broader social determinants of health, these studies have 
posed serious challenges to many works on the subject of health and justice and they 
also make it increasingly more difficult to separate theories on the ethics and justice of 
health from theories of justice in general. These impressive findings, therefore, have 
contributed to the reorientation of many studies in the field, including Daniels‟s work, 
which became less focused on issues of fairness in healthcare distribution and more 
focused on the fairness of social determinants of health and on the importance of health.  
Even more so since this reorientation, Daniels‟s work represents one of the best 
efforts in the liberal field in persuasively linking justice and health and accounting for 
the normative implications of this relationship for social policies. This chapter is thus 
also dedicated to support Daniels‟s broadening perspective on the relationship between 
health and justice while critiquing his typical liberal emphasis on distributive justice. By 
linking the intersubjective account of health and its associated concept of health as a 
sub-system of the lifeworld with Habermas‟s theory of justice and solidarity this chapter 
argues that the relationship between health and justice requires an understanding of 
justice that goes beyond principles of distribution. In concluding this analysis, to 
Daniels‟s insightful claim that justice is good for health, I advance the complementary 
claim that health is also good for justice. 
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Given that solidarity, which is a counterpart of justice in Habermas‟s theory, is 
the scarcest social integrative resource in modern capitalism, the role that health plays in 
fostering solidarity and relationships of mutual recognition is seen as a fundamental 
contribution to the possibility of rational discourses and therefore, for justice itself. This 
contribution points to a dynamic and reciprocal relationship between health and justice. 
The concept of the right to health is then explored as an illustration of how this 
communicative relationship between health and justice can contribute to the debate on 
the legitimacy of the right to health. The chapter argues that this reciprocal relationship 
between health and justice challenges the commonly held justification for the right to 
health based solely on the recognition of health as a necessary condition to the 
individual exercise of civil and political rights. 
1 The relationship between health and justice 
It is well documented that the health conditions of populations are affected by economic 
and political instability. As Thomas Pogge notes, for a significant part of the world‟s 
population, who live in conditions of extreme economic deprivation and often also in 
conditions of political instabilty, the levels of basic sanitary conditions and life 
expectancy still resemble the levels of two hundred years ago.479 But even in less 
poverty-stricken countries, periods of economic recession are commonly associated with 
a deterioration of the health of vulnerable groups due to material hardship, psychosocial 
effects, and changes in the population‟s pattern of behaviours.480 Use of drugs, 
alcoholism, depression, and violence are all associated with economic instability. The 
worsening of the health conditions and significant reduction of life expectancy that 
occurred in the countries of the former Soviet Union after its dissolution, for example, 
offer a good example of the close relationship between economic instability and health. 
In the early 1990‟s these countries went through a period of dramatic social and 
economic transformations, with rising unemployment, inflation, insecurity, and marked 
increase in social inequalities. Between 1990 and 1994, the mortality rate in Russia, for 
example, increased 39%, and the life expectancy was reduced in more than six years for 
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men and three years for women.481 The effects on the health conditions of these 
countries have been long-lasting and only recently improvements are observed.482  
Hazen Ghobarah et al. also demonstrate the important role of political conditions 
in influencing health conditions of populations. In a study consisting in a regressive 
analysis of data collected from 179 countries they studied the relationship between 
public health performances and other social measures such as level of democracy and 
civil and international conflicts.483 Among their findings are that democracies tend to 
spend more on their citizen‟s health than autocracies. A democratic government at the 
95
th
 percentile on the polity score, for example, allocates 49% more resources to health 
than a dictatorship at the 5
th
 percentile on the score. 484 They also demonstrated that 
enduring international rivalry largely impacts on the public health expenditures in 
health. Pakistan, for example, allocates less than 1% of its Gross Domestic Product to 
public health.485 The mere contiguity to any country experiencing civil war results in 
lower levels of public health performances.486 In addition, they demonstrate that 
international conflicts and security threats affect public investments in health due to 
allocation of significant resources on military and defense capabilities, to disruption on 
the provision of safe water and food, to destruction of healthcare and sanitary facilities, 
to substantial flight of trained professionals, and to the resulting masses of displaced 
people. In many countries the mortality rates among refugees is five to twelve times the 
normal rate.487 
In addition, recent studies have shown that the relationship between socio-
economic conditions and health is relevant to the population of richer and democratic 
countries too. These data point particularly to the growing relevance of inequalities 
within societies as a strong determinant of health. As Richard Wilkinson and Kate 
Pickett describe, 
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When health inequalities first came to prominence on the public health agenda in the early 
1980s, people would sometimes ask why there was so much fuss about inequalities. They argued 
that the task of people working in public health was to raise overall standards of health as fast as 
possible. In relation to that, it was suggested that health inequalities were a side issue of little 
relevance. We can now see that the situation may be almost the opposite of that. National 
standards of health [...] are substantially determined by the amount of inequality in a society. If 
you want to know why one country does better than another, the first thing to look at is the 
extent of inequality.
488
 
In The Spirit Level, Wilkinson and Pickett review the results of a series of 
studies about the social determinants of health, placing a special focus on the close 
relationship between health and social inequalities that these studies establish.489 Their 
analysis of these extensive data shows a remarkable relationship between economic 
development and life expectancy and health statuses of populations. While in poorer 
countries, life expectancy tends to increase significantly on the early stages of economic 
development and rising living standards, this relationship tends to weaken at the level of 
middle-income countries, until completely disappear as countries get richer. Although 
life expectancy continues to rise in these countries – it increases by between two to three 
years with every ten years – this rise is not associated with economic development, i.e. 
life expectancy and health indexes improve with time regardless of further increase in 
wealth.490 Analysing the 2006 United Nations Human Development Report, they point to 
the clear association between national income per person and life expectancy, which 
starts reducing significantly from around $10,000 and levels off beyond $25,000. 
Virtually no further gains are observed after this point. More interestingly, these data 
demonstrate striking discrepancies across countries. A country as rich as the United 
States, for example, has no better life expectancy than a country as Costa Rica, which is 
less than a fourth as rich.491 These data suggest that the relationship between economic 
development and health is just one of the variables that account for the status of health 
of different countries.  
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Although wealth and increasing living standards are still chiefly relevant in poor 
countries, as countries become more affluent, other factors such as culture and social 
policies, also seem to play important roles in determining population health indexes.492 
This finding has some important implications. Not only do these data challenge the 
libertarian claim that increasing levels of wealth tend to spread benefits to all including 
the worst-off, but they also seem to suggest that once a country has crossed a certain 
income threshold, how equally wealth is distributed matters more than how big it is in 
average or absolute terms. Going back to the example of Costa Rica, which is a country 
which has a more equitable distribution of income than the United States and the United 
Kingdom, data show that despite its significant lower income per person in comparison 
with these two countries, Costa Rica actually enjoys a higher life expectancy than 
them.493 In fact, as Daniels, Bruce Kennedy and Ichiro Kawashi analyse, the widening 
income differences in the United States and the United Kingdom may be associated with 
the deceleration of their life expectancy improvements.494 
Wilkinson and Pickett point to a paradox in these findings: while significant 
differences in wealth among richer countries do not correlate with differences in life 
expectancy rates, differences in wealth within any of them, is clearly and systematically 
linked with differences in life expectancy. Most notably, this finding is not only 
associated with the poor living conditions to which some are exposed; although those 
living in poverty do have a lower life expectancy than the richer, this trend extends to 
those outside poverty levels in almost every society. That means that even middle 
income groups in a country with high average wealth but high income inequality may 
enjoy lower health standards than comparable, or even poorer, groups in countries with 
lower income inequality.495In other words, what seems to matter is not the amount of 
wealth people have, but their position in the social ladder. 
What would explain this finding? Daniels, Kennedy and Kawashi point to the 
pattern of distribution of social goods such as education and broader life opportunities as 
important factors associated with the finding that inequality matters more than absolute 
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or average wealth. They refer to data that demonstrate that in the United States the most 
inegalitarian states invest less in human capital. They have a larger uninsured population 
and they invest less in education and social safety nets. They note that adult literacy is a 
strong predictor of life expectancy, and that gender disparities in access to education 
further decreases life expectancy and health achievements, a trend that is also observed 
across the globe.496  
Wilkinson and Pickett, however, point to another direction. They demonstrate 
through their analysis of extensive empirical data that problems such as violence, mental 
illness, drug use, teenage births, obesity, and poor educational performance are clearly 
more common among the poorer; yet, these problems have little or no relation with 
levels of average income in a society, i.e. this is still true even if the poorer in a given 
society are richer than middle income groups in other societies.497 Therefore, the matter 
does not seem to rest on living standards; rather it seems to rest in how people compare 
with each other in the same society.498  
They further illustrate this hypothesis by analysing the classic Whitehall studies, 
which consisted in the long-term follow up of the health status of British civil 
servants.499 These studies demonstrated an important correlation between service 
hierarchy and diseases and death rates. Those in jobs of lower status suffered more from 
heart diseases, some cancers, chronic lung diseases, depression, suicide, sickness 
absence from work, and back pain. Factors such as poverty and unemployment, access 
to healthcare, or lifestyle did not explain these findings, as the study population had both 
relatively stable jobs and full access to healthcare services. Furthermore, although those 
in lower status jobs were in fact more obese, heavier smokers, less physically active, and 
had higher blood pressure, these risk factors accounted for only a third of their increased 
risk of heart disease. One of the explanations for these findings is that the differences in 
health statuses and death rates between people occupying posts of different hierarchical 
statuses would be associated with levels of job stress and people‟s sense of control over 
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their work.500 Since the Whitehall studies, a number of different studies have focused on 
understanding these findings, having also associated lower social status with worst 
health profiles affecting not only people at the bottom of the social hierarchy. Wilkinson 
and Pickett conclude that from the very bottom to the very top of the social ladder, those 
who are above any given point have better health than those who are below this point. 
This trend, therefore, applies not only to „blue-collar workers‟; senior administrators do 
also live longer than those in professional and executive grades.501  
Likewise social status, researches in the field agree that social integration is 
another important determinant of health. Wilkinson and Pickett, for example, point out 
that at the individual level, the quality of the relationships that people have with others 
affects health too. In reviewing a number of studies on the subject, they show that social 
isolation is not good for health, and that the opposite, such as having friends and 
partners and taking part in social associations and support groups, protects health. Social 
support is associated with better recoveries from heart attacks; people with friends are 
less likely to catch a cold; and physical wounds heal faster if people have good 
relationships with their partners.
502
  
Focusing on the social level, they also reviewed studies that support the thesis 
that social relationships are important for health, and these findings would help explain 
the impacts of social inequalities on the health profile of populations. As they point out, 
inequalities weaken community life, reduce trust between people, and increase 
violence.
503
 Daniels, Kennedy and Kawachi also link the worst health profiles of 
inegalitarian societies with the corrosion of social cohesion.
504
 Referring to a number of 
studies in the field, they demonstrate that high income inequality is associated with 
lower political participation, lack of investment in human capital and social safety nets, 
and low interpersonal levels of trust.
505
 Trust, as Wilkinson and Pickett note, is closely 
associated with levels of economic equality: where there is more inequality, people 
seem to be less caring of one another, there is less mutuality in relationships, and 
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therefore there is less trust. Trust, they argue, is fundamental to social cooperation; as 
studies show, people who trust others are more likely to donate time and money to help 
others and they are also more likely to support the legal order. Trust also makes people 
feel more secure living in their communities, which affects health.
506
 Research evidence 
in the United States, for example, demonstrate that the risk of death is lower in poorer 
neighbourhoods characterised by high levels of trust and active community life, 
regardless of their level of social deprivation.
507
  
In making the point that absolute wealth is unrelated to improved health 
outcomes in countries that reached a certain stage of economic development, Wilkinson 
and Pickett further add that in rich countries levels of spending on healthcare and the 
availability of high medical technology are not related to indexes of population health. 
As they illustrate, the United States, which contains less than 5% of the world‟s 
population, spends between 40-50% of the world‟s total expenditure on health. Yet, the 
United States performs poorly in many health indicators in comparison to middle-
income and rich countries.
508
In fact, studies have found that black men living in some 
poor American neighbourhoods have lower life expectancies than men living in some 
undeveloped countries.
509
  
They finally conclude, considering that average levels of income and that 
expenditure in health and in high medical technology contribute little to determining 
mortality and health in a society, that it is inequality what matters, i.e. „more egalitarian 
societies tend to be healthier‟.510 The implication of this conclusion is that tackling 
poverty is not enough to improve health indexes and reduce health inequalities. Apart 
from eliminating poverty, this conclusion calls for better income distribution, regardless 
of the total amount of wealth of any given society.  
Daniels too agrees that social determinants of health and health inequalities 
matter; yet, he argues that demonstrating the correlation between inequalities and poor 
health does not provide the answer to the important question of whether these 
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inequalities are unjust. As he remarks, „correlation alone will not support judgments 
about injustice.‟511 In order to evaluate whether inequalities are unjust, it is necessary to 
understand their mechanisms. He observes, for example, that whereas inequalities that 
result from social exclusion and discrimination, such as gender, race and ethnic 
inequalities, are easier to be accepted as unjust, socio-economic inequalities may pose 
harder questions. This is because few people are radical egalitarians. Most people seem 
to accept some levels of socioeconomic inequalities, and some even see them as 
desirable incentives to harder work. Others are prepared to accept different levels of 
social inequalities provided they do not affect people‟s health. As he reflects,  
Few people are radical egalitarians opposing all forms of such inequality. Many who are not at 
all troubled by significant inequalities in income, wealth, or opportunities for a higher quality of 
life are particularly troubled by health inequalities. They believe that a socioeconomic inequality 
that otherwise seems just becomes unjust if it contributes to health inequalities. Is every health 
inequality that results from unequally distributed social goods unjust?
512
 
For Daniels, the answer to the question of „when are health inequalities unjust?‟ 
is fundamental to guide public health policies under resource constraints. 513 In providing 
a framework to answering this question Daniels employs John Rawls‟s principles of 
justice as fairness to the context of health, and as a result, he proposes that „health 
inequalities across demographic groups are unjust when they result from an unjust 
distribution of the socially controllable factors affecting health‟.514 Looking from the 
perspective of justice as fairness,
515
 Daniels argues that health is special for justice 
insofar as it protects opportunities. Since Rawls‟s principles of justice require societies 
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to protect individuals‟ opportunities, meeting health needs, including the fair distribution 
of social determinants of health, becomes a requirement of justice.  
Although ambitious, given the scope of what justice might require in terms of 
health policies, the relationship that Daniels establishes between health and justice, in 
being based on health‟s contribution towards the fair distribution of opportunities, is 
seen by some commentators as counter intuitive and restrictive. To assume that securing 
opportunities is all there is in the relationship between health and justice neglects the 
important other reasons why people attach a moral value to health and healthcare. In 
many cases, individuals do not receive healthcare to protect their enjoyment of life‟s 
opportunities. Some patients, for example, receive healthcare to alleviate suffering and 
even to contribute to a good death (one needs to think of a terminal patient who receives 
oxygen and pain-killers in her final days for the mere purpose of relieving her agony). In 
fact, a great deal of effort and money is spent in the treatment of patients who will not 
have their opportunities increased by healthcare, as it is the case of severely 
neurologically impaired individuals. As Shlomi Segall puts it, 
Most patients treated by healthcare systems are individuals in the twilight of their lives. [...] An 
often-cited figure is that, in the US, 30% of healthcare expenditure is currently spent on patients 
in the last six months of their life. [...] Healthcare in that case cannot be said to provide 
opportunity, equal or otherwise, to pursue life plans. The effect of successful treatment of 
patients who are in the last weeks of their lives is not so much that of giving them opportunity to 
pursue their life plans, but rather that of alleviating their pain and suffering and that of 
postponing death as long as possible.
516
 
Therefore, linking the fairness of meeting health needs to the protection of the 
enjoyment of life‟s opportunities carries a bias in favour of people who can be treated, 
who can be compensated, or who can claim preventive measures to maintain an active 
and productive life. Daniels replies to this line of criticism by reaffirming that what is 
crucial for the purposes of justice is the relation between health and opportunities; yet, 
whenever the protection of opportunities cannot be claimed as the justification, other 
values, such as compassion and benevolence, should compensate for that. These 
charitable values, however, are not attached to justice. This solution receives many 
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criticisms. Some egalitarians such as Dani Filc, for example, reject it by arguing that 
leaving the most vulnerable to depend on social beneficence as opposed to a sense of 
justice, is neither fair nor acceptable from an egalitarian point of view.
517
  
 Daniels‟s extension of Rawls‟s theory of justice to health, however, does not 
focus on equality of treatment, but on equality of opportunities, regardless of the 
outcomes and regardless of distributive inequalities, provided these inequalities secure 
the greatest benefit to the worst-off. Yet, this scope for accepting wide social 
inequalities poses a question on the compatibility of his theory with the very growing 
awareness of the impacts of social determinants of health which motivates his 
broadening perspective on health and justice. As seen above, much of this literature 
points to the relevance of relative inequality on health. If what matters for health is more 
income equality among the population, how can that be reconciled with a Rawlsanian 
conception of justice?
518
  
Daniels‟s association of health with the protection of opportunities is the focus of 
sharp criticisms. One of the difficulties of his argument is its emphasis on distributive 
justice, which leads him to overlook other potential moral links between health and 
justice. He does, of course, devote a significant part of his argument to the analysis of 
the moral importance of health in order to associate it with justice. Yet, because he 
captures the moral importance of health through the framework of Rawls‟s second 
principle of justice, from the start the relationship between health and justice is ensnared 
in a distributive logic, attached to the protection of opportunities, and therefore less open 
to seeing health as more intrinsically related to justice. As a Rawlsanian, of course, he 
could have attached a more important moral meaning to health by associating it with the 
first principle, i.e. by construing it as a basic liberty.
519
 He could have justified this 
construction by arguing that health may be more directly relevant to liberty and self-
determination than placing limits to government interferences, for example.
520
 In 
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addition, he could have argued that contractors, because behind the veil of ignorance, 
would not know their actual position, i.e. they would not know whether they are healthy 
or chronically ill or whether they live in a society with universal access to health or are 
uncovered. As a result, they would rationally choose to support a system of universal 
coverage that would provide the best health protection for all within budgetary 
constraints. To be sure, this argument would still be framed within distributive lines, but 
at least he would have avoided the counter intuitive claim that the protection of 
opportunities is all that is in the link between health and justice. 
He does not take this route, however. As he explains,: 
The special importance and unequal distribution of healthcare needs, like educational needs, are 
acknowledged by connecting the needs to institutions that provide for fair equality of 
opportunity. But opportunity, not healthcare or education remains the primary social good.
521
  
Therefore, what matters for justice is not health per se, but opportunity.
522
 The 
importance of health for justice is only instrumental, i.e. health is a demand of justice 
only insofar it protects the real good – opportunity. That he needs the backup of other 
values extrinsic to justice, such as benevolence, to compensate for the cases that do not 
fit into his account is already an indication that he may have narrowed the relationship 
between health and justice a bit too much.  
Granted, fair distribution of opportunities is a good principle of justice. Few 
would disagree that protecting life‟s opportunities is a good thing or equally in the 
interests of all. Likewise, criticising his focus on distributive justice does not imply a 
denial of the inevitable distributive connotations of health policies and healthcare 
services. One way to address this issue is to place these distributive connotations within 
Habermas‟s distinction between discourses of justification and discourses of application, 
in which they would fit into the domain of discourses of application that follow 
discourses of justification; it is in the latter that the moral relevance of health would 
have to be first established by participants. 
This preceding analysis on the moral importance of health can take advantage of 
the concept of health system developed in the last chapter, in which the deeply moral 
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nature of the intersubjective experiences of health, illness, and healthcare were revealed 
along with the contributions of the health system to social integration by fostering 
solidarity and by facilitating the reconstruction of selves more capable of joining 
relationships of mutual recognition. The question of the relationship between health and 
justice, therefore, can take the form of: why supporting the health system is equally in 
the interests of all? This universalist question combined with the insights about the 
important social roles of the health system, leads to the appraisal of the relationship 
between health and justice from a broader perspective. Apart from asking what justice 
demands from societies regarding the health system, participants can also ask whether, 
and if so how, support for the health system contributes for justice.  
As seen in Chapter 2, Habermas establishes a close relationship between justice 
and solidarity. From the premises of discourse theory, justice cannot protect the 
individual without also protecting the net of intersubjectivity that the individual depends 
on to both form and recognise her unique identity. Justice and solidarity are therefore 
counterparts. Solidarity in Habermas‟s work is not equated to benevolence or charity, 
and its role is not to compensate for gaps in justice. Rather, it represents the necessary 
conditions of mutual recognition and concern for others that must be met if discourses 
are not to be steered strategically. As also seen, in modern capitalism solidarity is a 
scarce resource, which threatens the possibility of universal agreements and of 
communication free from coercion or manipulation. For this reason, solidarity needs to 
be renewed and nurtured, and this is a task for the lifeworld.  
Lifeworld‟s institutions, including the institutions of the health system, in 
operating on a communicative and inclusive basis rather than on the differentiation of 
clients‟ status or ability to pay, play an important part on this project. They are 
privileged spaces for communicative practices and in times of crises, they offer the 
reassurance of the cooperative basis of society; they reaffirm social commitments to 
protect individuals in their vulnerability in the face of the uncertainties of life and of the 
deficinecies of social arrangements. Well structured safety and welfare nets, therefore, 
work as buffers against difficult times.
523
 They make it easier for individuals to get 
through adversities, and in carrying the message that society is a cooperative and 
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supportive project, they contribute to maintain society stable and cohesive. They 
generate trust. More importantly, in protecting both the individual and their net of 
intersubjectivity, these structures become vital spaces for the renewal and for the 
reproduction of solidarity.  
The lifeworld, therefore, is the space in which practices conducive to solidarity 
can take place, and the practices involved in the health system, as seen in the last 
chapter, are specially positioned to this project of renewal and of sustaining solidarity. 
In contributing to fostering solidarity, the health system also contributes to justice, and 
from this perspective, it can be concluded that the relationship between justice and 
health is reciprocal. It flows from both directions, i.e. a post-conventional justice 
supports health practices that are solidarity and equally in the interests of all, at the same 
time that health practices of universalist orientation help sustain the internalisation of a 
post-conventional justice by creating the space for social solidarity to flourish. The 
relationship between justice and health, therefore, is dynamic, and solidarity is the link 
which keeps this relationship flowing in both directions. In sum, just as justice is good 
for health, health is good for justice. 
2 The right to health 
Having established a relationship between health and justice, this section briefly access 
whether this perspective has any implication to the controversial right to health. Despite 
being largely recognised in domestic and international law, it still stirs controversy for a 
number of different reasons, including the lack of funding and economic viability, the 
lack of definition of obligations and accountability, the lack of moral obligation to fulfil 
this positive claim, the conceptual inappropriateness of the right to health, and even the 
lack of agreement on the definition of health itself. This section analyses the challenges 
to the right to health presented by Onora O‟Neill and Thomas Pogge‟s institutional 
approach to rights and attempt to bring socio-economic rights within the negative rights 
categories as an opportunity to explore whether Habermas‟s conceptualisation of rights 
offers a more promising approach to the right. Before that, a brief account of the status 
of the right to health is developed. 
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The World Health Organization,
524
 states in the preamble of its constitution that 
„(t)he enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health is one of the fundamental 
rights of every human being without distinction of race, religion, political belief, 
economic or social condition‟.525 More modestly, in the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, healthcare is mentioned in Article 25 (1) which states that „every person 
has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself 
and his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social 
services…‟526 The right was eventually reinforced and broadened at the United Nations 
by the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, in which Article 
12 binds the States Parties to „recognize the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the 
highest attainable standard of physical and mental health‟.527 In addition, Article 12.2 of 
the Covenant establishes the provisions that states are required to make to realize it: 
Article 12.2 (a) provides for the right to maternal, child and reproductive health; Article 
12.2 (b) provides for the right to healthy natural and workplace environments; Article 
12.2 (c) provides for the right to prevention, treatment and control of diseases; and 
Article 12.2 (d) provides for the right to health facilities, goods and services. 
The right to health with its broad scope has been also recognised in many 
International Treaties and incorporated into various domestic jurisdictions. It is 
recognized inter alia, in article 5 (e) (iv) of the International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination of 1965; in articles 11.1 (f) and 12 of 
the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women of 
1979; in article 24 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child of 1989, in Article 11 of 
the European Social Charter of 1961 (as revised); Article 16 of the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples‟ Rights of 1981; and Article 10 of the Additional Protocol to the 
American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural 
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Rights of 1988.
528
 Moreover, currently 192 countries are members of the World Health 
Organization abiding by its constitution.
529
 
Despite this wide recognition, the status of the right to health as a positive right 
is still contested. To the mainstream jurisprudence, with a few exceptions coming from 
jurisdictions such as South Africa and Latin America, the right to health, along with 
other socio-economic rights, is seen more as an aspiration or a moral right rather than a 
legal right proper. While civil and political rights are generally understood as negative, 
cost-free, allowing immediate implementation, precise in meaning and non-ideological, 
socio-economic rights are generally considered positive, resource demanding, of 
progressive implementation, vague, and ideological.
530
 Historically, this dichotomic 
approach is reminiscent of the creation in 1952 by the „Separation Resolution‟ of two 
separate covenants on human rights under the United Nations
531
, the Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights and the Covenant on Socio-Economic and Cultural Rights. This 
separation reflected the political normative dispute over the hierarchy of rights between 
capitalist and socialist countries in the post-war context.
532
 This separation was later 
rejected by the 1993 Vienna Declaration, which states that: „(a)ll human rights are 
universal, indivisible and interdependent and interrelated. The international community 
must treat human rights globally in a fair and equal manner, on the same footing, and 
with the same emphasis‟.533 This step, however, did not represent the end of the debate, 
now facing a post-cold war scenario. With the end of the cold war, for many, the priority 
of Civil and Political Rights seemed reinforced.
534
 
This is not to say that courts have not have not made decisions taking socio-
economic rights into consideration. The European Court of Human Rights, in the case 
Airey and Ireland,
535
 for example, which involved the debate whether the right to a fair 
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trial in civil lawsuits would involve the right to legal aid for people of reduced financial 
means, stated that there are no clear-cut divisions between civil and political rights and 
social and economic rights and that the fulfillment of a right under the Convention 
would sometimes require positive action. The Court stated that 
[t]he court is aware that the further realization of social and economic rights is largely dependent 
on the situation – notably financial – reigning in the state in question. On the other hand, the 
Convention must be interpreted in the light of present day conditions and is designed to 
safeguard the individual in a real and practical way as regards those areas with which it deals. 
Whilst the Convention sets forth what are essential civil and political rights many of them have 
implications of a social and economic nature (…) the mere fact that an interpretation of the 
Convention may extend into the sphere of social and economic rights should not be a decisive 
factor against such an interpretation; there is no watertight division separating that sphere from 
the field covered by the Convention.
536
 
Ida Koch observes, however, that the recognition of socio-economic rights as justiciable 
rights seems to apply only  „to situations where the social rights appear as necessary 
fulfillment elements in civil rights, and often, the criteria for accepting the social 
fulfillment elements as part of the civil rights are not very transparent.‟537 As she 
concludes, socio-economic rights, therefore, are not legitimated on their own right, 
which tends to reinforce the priority of civil and political rights. Moreover, matters of 
socio-economic deprivation which are not evidently tied to a compromise in the exercise 
of a civil or political right do not receive legal protection and enforcement. As Koch 
remarks, „those who are „“only” hungry, homeless or without health care cannot count 
on having the legitimacy of [their] claim enforced by the judiciary‟.538  
This functionalist dependence of socio-economic rights to the exercise of civil 
and political rights can be observed in the European Court case of D. v The United 
Kingdom
539
 which involved an AIDS patient in terminal stage facing expulsion to his 
home country (St. Kitts in the Caribbean) in which no treatment for his condition was 
available. The Court ruled in favour of the patient; however not on the basis that in 
being allowed to stay in the UK he would be able to receive the needed medical 
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treatment that otherwise would be unavailable to him. The decision revolved around the 
political issue of expulsion and was finally based on the grounds that his removal would 
violate Article 3 of the European Convention which prohibits inhumane treatment.  
In fact, the prohibition of inhumane and degrading treatment alongside the right to 
life, the right to private and family life,
540
 and the principle of non-discrimination have 
being more commonly been appealed to when dealing with cases involving human 
health,
541
 reinforcing the fact that the courts are generally very reluctant to acknowledge 
that the positive claims they entail can be justiciable.
542
 Furthermore, in the few 
instances that they do acknowledge so, as Aart Hendriks points out, they tend to restrain 
themselves to issues of the bare minimum content of the right,
543
 and when the case is 
decided against the fulfillment of the positive right, there is generally the 
acknowledgment of the limitations of resources as well as the acknowledgement of the 
limited role of the courts in matters of policies of welfare institutions.
544
  
2.1 Health as a relational right 
O‟Neill‟s skepticism towards the right to health starts with the expression „right to 
health‟, as the right can sound absurdly unrealistic if literally interpreted as the right of 
everyone to be healthy with the according obligation on people or states to assure it for 
all. As she claims, the right to health is „literally speaking incoherent (…) a fantasy that 
overlooks the fact that no human action can secure health for all‟ and that „there can be 
no human obligation to do so, and hence, no right to health‟.545 Against this literal 
interpretation of the meaning of the right, Virginia Leary argues that the right to health 
is simply a shorthand expression translating propositions such as a right to health care, a 
right to health protection or a right to healthy conditions. She adds that in the context of 
Human Rights law, the right does not receive such literal interpretation.
546
 In addition, 
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the Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights has also clarified that „the right 
to health is not to be understood as a right to be healthy‟.547 It also qualifies the right‟s 
normative content by commenting that its interpretation  
takes into account both the individual's biological and socio-economic preconditions and a 
State's available resources. There are a number of aspects which cannot be addressed solely 
within the relationship between States and individuals; in particular, good health cannot be 
ensured by a State, nor can States provide protection against every possible cause of human ill 
health. Thus, genetic factors, individual susceptibility to ill health and the adoption of unhealthy 
or risky lifestyles may play an important role with respect to an individual's health. 
Consequently, the right to health must be understood as a right to the enjoyment of a variety of 
facilities, goods, services and conditions necessary for the realization of the highest attainable 
standard of health.
548
 
Apart from its conceptual awkwardness, O‟Neill has more reasons to be sceptical 
about the right. She considers, for example, that the proliferation of rights that followed 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is detrimental to the concept, because it 
trivialises people‟s understanding of rights and delays action due to the lack of objective 
meaning of many of these rights and the lack of identification of their correspondent 
obligation bearers. She argues that  
 (a) common problem with rights based approaches is that rights are usually identified using 
highly ambiguous substantival phrases such as “right to life” or “right to health”, “right to 
development” and “right to work”, “right to equal opportunity” and “right to access”, as well as 
latterly “right to know” and “right to not know”. Most of these phrases have multiple 
interpretations: they cannot be disambiguated without sorting out who has to do what for whom – 
in short by specifying which obligations correspond to various more specific interpretations of 
each supposed right. Taking rights as basic to ethics, including health ethics, does not get close 
enough to the action.
549
 
Thus, for O‟Neill the language of rights by focusing on the recipient does not 
properly address pressing moral issues, such as world hunger, because it does not 
specify who has the correlative obligation of fulfilling these rights.
550
 She argues that 
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morality is better construed in the language of duties,
551
 and making reference to Kant‟s 
categorical imperative she argues that moral agents act out of duty for its own sake. 
Other elements such as obligations, rights, claims, virtues, capacities, dispositions and 
conducts of agents, therefore, have only a conditional value and are themselves derived 
from duty.
552
 It follows from this perspective that rights have always correlative duties, 
but duties sometimes meet no correlative rights. As she explains, the advantage of this 
approach is that duties go beyond rights, amplifying thus the content of morality.
553
  
Using the example of world hunger O‟Neill argues that people do have a duty to 
help; however, as she states this duty is owed to no person in particular. The helper can 
determine who and how to help. Therefore, in the case of hunger, no one has a specific 
claim against anyone, and especially not against someone who is already helping 
someone else.
554
 If there is no claim, she argues, there is no right, and for this reason the 
language of obligations are more adequate to address important moral issues. When 
rights are promulgated without allocation of correlative obligations, and O‟Neill points 
out that many of them cannot do so, they cannot be claimed from others and therefore 
amount to „manifesto rights‟.555 The lack of allocation of responsibility for realising the 
right to health, adds therefore, for her scepticism towards the right. 
Pogge, disagrees with O‟Neill, arguing that in situations in which a right has to 
remain unfulfilled, for lack of conditions to help for example, it does not mean that there 
is no such right. It only means that there is a conditional content attached to that claim, 
meaning that the right can be fulfilled only under feasible conditions. For example, if 
every better-off person is already helping the hunger the most they can, and some people 
still remain hungry because the help is not enough due to genuine lack of conditions, the 
better-off will not be violating the remaining hungry people‟s rights. It does not mean in 
this case that there is no right to be free from hunger or that the right is a manifesto 
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right; rather it means that although having a morally legitimate and genuine right, these 
remaining hungry people have no claim against others.
556
 He argues therefore, that 
rights sometimes can be unspecified and conditional to feasible conditions and that both 
languages of rights and duties can be rightly employed to address important questions 
such as world hunger.
557
  
O‟Neill‟s approach relies heavily on individuals‟ self-allocation of duties. In a 
modern complex world in which it is increasingly difficult for individuals to identify to 
whom they owe obligations, however, her focus on obligations rather than rights may 
not necessarily be more effective. In addition, this approach does not eliminate 
motivational deficits, as there is no good reason to believe that focusing on moral duties 
and obligations instead of rights will be empirically more persuasive to the unwilling 
better off, who may just as well deny they bear such obligations. This problem of 
motivation is better addressed by Habermas, who argues that fulfilling rights cannot be 
safely left to moral rules. He conceives rights as legal categories, which associating their 
moral character with the facticity of law, and therefore, are better suited to address the 
question of motivation and fulfillment of rights.
558
  
As a result, this individual centered conception of bearers of obligations tends to 
be deficient in conceiving collective or institutional duties of rights fulfillment. For 
Pogge, the best presentation of morality conceives people not merely as individual 
moral agents but also as coexisting participants in social institutions and social 
practices.
559
 This is because in doing so the importance of human arrangements in the 
violation of rights is brought into view.
560
 Therefore, according to him, moral agents not 
only have duties towards others individually but also have the collective duty to work 
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for just social arrangements.
561
 The correlative right also exists – people have the right 
to live under just social arrangements, which allow them to fulfill their basic needs.
562
  
Thus, under Pogge‟s institutional model individuals not only have to refrain 
from causing direct harm to others but also have to refrain from supporting, participating 
or simply being indifferent about institutions that contribute, support or directly harm 
others. This approach brings an interesting light to liberal perspectives on human rights. 
First, it broadens the concept of harms and responsibilities – people have duties and 
carry the responsibility of not harming others not only by their own direct actions, but 
also by not indirectly supporting policies and institutions that harms others. This concept 
of harms and responsibilities addresses more adequately the impersonal mode of human 
rights violations which characterizes the current world order. Furthermore, Pogge‟s 
reinforces the connection between realisation of human rights and democracy by 
assigning a vital role to citizenry participation.
563
. He allocates a fundamental role to the 
citizenry in condemning negligent and unjust governments and policies and in refraining 
from participation in institutional arrangements that violate the rights of others. For 
Pogge, a committed citizenry is crucial in securing human rights. As he argues: 
(w)hat is needed to make the object of a right truly secure is a vigilant citizenry that is deeply 
committed to this right and disposed to work for its political realisation (...) and (if need be) 
replace or reorganize their government so as to safeguard secure access to these objects for all.
564
 
Pogge claims that an advantage of his focus on duties of non-participation in 
institutional orders that violate human rights is that his theory, in contrast with 
mainstream liberalism, does not categorise socio-economic rights as „manifesto rights‟. 
This is because he attempts at incorporating socio-economic rights within the domain of 
negative duties, and therefore, also at bringing socio-economic rights in line with 
liberalism. As he states, 
 (t)his institutional understanding narrows the philosophical gap because it does not sustain the 
thought that civil and political human rights require only restraint, while social and economic 
human rights also demand positive efforts and costs. Rather, it emphasizes negative duties across 
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the board. Human agents are not to collaborate in upholding a coercive institutional order that 
avoidably restricts the freedom of some so as to render their access to basic necessities insecure 
without compensating for their collaboration by protecting its victims or by working for its 
reform.
565
 
Yet, one of the problems with bringing socio-economic rights within the 
category of negative rights is that this categorization may not be adequate to address 
conditions of extreme deprivation and suffering, in which simply refraining from doing 
harm is not enough. Here Habermas‟s relationship of justice and solidarity grounds a 
more promising approach: 
Just as justice and solidarity are simply sides of the same coin, so too negative and positive 
duties spring from the same source. If rights and duties are to foster the integrity of individuals 
who are by their very nature socialized, then the constitutive social context of interaction is not 
something secondary for those whose lives and identity are made possible and sustained by it. 
Omissions are no less a potential threat to personal integrity than injuries actively inflicted.
566
  
For Habermas,
567
rights are relational categories, representing the normative 
standards of relationships between people. As the individualistic concept of rights gives 
way to a discursive understanding and mutual allocation of rights and responsibilities, 
negative rights do not enjoy privilege over positive rights.
568
 This relational character of 
rights is also supported by Martha Minow. In her words, 
Interpreting rights as features of relationships, contingent upon negotiation within a community 
committed to this mode of solving problems, pins law not on some force beyond human control 
but on human responsibility for the patterns of relationships promoted or hindered by this 
process. In this way, the notion of rights as tools in continuing communal discourse helps to 
locate responsibility in human beings for legal action and inaction.
569
 
The right to health, therefore, should also be interpreted in relational terms. It 
represents our normative commitments to support a structure of care that helps people in 
periods of illness, in which pain, physical discomfort, and loss of identity and autonomy 
may occur. These experiences of illness are also resistances that put to test people‟s 
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understanding of the world. A solidaristic system of health not only provides comfort 
and support for the ill, it also reaffirms the cooperative basis of society. The right to 
health thus represents this commitment to protect not only our autonomy but also the 
space in which relations of mutual recognition and solidarity can be fostered. The 
reciprocal relationship between health and justice, revealed through a discourse 
theoretical perspective provides good and more solid reasons for upholding the right to 
health as a legitimate human right.  
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Conclusion 
This thesis started by reflecting on the moral uneasiness of our times caused by the 
awareness both of the preventable large scale human suffering and deprivation in times 
of plenty and of the possibility that through our increasingly complex interconnections 
we may be contributing to these tragedies. That we are increasingly individualised and 
yet increasingly interconnected in ways that escape our full awareness and 
understanding poses an important moral question to the late modern individual. How 
can we regulate our lives together in a world of increasing complexity, pluralism, and 
functional interconnections? We cannot rely on any particular unified set of rules, and in 
addition, as moral agents it becomes increasingly difficult to identify all those to whom 
we owe moral accountability. As studies show that modern life itself affects people‟s 
health in a variety of ways, identifying precisely how much each one of us is responsible 
for that becomes an impossible exercise. Nevertheless, regardless of whether modern 
life arrangements are fair or unjust, or whether some people are naturally more 
vulnerable or directly harmed, the mere fact that social arrangements or life in society in 
itself contribute to these situations or aggravate them does pose a question of moral 
accountability. The weight of this question may well exceed the resources of 
conventional ethical horizons. How far can ethics of face-to-face encounters or old 
dichotomies between positive and negative duties take us? To what extent are they 
(unwillingly) condoning reality? Does not this paradox of increasing individualisation 
on the one hand and increasing interconnection and interdependence on the other 
demand that we reframe or at least expand our moral horizons? 
 The premise of this thesis is that Habermas‟s discourse theory offers the best 
alternative to address these questions. Because his account of individuation through 
socialisation, and indeed his intersubjective paradigm, do not construct the individual 
either in tension or absorbed by society, but rather interrelated with it, his theory is in a 
better position to analyse the moral challenges of the modern world. His intersubjective 
paradigm leads him, for example, to construct the relationship between justice and 
solidarity as one of partnership and interdependence. In contrast with liberal 
constructions of justice in which values of benevolence and charity are called as 
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backups to address the distortions that an individualist ethics generates, solidarity in 
Habermas is not simply a complement to justice, but its counterpart. It is grounded on 
the insight that individuals cannot be protected in their uniqueness without protection of 
the net of intersubjectivity that forms and protects their very identities. From this 
perspective, we find good reasons to be concerned with the fate of others and with 
protecting them even when their conditions are not caused by perceived injustices. 
Hence, we have good reasons to believe that caring for the health of others and that 
caring for the vulnerable and the ill matters for justice. This is because justice conceived 
discursively relies on a solid ethical orientation of solidarity with others. Further 
implications of this perspective on the relationship between justice and solidarity is that 
it makes no sense of categories of negative and positive duties, and it includes within the 
focus of our moral concerns „everything that wears a human face‟. 
 Habermas‟s post-conventional and procedural account of morality is not without 
its problems. As seen above, it has only a weak force for motivating action. The mere 
awareness of duties towards others do not secure that modern individuals will act upon 
it. This motivational deficit has to be compensated by an ethical orientation that supports 
and incorporates post-conventional premises, and this ethical orientation needs to be 
nurtured by the everyday practices of the lifeworld.Therefore, justice relies on the 
lifeworld as the source of much needed solidarity and orientation towards mutual 
recognition. To realise this radically inclusive conception of justice, one that 
understands that an individual‟s freedom cannot be bought by the oppression of others, 
is a project that places the possibility for emancipation in the communicative practices 
of everyday life. Furthermore, the responsibility for taking up this project is placed on 
our shoulders.  
 In thinking how our everyday practices can be set towards this project of 
emancipation, this thesis explored the role that health plays in this project. With the help 
of Habermas‟s discourse theory this thesis concluded that an uncolonised health system 
plays an important role in reproducing the lifeworld and in fostering the conditions for 
justice by providing a space for social criticism, by exposing the vulnerability and 
interdependence of our selves, by contributing to the process of socialisation by 
facilitating the reconstruction of less egocentric selves, by remind us of the cooperative 
181 
basis of society, and by nurturing solidarity. In doing so, the health system establishes a 
reciprocal relationship with justice. As justice is important for its maintenance, its 
maintenance is important for justice. This relationship, by its turn, gives us good reasons 
not only to support the system in the shifting roles we play in it, but also to resist its 
commodification and bureaucratisation.  
 Habermas‟s theory served well for the purpose of analysing the relationship of 
health, solidarity, and justice. The wide scope and complexity of his theory offers a 
range of tools that make possible an analysis of health in all its complexity. In this 
thesis, for example, his theory allowed an analysis of the debate on the definition of 
health, concluding that health has no definite definition, but a multitude of 
interpretations which can be equally legitimate, depending on the validity of reasons 
given in their support and on their appropriateness to the context. Therefore, the concept 
of health in a medical research environment may be different, yet equally legitimate to 
the interpretation of health in the context of a bioethical debate. In the context of 
analysing the relationship of health with justice and solidarity, an appropriate 
interpretation must take account of its normative dimension. For this thesis this 
normative dimension was captured by an intersubjective understanding of health. This 
intersubjective understanding led to the analysis of the experiences of health, illness, and 
healthcare from the perspective of the participants, which revealed the deeply moral and 
political character of health. These moral and political characters pointed to the 
relevance of health to justice. 
 Habermas‟s dual concept of society also allowed the development of a model of 
health system as a sub-system of the lifeworld that incorporates the different types of 
interactions, knowledge generation, and institutions associated with health. These 
different constitutive parts of the health system were associated with different structural 
components of the lifeworld, different moments of reason, different types of discourses, 
and different forms of contributions to society. The contributions towards social 
integration by nurturing solidarity and socialisation by facilitating the reconstruction of 
selves capable of joining relationships of mutual recognition and of taking responsibility 
for others permitted the link between health and justice. This dual concept of society 
also permitted the identification of the distortions in the health system as processes of 
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colonisation by the system media, and the analyses of the consequences of this 
colonisation both from a functional and normative point of view. If the health system is 
to maintain its emancipatory potentials and its reciprocal relationship with justice, it is 
concluded that these processes of colonisation need to be resisted. In sum, in its choice 
of methodology this thesis concludes that the discourse theoretical method is both a 
powerful instrument for social analysis and critique and an alternative approach that 
inspires the possibility that a new reality can be generated. 
 The debate on health and its relationship with justice is not new. It has been 
widely studied from a multitude of angles. Health has been linked with justice by being 
conceived as a capability, as a right, as instrumental to opportunities, as a virtue, as a 
basic need, and even as having no link with justice at all. Yet, there is a very limited 
literature interpreting the relationship between health and justice from a discourse 
theoretical perspective. Contributing to fill in this gap was one of the purposes that this 
thesis hopes to have accomplished. 
 This contribution is a work in progress, of course. The analysis here developed 
has a lot to benefit from an exchange of ideas with critics from different disciplines and 
theoretical orientations. It can also benefit by the insights gained by the application of its 
concepts to more specific debates such as: (a) the (different) implications of this 
interpretation of health and justice at the domestic and international level; an analysis 
that would also benefit from Habermas‟s reinterpretation of Kantian cosmopolitanism; 
(b) the implications of this perspective on bioethical debates, of which the 
commodification of the body and its parts would be specially illustrative of an attempt 
of systemic colonisation and the resistance that it finds from the lifeworld; (c) the 
application of the discourse theoretical model of health systems here developed to the 
analysis of different contributions of self-help groups in either supporting the solidaristic 
basis of health systems or in reinforcing bureaucratic clientelism and exclusivist 
policies; (d) the importance of increasing public participation in health systems; and (e) 
the implications of profit-based healthcare systems, considering that the analysis 
developed in thesis seems to imply that such form of organisation, especially in its 
corporate form, may be at odds with the values of an uncolonised health system.  
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Finally, this thesis concludes that preventing the moral tragedies that characterise 
modern society, requires, as Habermas defends, that we make good the emancipatory 
ideals of modernity. The success of this project depends on the protection of the 
integrity of the lifeworld against economic and administrative encroachment; it implies 
creating the conditions for a socialisation within the premises of a radically inclusive 
morality and the nurturing of solidarity and of relationships of mutual recognition. 
Protecting the lifeworld is our task and responsibility, and the health system can offer a 
much needed help if we succeed in rejecting the systemic encroachment of this deeply 
meaningful space. The right to health should also be seen under these premises, i.e. as a 
right that represents the commitment to protect not only our autonomy but also the space 
in which relations of mutual recognition and solidarity can be fostered and thus allowed 
to give their contribution to social integration and to the possibility of justice. It may be 
no easy task, but is one that we cannot afford to evade. 
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